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SUMMARY
Smartphones are rapidly becoming a widespread computation platform, with many
users relying on their mobile devices as their primary computing device. This popularity
has brought about a plethora of mobile applications and services which are designed to
efficiently make these limited devices a viable source of entertainment and productivity.
This is commonly accomplished by moving the critical application computation to a Cloud
or application server managed by the application developer. Unfortunately, the significant
number of breaches experienced by mobile application infrastructure and the accompanying
loss of private user data indicates the need for stronger security and privacy guarantees
before this model of computation can become ubiquitous.
The cryptographic community has developed the field of secure multiparty computation
(SMC) to allow applications to perform computation over encrypted data. Such a protocol
would allow mobile users to keep their private information encrypted while still enjoying
the convenience of their Cloud based applications. However, while SMC protocols have
seen significant advances in efficiency on desktop and server class machines, they currently
require more computation power and memory than is available on commodity smartphones.
Furthermore, even as smartphone computational power increases, the mobile-specific limi-
tations of network bandwidth and power usage will always stand as barriers to efficiently
executing SMC protocols.
This dissertation develops techniques for outsourcing the costly operations in garbled
circuit SMC protocols to an untrusted Cloud to allow resource-constrained devices to use
this cryptographic primitive. By providing the mobile device with a third party Cloud
provider, we show that it is possible for a mobile device to execute a garbled circuit with
an application server at approximately the same efficiency as the same computation run
between two server class machines. We first show two protocols for outsourcing the garbled
circuit evaluation and generation. We develop a novel outsourced oblivious transfer (OOT)
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protocol to make this type of outsourcing possible. Second, we develop a black box tech-
nique for outsourcing any two-party SMC protocol, and show that the overhead incurred
by outsourcing is minimal. Finally, we develop a protocol for outsourcing SMC that pro-
vides both input privacy and circuit privacy, preventing the assisting Cloud from learning
anything about the computation besides the fact that it took place. Through the protocols
and the empirical evaluations in this dissertation, we show that executing SMC protocols
on mobile devices can be done with comparable efficiency to the desktop platform, and





As modern computing trends move towards more mobile and cloud computing, data pri-
vacy is more important than ever before. With smartphones constituting over 57% of the
U.S. market share [44] and with over 1.4 billion in use worldwide [108], users are running
applications that routinely send private information to application servers. Location-based
services, social networks, and banking apps are a few examples of applications that process
private information. Outside of mobile computing, cloud storage and processing have be-
come convenient ways for individuals and corporations to outsource their computing needs
to services such as Amazon EC2 and Microsoft Azure. However, this convenience comes at
the cost of losing privacy to the corporation that is hosting these cloud services. A growing
record of cloud data breaches clearly demonstrates that these corporations are struggling
to maintain a requisite level of privacy for user data [154, 155, 144, 94]. Finally, as news
continues to break regarding government surveillance on digital communication, it is clear
that companies like Google and Facebook, who manage the services that millions use to
communicate online, cannot provide the necessary security to prevent government man-
dated data seizure. Given that it is highly likely that outsourcing computation will only
grow in popularity, the issue of maintaining data privacy while preserving the convenience
of cloud computing is a critical problem.
One possible solution to this problem is secure multiparty computation (SMC). First
demonstrated possible with the Yao garbled circuit in 1986 [160], SMC protocols allow two
or more mutually distrustful parties to compute a shared result while keeping their respec-
tive inputs hidden from the other participating parties. A number of different techniques
have been used to achieve these impressive security guarantees, including homomorphic
encryption [63], secret-sharing schemes [21], and Oblivious RAM [71]. In recent years, new
research has moved the Yao garbled circuit construction from a theoretical novelty to the
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most efficient technique for 2-party SMC [151, 109, 79]. However, while the techniques for
executing garbled circuit protocols have come a long way, there are still many efficiency
roadblocks that are preventing these techniques from being applied in practical applica-
tions. Specifically, the process of garbling, sending, and evaluating a boolean circuit of any
useful size still requires significant computational power, memory, and bandwidth [32]. In
addition, one of the primitives used to build these protocols, Oblivious Transfer (OT), is
a notably expensive operation because of the asymmetric cryptographic primitives it uses.
To achieve security against malicious adversaries, these costs are magnified through the use
of cut-and-choose techniques. Given these restrictions, it is impractical for cloud services
and nearly impossible for mobile applications to implement garbled circuit protocols.
The goal of this dissertation is to improve the efficiency of garbled circuit SMC protocols
enough to begin seeing practical implementation on the mobile platform. Rather than
constructing new primitives for garbled circuit protocols, we develop outsourcing techniques
that allow existing protocols to be executed more efficiently and that can be applied to new
garbled circuit protocols as they are developed. It is critical for these techniques to improve
efficiency with respect to not only computation time, but all system resources, including
memory and bandwidth usage. Additionally, it is critical that these improvements account
for real-world security requirements and assumptions to ensure that they can be directly
and simply implemented in practice. The first part of our work demonstrates how existing
techniques for evaluating garbled circuits can be ported to mobile devices with the help of an
outsourcing cloud. This allows mobile devices to participate in garbled circuit computation
at approximately the same efficiency as desktop-class machines, with minimal computation,
memory, and bandwidth cost. We then show that under specific adversarial assumptions, we
can increase the security of outsourcing SMC to prevent the Cloud from learning anything
about the circuit being evaluated, in addition to maintaining input and output privacy.
1.1 Thesis Statement
The goal of this work is to bring SMC into the realm of practical use on the mobile platform.
Given the rapid development of new SMC techniques, we believe the focus of research
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should be on applying the existing garbled circuit protocols in ways that meet the security
needs of real-world applications, and will continue to provide efficiency improvements as
the underlying garbled circuit protocols are improved and replaced. Given these goals and
building on our preliminary work, we present the following thesis statement:
Outsourcing costly cryptographic operations for SMC to untrusted Cloud infrastructure
can provide equivalent security to non-outsourced protocols and significantly improves mobile
protocol performance, allowing resource-constrained devices such as smartphones to run real-
world applications using these privacy-preserving primitives.
1.2 Contributions
Prior to this work, the performance of SMC protocols on the mobile platform had not
been characterized, and no efficient techniques for mobile SMC existed. This dissertation
provides three major contributions:
• Characterization of mobile SMC: We first show that existing SMC protocols are
too computationally expensive for the resource-constrained mobile platform. Further-
more, our work demonstrates that the high bandwidth costs of these protocols is likely
to make them inefficient for mobile devices well into the future.
• Develop SMC outsourcing techniques: Our work constructs a set of protocols
that can outsource the most costly operations associated with SMC securely from
a mobile device. We demonstrate that these protocols are secure against malicious
adversaries, and show how new SMC protocols can be outsourced in the same security
setting.
• Develop Private Function Evaluation for outsourcing: We examine specific
adversary constraints that can allow for SMC outsourcing without revealing the circuit
being evaluated to the Cloud. This construction allows for efficient and maximally
secure outsourcing in a variety of real-world application scenarios.
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1.3 Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the related literature; Chap-
ter 3 presents our protocol for outsourcing garbled circuit evaluation and a characterization
of garbled circuit evaluation on the mobile platform; Chapter 4 presents our protocol for
outsourcing garbled circuit generation; Chapter 5 presents our protocol for outsourcing any
two-party SMC protocol as a black box; Chapter 6 presents our set of protocols for out-
sourcing SMC with both function and input privacy; and Chapter 7 provides concluding




2.1 Secure Multiparty Computation
Since the first protocols were developed by Andrew Yao [159], research in secure multiparty
computation has developed into a broad and diverse field of research. Encompassing con-
structions such as oblivious transfer [143] and private information retrieval [42, 106], SMC
generally describes any technique for evaluating some functionality in a privacy-preserving
way. The security provided by these schemes is most commonly demonstrated using a
real/ideal world paradigm, which proves that in a real world execution of the SMC pro-
tocol, participants output a computationally indistinguishable set of values from an ideal
world where the function is evaluated by a trusted third party, who then distributes some
output to all participants [66]. While many variations on this paradigm are used to prove
the security of different constructions, this basic concept intuitively demonstrates that the
SMC protocol provides equivalent security to the best achievable solution of a fully trusted
third party. We provide the outsourced formulation of this security model in Chapter 3.
This work develops protocols for privacy-preserving computation of arbitrary functions.
The existing protocols to achieve such generic SMC constructions can be divided into three
categories of techniques: Secret-Sharing, Homomorphic Encryption, and Garbled Circuits.
2.1.1 Secret-Sharing
Secret-sharing SMC techniques encompass a variety of protocols that allow for private data
to be split into encrypted shares and divided between the participants. These shares are
then processed in a privacy-preserving interactive protocol and combined at the end to
recover the resulting output. These protocols commonly require some random data (e.g.,
multiplication triples) to be encrypted in a pre-processing phase, which is then combined
with the secret shares during the online computation to allow for non-linear operations
such as multiplication in the arithmetic setting or bitwise AND in the boolean setting. The
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GMW construction [67] developed one of the earliest secret-sharing techniques, which al-
lowed for computation over boolean circuits, and required an oblivious transfer protocol to
be executed for computing AND gates. While the extensive use of OT in this protocol has
commonly been seen as prohibitively costly in terms of communication complexity, recent
developments have shown that the GMW protocol can be quite efficient for evaluating low-
depth boolean circuits [129, 132, 149, 40, 6, 140, 107]. In addition, many arithmetic secret-
sharing protocols and optimizations have been developed using a wide range of underlying
secret sharing protocols [12, 7, 141, 52, 29, 65]. These optimizations have been augmented
with further research into constructing optimal arithmetic circuit representations for com-
mon functions [36, 37]. However, secret-sharing protocols are generally optimal for large
numbers of participants, and tend to be less practical in the two-party setting.
2.1.2 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption includes a range of encryption schemes that satisfy one or more
homomorphic operations over the ciphertext. Specifically, given an encryption scheme
(Gen(·), Enckey(·), Deckey(·)), an operation  over the plaintexts, and an operation ? over
the ciphertexts, it holds for any two messages m0,m1 that:
Deck(Enck(m0) ? Enck(m1)) = m0 m1
For example, an additive homomorphic scheme sets the operation  to addition, and allows
for the addition of plaintext messages while encrypted. Schemes that allow for one homo-
morphic operation have been known since the original RSA construction [146]. Termed
partially homomorphic encryption, these techniques have yielded several special-purpose
protocols for computing specific functions [135, 32, 28, 75, 122]. However, without sup-
porting a universal set of homomorphic operations, these schemes do not allow for generic
computation over encrypted data.
To evaluate arbitrary functions over encrypted data, the concept of a fully-homomorphic
encryption (FHE) scheme was proposed by Rivest et al. [145]. To satisfy the current defi-
nition for FHE, an encryption scheme must provide the following three properties. First, it
allows for a universal set of homomorphic operations, such as addition and multiplication.
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Second, it allows for evaluation of arbitrary-depth circuits. Finally, the ciphertext size is
not dependent on the size of the function that produced it. The first scheme to achieve
these properties was developed by Gentry [63, 62] by using the concept of a bootstrappable
encryption scheme. This concept is built on the use of somewhat homomorphic encryption
(SHE), which is an encryption scheme that allows for a universal set of homomorphic oper-
ations, but can only evaluate circuits of a limited depth. As long as the depth limit of the
SHE scheme is greater than the depth of the decryption circuit for that scheme, the cipher-
text can be decrypted homomorphically, producing a fresh ciphertext that can accept more
homomorphic operations. This process of homomorphic decryption is called bootstrapping.
Gentry instantiated his SHE scheme using a lattice construction, which has been a common
primitive across many more recent homomorphic encryption constructions [25, 45, 2, 23].
More recently, leveled-FHE schemes have been developed that eliminate the need for boot-
strapping [24, 64]. While these schemes can evaluate circuits of arbitrary depth, that depth
d must be specified when the key is chosen, after which the depth of the evaluated circuits
must be less than or equal to d. Beyond standard computation over encrypted data, FHE
has been used as an underlying primitive in other constructions, such as attribute-based en-
cryption [22] and functional encryption [60], as well as applications such as reusable garbled
circuits [69], verifiable computing [61], and homomorphic signatures [70]. While these cryp-
tosystems have developed significantly in only a few years of research, they are currently
too inefficient to be used practically, even on server-class machines.
To apply homomorphic encryption schemes for more practical SMC protocols, several
techniques for combining SHE with secret-sharing techniques have produced multiparty
protocols that are significantly more efficient than FHE [19, 47, 46, 50, 95]. By using SHE
during a preprocessing phase to produce a set of multiplication triples, these protocols allow
for a highly efficient online phase that is optimized for computation between a large number
of participants. Unfortunately, the costly preprocessing phase and the loss of efficiency in
the two-party case makes these protocol less practical for our mobile setting.
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2.1.3 Garbled Circuits
The garbled circuit SMC protocol that we apply in this dissertation was developed by
Andrew Yao [160], and provided the first protocol for evaluating arbitrary functions in a
privacy-preserving manner. Using only a symmetric encryption scheme and an oblivious
transfer protocol, Yao’s protocol allows functions represented as boolean circuits to be
obliviously evaluated in a constant number of communication rounds. The protocol requires
at least two participants. The first is the generator, who is responsible for obscuring the bit
values and gate functionality for the chosen function to be evaluated. The evaluator is then
given a set of garbled input values and the garbled circuit, and is responsible for obliviously
evaluating the circuit. The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. Garbling: For every wire in the circuit, the generator creates two random strings
w0i , w
1
i , which are the garbled wire labels for the bit values 0 and 1 on the i
th wire.
Next, he garbles each gate by encrypting the entries in a truth table that corresponds
to the gate’s functionality. For simplicity, we only consider two-input gates, but the
same operations can be used to garble a gate with any number of inputs or outputs.
For a gate executing the arbitrary boolean operation ? which takes input wires i and










where bi and bj are the logical bit values for wires i and j. After permuting the entries
in each garbled truth table, the generator sends all of the garbled gates and the input
wire values that correspond to his secret input to the evaluator.
2. Oblivious Transfer: For each of the evaluator’s secret input bits bi, the generator
and evaluator execute a 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer. This protocol allows the eval-
uator to receive the garbled wire label wbii without the generator learning the secret
value bi. Moreover, the evaluator learns nothing about the wire label w
1−bi
i .
3. Evaluation: Given the garbled input values for both parties and the garbled gates,
the evaluator can obliviously evaluate the circuit. For each gate, she possesses the
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correct wire labels to decrypt exactly one entry in the garbled truth table, which
allows her to decrypt subsequent entries in subsequent gates.
4. Output: Once the evaluator possesses wire labels for each of the output wires, she
can deliver these garbled wire values back to the generator, who can recover the output
using his original mappings between garbled wire labels and logical bit values. The
generator can then optionally deliver this output to the evaluator.
The privacy guarantee of Yao’s protocol is based on the fact that the generator never ob-
serves any of the intermediate wire labels used during evaluation, while the evaluator never
learns the mappings between garbled wire labels and logical wire values [114]. However, this
basic protocol only ensures security against semi-honest adversaries who are guaranteed not
to deviate from the prescribed protocol.
Beginning with Fairplay [119], several garbled circuit-based SMC implementations and
applications have been developed in the semi-honest adversarial model [105, 86, 82, 90,
110, 113, 118, 134, 16]. However, a malicious party using corrupted inputs or circuits can
learn private information about the other party’s inputs in these constructions [98]. To
resolve these issues, new protocols have been developed to achieve security in the malicious
model, using cut-and-choose constructions [119, 123, 112, 158, 150, 115, 109, 57, 79], input
commitments [150], and other various techniques [123, 124, 139, 99, 83, 85, 103]. To provide
the ability to exchange security for efficiency, the covert security model was developed to
provide security guarantees against an adversary who will only cheat if it is possible to do
so without discovery [9, 48, 72]. The latest garbled circuit protocols focus on amortizing
the cost of the cut-and-choose by batching several instances of the same computation [116,
84]. To improve the performance of these schemes in both the malicious and semi-honest
adversarial models, a number of optimization techniques have also been developed to reduce
the cost of generating and evaluating circuits [101, 41, 128, 109, 79, 104, 15].
As general SMC protocols for each of these underlying techniques become more efficient,
a new set of protocols has started to develop which switches between techniques based
upon which technique is optimal for the current function being evaluated [77, 54]. However,
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these schemes require a significant amount of manual inspection to ensure that the best
SMC technique is being used for each step of the function being evaluated. One early
effort towards automated protocol compilation was made by Kerschbaum et al. [97]. While
these combination techniqes allow for significant improvements in the performance of the
protocol, the lack of efficient automated techniques for compiling functions into a hybrid
SMC protocol makes these combination protocols difficult to use in practice.
2.2 Oblivious Transfer
A critical underlying protocol used in many SMC constructions is the oblivious transfer
(OT) protocol [143]. While generalized k-out-of-n oblivious transfer schemes exist, we focus
our attention on the basic 1-out-of-2 OT that is required to securely execute the garbled
circuit protocol. A 1-out-of-2 OT protocol takes place between two participants, the sender
and the chooser. The sender inputs two values w0, w1, while the chooser inputs a selection
bit b. At the end of the protocol, the sender receives nothing while the chooser receives
wb. The privacy guarantee that must be ensured by this primitive applies to both parties.
Specifically, the OT must guarantee that the sender learns nothing about the selection bit
b, while the chooser learns nothing about the value w1−b that she did not select.
Since the primitive was originally conceived, several OT schemes built on a wide range
of underlying assumptions have been developed [17, 130, 115, 59], including a round-optimal
construction using lattices by Peikert et al. [137]. However, the most significant OT devel-
opments to allow for improved garbled circuit protocols are OT extensions [13]. The Ishai
et al. OT extension [87] allows any base OT scheme to be extended to reduce kc oblivious
transfers to k oblivious transfers for any given constant c. This is done by exchanging
random seeds during the base OT, then using those seeds to add and remove some type of
encryption from the values provided by the sender later in the protocol. Using OT exten-
sions, delivering the garbled values corresponding to potentially large inputs became much
less costly in terms of cryptographic operations and network overhead. Several more recent
improvements to the Ishai et al. extension have further reduced the cost by as much as 2-3
times [100, 6]. In some settings, the online computation time of oblivious transfers can be
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further reduced by precomputing the OT [11]. Even with these drastic improvements in
efficiency, oblivious transfers still tend to be a costly step in evaluating garbled circuits.
2.3 Private Function Evaluation
To provide function privacy along with input privacy, a specialized set of SMC protocols have
been developed for private function evaluation (PFE). The first constructions to provide
both of these privacy guarantees used existing SMC constructions to evaluate a universal
circuit that accepts the desired function as an input parameter [157, 1, 102, 148]. Because
the specific function being evaluated is treated as an input to the universal circuit, the input
privacy of the SMC protocol protects both the inputs and the function. However, the use of a
universal circuit incurs significant overhead in the circuit size beyond the size of the function
being computed. To provide a more efficient solution, many specialized PFE protocols were
developed to provide function privacy for certain classes of functions [88, 27, 10, 136]. The
first general PFE protocol to provide linear asymptotic efficiency with respect to circuit size
was developed by Katz and Malka [93]. Using techniques reminiscent of the LEGO SMC
construction [133], they show how a generating party can generate a set of garbled gates
that are then assembled and evaluated by the party possessing the function to be computed.
In more recent work, Mohassel et al. [126] demonstrated how this idea can be generalized
for various underlying SMC primitives, and later extended this concept for secret sharing
protocols to be secure against active adversaries [125]. However, these protocols assume a
significant amount of computational power for all parties participating in the protocol.
2.4 Mobile Privacy
With smartphone applications retrieving private user data at an increasing rate, SMC could
potentially offer a way to maintain privacy and functionality in mobile computing. How-
ever, the efficiency challenges of SMC are compounded when considered in the resource-
constrained mobile environment. Previous work has shown that smartphones can evaluate
simple functions using garbled circuits in the semi-honest model [80]. However, to thor-
oughly examine the capability of smartphones for common mobile-specific applications, our
preliminary work developed a set of protocols using partially homomorphic encryption to
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perform privacy-preserving proximity tests and set intersection [32]. We then compared the
performance of several general purpose garbled circuit protocols to our custom protocols to
evaluate the optimal approach to privacy-preserving mobile computation.
Our evaluation demonstrated that even for these simple applications, as input sizes and
circuit complexity increased, the cost of garbled circuit protocols became prohibitively ex-
pensive in terms of memory consumption and computation time. Furthermore, we showed
that the high network costs of garbled circuit protocol could potentially pose practical con-
cerns due to mobile carrier-imposed bandwidth caps or rapid depletion of battery power.
While this early work seemed to indicate that custom protocols offered a viable choice
for privacy-preserving smartphone computation, our custom protocols highlighted the sig-
nificant computational load imposed by the complex mathematics used in most partially
homomorphic encryption schemes. And while the bandwidth required to execute our pro-
tocols was less than that of the garbled circuit constructions, the large ciphertexts of our
underlying public-key encryption schemes could be a significant burden on the mobile band-
width for more complex functions. Finally, the cost of designing a custom protocol for every
potential application poses a significant barrier that most application developers who are
not experts in the field cannot overcome.
In recent work, Demmler et al. [53] showed how to incorporate pre-computation on
hardware tokens to improve efficiency on mobile devices in the semi-honest setting. In
addition to the cost of evaluating SMC protocols, Mood et al. [128] and Kreuter et al. [104]
demonstrated that even with significant optimization, the task of compiling circuits on the
mobile device can also be quite costly.
The final obstacle for mobile SMC constructions is increasing security to a more realistic
adversary model. Our initial characterization, as well as all of the previous work examining
mobile SMC, has only considered protocols in the semi-honest adversarial setting. The
cut-and-choose constructions required to increase security to the covert or malicious model
multiply the amount of computational power and bandwidth required by a significant factor,
further reducing the ability of these resource-constrained devices to participate in privacy-
preserving computation. To get over these hurdles, this dissertation examines the potential
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for securely outsourcing the most costly operations.
2.5 Outsourced Computation
The idea of outsourcing computationally-expensive tasks to a more capable machine has
existed in computer science for many decades. Among the earliest examples of outsourced
computation is the mainframe architecture, which allowed computationally weak terminals
to connect to a powerful mainframe computer over a network [26]. Although the cost of
high-powered computing equipment was high, mainframes allowed users the convenience of
operating their own terminal while consolidating cost into a single, centralized server. The
next advances in distributed computing techniques allowed these single centralized main-
frames to be spread into distributed server clusters [38]. As personal computers developed
and became powerful enough to be used without mainframe support, the mainframe and
terminal architecture was relegated to supercomputing clusters and disappeared from every-
day use. However, new architectures for outsourced computation took advantage of these
powerful end user systems. Distributed architectures such as GRID computing [56] and
heterogeneous clusters [3] allowed for very large computation tasks to be outsourced across
a peer-to-peer network of end user systems. Some notable ongoing projects using this archi-
tecture are SETI at home [156, 4] and the Great Internet Mersenne Prime Search [121]. More
recently, the advent of mobile computing and the near-ubiquitous availability of high-speed
network connectivity have brought outsourcing similar to the mainframe architecture back
as cloud computing [142, 30]. Cloud computing has again made outsourcing cost-effective
for applications such as on-demand infrastructure [74] and distributing data-intensive pro-
cessing [55]. However, its use in providing complex application functionality to mobile
devices is most relevant to this work, as it demonstrates how a weak device with network
connectivity can execute a complete set of applications by sending expensive computation
to a remote server [43, 152, 153]. Unfortunately, the lack of privacy guarantees for this
type of outsourcing will prevent cloud-based applications from becoming ubiquitous unless
stronger security can be provided [5, 147].
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2.6 Server-Aided Cryptography
To further improve the speed of cryptographic protocols on devices with minimal compu-
tational resources, the idea of outsourcing cryptographic operations has been explored for
many years in the field of Server-assisted cryptography [120, 14]. Naor et al. [131] develop
an oblivious transfer technique that sends the chooser’s private selections to a third party,
termed a Proxy Oblivious Transfer. More recently, Green et al. [73] developed a technique
for outsourcing the costly decryption of attribute-based encryption schemes to the cloud
without revealing the contents of the ciphertext. Atallah and Frikken [8] developed a set
of special-purpose protocols for securely outsourcing Linear Algebra computations to a sin-
gle cloud server. Homomorphic encryption has been used to allow secure outsourcing in
data mining applications [96] as well as solving common graph problems [20]. For more
generic computation, López-alt et al. developed a theoretical construction for outsourcing
multiparty computation using FHE [117]. While all of these applications provide significant
performance gains for specific cryptographic applications, none of them provide an efficient
solutions for outsourcing general secure computation.
In concurrent work to our own, Kamara et al. [91, 92] developed two protocols for
securely outsourcing the computation of arbitrary functions to the cloud. This work es-
tablished the definitions of security for future outsourced SMC, demonstrated a theoretical
construction for black box outsourcing, and presented the first implemented outsourced
SMC protocols. However, their work was intended to demonstrate the feasibility of out-
sourcing in general, and to provide protocols with a complexity less than that of a two-party
SMC protocol. Our work attempts to provide both stronger security guarantees and min-
imized computation at the mobile device. In addition to this work, Jakobsen et al. [89]
developed a theoretically efficient black box outsourcing technique with a novel multiplica-
tive MAC construction. However, their construction requires the underlying SMC protocol
to allow for efficient reactive computation, which does not include a large set of the most
efficient SMC protocols in existence. Furthermore, their work provides only a protocol
and complexity analysis, and does not provide an implementation or any insight into the
practical performance of their scheme.
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CHAPTER III
OUTSOURCING GARBLED CIRCUIT EVALUATION
3.1 Introduction
SMC protocols promise to make cloud computing a practically useful model for computation,
even when strict data privacy is required. However, applying standard SMC constructions to
the mobile platform is a non-trivial challenge. First, these protocols universally require that
both parties possess symmetric computational power, and that both parties perform work
that is linear with respect to the size of the function being evaluated. Second, the mobile
platform presents unique constraints beyond lower computational power and memory. Many
mobile carriers limit the amount of bandwidth available to devices, and limited battery life
requires that the solution be power efficient as well as computationally efficient.
A potential solution to this problem is to outsource the most costly operations in the
SMC protocol to a more capable server. However, this technique introduces several technical
challenges. Outsourcing introduces a new party, the Cloud provider, into the computation.
This third party may or may not be trusted to handle private inputs. An ideal outsourcing
solution would provide security against both the participating parties and the outsourcing
Cloud. In addition to these security requirements, it should significantly reduce the compu-
tational burden on the resource-constrained mobile device without significantly increasing
the computational burden on the servers involved.
In this chapter, we develop some of the first mechanisms for the secure outsourcing of
garbled circuit SMC from constrained devices to more capable infrastructure. This protocol
maintains the privacy of both the mobile user’s and the application server’s inputs and
outputs while significantly reducing the computation and network overhead required by the
mobile device for garbled circuit evaluation. We develop a number of extensions to allow
the mobile device to check for malicious behavior from the circuit generator or the cloud
and a novel Outsourced Oblivious Transfer (OOT) for sending garbled input data to the
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cloud. We then implement the new protocol on a commodity mobile device and reasonably
provisioned servers and demonstrate significant performance improvements over evaluating
garbled circuits directly on the mobile device.
This protocol and the accompanying evaluation make the following contributions:
• Outsourced oblivious transfer & outsourced consistency checks: Instead of
blindly trusting the Cloud with sensitive inputs, we develop a highly efficient Out-
sourced Oblivious Transfer primitive that allows mobile devices to securely delegate
the majority of computation associated with oblivious transfers. We also provide
mechanisms to outsource consistency checks to prevent a malicious circuit generator
from providing corrupt garbled values. These checks are designed in such a way that
the computational load is almost exclusively on the cloud, but cannot be forged by a
malicious or “lazy” cloud. We demonstrate that both of our additions are secure in
the malicious model as defined by Kamara et al. [92].
• Performance Analysis: Extending upon the implementation by Kreuter et al. [103],
we conduct an extensive performance analysis against a number of simple applications
(e.g., edit distance) and cryptographic benchmarks (e.g., AES-128). Our results show
that outsourcing SMC provides improvements to both execution time and bandwidth
overhead. For the edit distance problem of size 128, we reduce execution time by
98.92% and bandwidth by 99.95% compared to direct execution without outsourcing
on the mobile device.
• Privacy Preserving Navigation App: To demonstrate the practical need for our
techniques, we design and implement an outsourced version of Dijkstra’s shortest
path algorithm as part of a Navigation mobile app. Our app provides directions for a
Presidential motorcade without exposing its location, destination, or known hazards
that should be avoided (but remain secret should the mobile device be compromised).
The optimized circuits generated for this app are among the largest circuits evaluated
to date. Without our outsourcing techniques, such an application is far too processor,
memory and bandwidth intensive for any mobile phone.
16
This work was originally published at the USENIX Security Symposium [34].
3.2 Assumptions and Definitions
To construct a secure scheme for outsourcing garbled circuit evaluation, some new assump-
tions must be considered in addition to the standard security measures taken in a two-party
secure computation. In this section, we discuss the intuition and practicality of assuming
a non-colluding cloud, and we outline our extensions on standard techniques for preventing
malicious behavior when evaluating garbled circuits. Finally, we conclude the section with
formal definitions of security.
3.2.1 Non-collusion with the cloud
Throughout our protocol, we assume that none of the parties involved will ever collude
with the cloud. This requirement is based in theoretical bounds on the efficiency of garbled
circuit evaluation and represents a realistic adversarial model. The fact that theoretical
limitations exist when considering collusion in secure multiparty computation has been
known and studied for many years [39, 18, 111], and other schemes considering secure
computation with multiple parties require similar restrictions on who and how many parties
may collude while preserving security [31, 49, 51, 92, 91]. Kamara et al. [92] observe that if
an outsourcing protocol is secure when both the party generating the circuit and the cloud
evaluating the circuit are malicious and colluding, this implies a secure two-party scheme
where one party has sub-linear work with respect to the size of the circuit, which is currently
only possible with fully homomorphic encryption. However, making the assumption that the
cloud will not collude with the participating parties makes outsourcing securely a possibility
in practice. In reality, many cloud providers such as Amazon or Microsoft would not allow
outside parties to control or affect computation within their cloud system for reasons of
trust and to preserve a professional reputation. In spite of this assumption, we cannot
assume the cloud will always be semi-honest. For example, our protocol requires a number
of consistency checks to be performed by the cloud that ensure the participants are not
behaving maliciously. Without mechanisms to force the cloud to make these checks, a “lazy”
cloud provider could save resources by simply returning that all checks verified without
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actually performing them. Thus, our adversarial model encompasses a non-colluding but
potentially malicious cloud provider that is hosting the outsourced computation.
Kamara et al. [91] define this property formally as a non-cooperative adversary.
Definition 1. An adversary Ai is non-cooperative with respect to adversary Aj if the mes-
sages Ai sends to Aj reveal no information about Ai’s private values to Aj beyond what can
be inferred from Aj’s output fj(x).
This property ensures that the view of two adversaries is not shared in any way, even if
both parties are corrupted. As demonstrated by Kamara et al. [91], this allows us to prove
security using a set of partial outputs for each non-cooperative adversary (we define partial
outputs later in this section). In practice, this allows us to guarantee security when all of
the parties in the protocol are at least semi-honest (that is, they are not honest and may
collude with one another unless defined as non-cooperative).
3.2.2 Attacks in the malicious setting
When running garbled circuit based secure multiparty computation in the malicious model,
a number of well-documented attacks exist. We address here how our system counters each.
• Malicious circuit generation: In the original Yao garbled circuit construction,
a malicious generator can garble a circuit to evaluate a function f ′ that is not the
function f agreed upon by both parties and could compromise the security of the
evaluator’s input. To counter this, we employ an extension of the cut-and-choose
technique using random seeds developed by Goyal et al. [72] and implemented by
Kreuter et al. [103]. Essentially, the technique uses a cut-and-choose, where the
generator commits to a set of circuits that all presumably compute the same function.
The parties then use a fair coin toss to select some of the circuits to be evaluated and
some that will be re-generated and hashed by the cloud given the random seeds used to
generate them initially. The evaluating party then inspects the circuit commitments
and compares them to the hash of the regenerated circuits to verify that all the check
circuits were generated properly. Recent developments have produced significantly
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improved techniques for cut-and-choose in garbled circuit protocols [109, 79]. Because
the technique developed by Lindell [109] maintains separate roles of circuit generator
and evaluator, we believe that it is possible to incorporate this optimization into our
outsourcing protocol, and leave this improvement to future work.
• Selective failure attack: If, when the generator is sending the evaluator’s garbled
inputs during the oblivious transfer, he lets the evaluator choose between a valid
garbled input bit and a corrupted garbled input, the evaluator’s ability to complete
the circuit evaluation will reveal to the generator which input bit was used. To prevent
this attack, we use the input encoding technique from Lindell and Pinkas [112], which
lets the evaluator encode her input in such a way that a selective failure of the circuit
reveals nothing about the actual input value. To prevent the generator from swapping
garbled wire values, we use a commitment technique employed by Kreuter et al. [103].
• Input consistency: Since multiple circuits are evaluated to ensure that a majority of
circuits are correct, it is possible for either party to input different inputs to different
evaluation circuits, which could reveal information about the other party’s inputs.
To keep the evaluator’s inputs consistent, we again use the technique from Lindell
and Pinkas [112], which sends all garbled inputs for every evaluation circuit in one
oblivious transfer execution. To keep the generator’s inputs consistent, we use the
malleable claw-free collection construction of shelat and Shen [150]. This technique is
described in further detail in Section 3.2.3.
• Output consistency: When evaluating a two-output function, we ensure that out-
puts of both parties are kept private from the cloud using an extension of the tech-
nique developed by Kiraz and Schoenmakers [98]. The outputs of both parties are
XORed with random strings within the garbled circuit, and the cloud uses a witness-
indistinguishable zero-knowledge proof as in the implementation by Kreuter et al. [103].
This allows the cloud to choose a majority output value without learning either party’s
output or undetectably tampering with the output. At the same time, the witness-
indistinguishable proofs prevent the evaluator and the generator from learning the
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index of the majority circuit. This prevents the generator from learning anything by
knowing which circuit evaluated to the majority output value.
3.2.3 Malleable claw-free collections
To prevent the generating party from providing different inputs for each evaluation cir-
cuit, we implement the malleable claw-free collections technique developed by shelat and
Shen [150]. Their construction essentially allows the generating party to prove that all of
the garbled input values were generated by exactly one function in a function pair, while
the ability to find an element that is generated by both functions implies that the generator
can find a claw.
Goldreich and Kahan define a claw-free collection as a three-tuple of algorithms [68].
The index sampling algorithm, G, takes a security parameter 1n as input, and specifies
an index I. This index specifies a pair of domains D0I ,D1I and a pair of functions f0I , f1I .
The domain sampling algorithm D is given an index I and a bit σ as input and outputs
a random element from the domain DσI . Finally, given input I, σ, x ∈ DσI , the evaluation
function F outputs the value of the function fσI for input x. Given these definitions, they
define the conditions of a claw free collection as follows.
Definition 2. Claw-free Collections [150, 68]: A three-tuple of algorithms (G,D,F ) is a
claw-free collection if the following conditions hold.
1. Easy to evaluate: Both the index selecting algorithm G and the domain sampling
algorithm D are probabilistic polynomial-time, while the evaluating algorithm F is
deterministic polynomial-time.
2. Identical range distribution: Let f bI (x) be the output of F given input (b, I, x).
For any I ∈ range(G), the random variables are identically distributed.
3. Hard to form claws: For every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time algo-
rithm A, every polynomial p(·), and every sufficiently large n, it is true that Pr[I ←




Given this definition, shelat and Shen build their scheme on a modified construction
which adds in a malleability property, and focuses on a special case where D0I = D1I and
this domain forms a group. This allows the consistency of the inputs to be checked with a
witness-indistinguishable proof.
Definition 3. Malleable Claw-Free Collection [150]: A four-tuple of algorithms (G,D,F,R)
is a malleable claw-free collection if the following conditions hold:
1. A subset of claw-fee collections: (G,D,F ) is a claw-free collection, and the range
of D and F form groups, denoted by (G1, ?) and (G2, ) respectively.
2. Uniform domain sampling: For any I in the range of G, random variable D(0, I)
and D(1, I) are uniform over G1, and denoted by D(I) for simplicity.
3. Malleability: R : G1 → G2 runs in polynomial time, and for b ∈ {0, 1}, any I in the
range of G, and any m1,m2 ∈ G1, f bI (m1 ? m2) = f bI (m1) RI(m2).
Our implementation of a malleable claw-free collection uses the same construction as
Kreuter et al. [103], built on the discrete logarithm assumption.
3.2.4 Model and Definitions
The work of Kamara et al. [92] presents a definition of security based on the ideal-model/real-
model security definitions common in secure multiparty computation. Because their defini-
tion formalizes the idea of a non-colluding cloud, we apply their definitions to our protocol
for the two-party case in particular. We summarize their definitions below.
Real-model execution. The protocol takes place between two parties (P1, P2) executing
the protocol and a server P3, where each of the executing parties (P1, P2) are provided
input xi, auxiliary input zi, and random coins ri for i = 1, 2. The server P3 is provided
only auxiliary input z3 and random coins r3. In the execution, there exists some subset of
independent parties (A1, · · · , Am),m ≤ 3 that are malicious adversaries (we preserve this
definition from Kamara et al. [92] but prove security when m = 1. This provides equivalent
security to the Salus framework with two participants and the Cloud). Each adversary
corrupts one executing party and does not share information with other adversaries. For
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all honest parties, let OUTi be its output, and for corrupted parties let OUTi be its view
of the protocol execution. The ith partial output of a real execution is defined as:
REAL(i)(k, x; r) = {OUTj : j ∈ H} ∪OUTi
where H is the set of honest parties, k is a computational security parameter, x is the set
of all player inputs xi and zi for i = 1, 2, 3, and r is all random coins of all players.
Ideal-model execution. In the ideal model, the setup of participants is the same except
that all parties are interacting with a trusted party that evaluates the function. All parties
are provided inputs xi, auxiliary input zi, and random coins ri. If a party is semi-honest,
it provides its actual inputs to the trusted party, while if the party is malicious and non-
colluding, it provides arbitrary input values. In the case of the server P3, this means simply
providing its auxiliary input and random coins, as no input is provided to the function being
evaluated. Once the function is evaluated by the trusted third party, it returns the result
to the parties P1 and P2, while the server P3 does not receive the output. If a party aborts
early or sends no input, the trusted party immediately aborts. For all honest parties, let
OUTi be the output given to Pi by the trusted party, and for corrupted parties let OUTi
be some value output by Pi. The ith partial output of an ideal execution in the presence
of some set of independent simulators is defined as:
IDEAL(i)(k, x; r) = {OUTj : j ∈ H} ∪OUTi
where H is the set of honest parties, k is a computational security parameter, x is the set
of all player inputs xi and zi for i = 1, 2, 3, and r is all random coins of all players. In this
model, the formal definition of security is as follows:
Definition 4. A protocol securely computes a function f if there exists a set of proba-
bilistic polynomial-time (PPT) simulators {Simi}i=1,2,3 such that for all PPT adversaries
(A1, · · · , A3), x, and for all i = 1, 2, 3:
{REAL(i)(k, x; r)}k∈N
c
≈ {IDEAL(i)(k, x; r)}k∈N













Figure 1: The complete evaluation outsourcing protocol.
Finally, we include the following lemma from Kamara et al. [91] which is used to prove
the security of our protocols.
Lemma 1. If a multi-party protocol between n parties (P1, ..., Pn) securely computes f in the
presence of (1) independent and semi-honest adversaries and (2) a malicious Ai and honest
{Aj}j 6=i; then it is also secure in the presence of an adversary Ai that is non-cooperative
with respect to all other semi-honest adversaries.
3.3 Protocol
3.3.1 Participants
Our protocols reference three different entities:
Mobile: The evaluating party, called Mobile, is assumed to be a mobile device that is
participating in a secure two-party computation.
Application: The party generating the garbled circuit, called Application, is an application-
or web- server that is the second party participating with Mobile in the secure computation.
Cloud: The proxy, called Cloud, is a third party that is performing heavy computation
on behalf of Mobile, but is not trusted to know her input or the function output.
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3.3.2 Protocol Phase Summary
Our protocol can be divided into five phases, illustrated in Figure 14. Given a circuit
generator Application, and an evaluating mobile device Mobile, the protocol can be
summarized as follows:
• Phase 1: Application generates a number of garbled circuits, some of which will
be checked, others will be evaluated. After Application commits to the circuits,
Mobile and Application use a fair coin toss protocol to select which circuits will be
checked or evaluated. For the check circuits, Application sends the random seeds
used to generate the circuits to Cloud and the hashes of each circuit to Mobile.
These are checked to ensure that Application has not constructed a circuit that is
corrupted or deviates from the agreed-upon function.
• Phase 2: Mobile sends her inputs to Application via an outsourced oblivious trans-
fer. Application then sends the corresponding garbled inputs to Cloud. This al-
lows Cloud to receive Mobile’s garbled inputs without Application or Cloud
ever learning her true inputs.
• Phase 3: Application sends his garbled inputs to Cloud, which verifies that they
are consistent for each evaluation circuit. This prevents Application from providing
different inputs to different evaluation circuits.
• Phase 4: Cloud evaluates the circuit given Mobile and Application’s garbled
inputs. Since Cloud only sees garbled values during the evaluation of the circuit,
it never learns anything about either party’s input or output. Since both output
values are blinded with one-time pads, they remain private even when Cloud takes
a majority vote.
• Phase 5: Cloud sends the encrypted output values to Mobile and Application,




Common inputs: a function f(x, y) that is to be securely computed; a malleable claw-
free collection (GCLW , DCLW , FCLW , RCLW ); a one-way, collision-resistant hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k; a primitive 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol; two commitment
schemes: a perfectly binding commitment scheme comB(key,message) and the output com-
mitment scheme comO(key,message) by Kiraz and Schoenmakers [98]; and the following
security parameters: a statistical security parameter for the number of circuits built λ, a
computational security parameter k, and the number of encoding bits ` for each of Mobile’s
input wires.
Private inputs: The generating party Application provides his input to the function a
and a random string of bits ar that is the length of the output string. The evaluating party
Mobile provides her input to the function m and a random string of bits mr that is the
length of the output string. Assume without loss of generality that all input and output
strings are of length n.
Output: The protocol outputs separate private values fm for Mobile and fa for Appli-
cation.
Phase 1: Circuit generation and checking
1. Circuit preparation: Before beginning the protocol, both parties agree upon a circuit
representation of the function f(m, a), where the outputs of the function may be
defined separately for Mobile and Application as fM (m, a) and fA(m, a). The
circuit must also meet the following requirements:
(a) Additional XOR gates must be added such that Application’s output is set to
fa = fA(m, a)⊕ ar and Mobile’s output is set to fm = fM (m, a)⊕mr.
(b) For each of Mobile’s input bits, the input wire wi is split into ` different input
wires wj,i such that wi = w1,i ⊕ w2,i ⊕ · · · ⊕ w`,i following the input encoding
scheme by Lindell and Pinkas [112]. This prevents Application from correlating
a selective failure attack with any of Mobile’s input bit values.
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2. Circuit garbling: Application first selects and malleable claw-free collection as in-
dex I = G(1k) and sends I to Mobile. Application then takes the circuit C
and creates λ independent garbled versions of C, called GC1 · · ·GCλ, using random
coins rc1 · · · rcλ and the garbling technique implemented by Kreuter et al. [103]. For
Application’s jth input wire on the ith circuit, Application associates the value
H(βb,j,i) with the input value b, where βb,j,i = FCLW (b, I, αb,j,i). For Mobile’s j
th
input wire, Application associates the value H(δb,j,i) with the input value b, where
δb,j,i = FCLW (b, I, γb,j,i). All the values αb,j,i and γb,j,i for b = {0, 1}, j = 1 · · ·n, i =
1 · · ·λ are selected randomly from the domain of the claw-free pair using D.
3. Circuit commitment: Application generates commitments for all circuits by hash-
ing H(GCi) = HCi for i = 1 · · ·λ. Application sends these hashes to Mobile. In
addition, for every output wire wb,j,i for b = {0, 1}, j = 1 · · ·n and i = 1 · · ·λ, Ap-
plication generates commitments COj,i = comB(ckj,i, (H(w0,j,i), H(w1,j,i))) using
commitment keys ckj,i for j = 1 · · ·n and i = 1 · · ·λ and sends them to both Mobile
and the Cloud.
4. Input label commitment: Application commits to Mobile’s garbled input wires
as follows: for each generated circuit i = 1 · · ·λ and each of Mobile’s input wires
j = 1 · · · ` · n, Application creates a pair of commitment keys mk0,j,i,mk1,j,i and
commits to the input wire label seeds δ0,j,i and δ1,j,i as CMb,j,i = comB(mkb,j,i, δb,j,i).
For each of Mobile’s input wires j = 1 · · · ` ·n, Application randomly permutes the
commitments within the pair CM0,j,i, CM1,j,i across every i = 1 · · ·λ. This prevents
Cloud from correlating the location of the commitment with Mobile’s input value
during the OOT phase.
In the same fashion, Application commits to his own input wires: for each circuit
i = 1 · · ·λ and each of his input wires j = 1 · · ·n, Application creates commitment
keys ak0,j,i, ak1,j,i and commits to the input wire label seeds β0,j,i and β1,j,i as CAb,j,i =
comB(akb,j,i, βb,j,i), permuting each pair CA0,j,i, CA1,j,i as above.
5. Cut and choose: Mobile and Application then run a fair coin toss protocol to agree
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on a set of circuits that will be evaluated, while the remaining circuits will be checked.
The coin toss generates a set of indices Chk ⊂ {1, · · · , λ} such that |Chk| = 35λ, as in
shelat and Shen’s cut-and-choose protocol [150]. The remaining indices are placed in
the set Evl for evaluation, where |Evl| = e = 25λ. For every i ∈ Chk, Application
sends rci and the values [αb,1,i, · · · , αb,n,i] and [γb,1,i, · · · , γb,`·n,i] for b = {0, 1} to the
Cloud. Application also sends all commitment keys ckj,i for j = 1 · · ·n and i ∈ Chk
to Cloud. Finally, Application sends the commitment keys mkb,j,i and akb,j,i for
b = {0, 1}, i ∈ Chk, and j = 1 · · · ` ·n to Cloud. Cloud then garbles C using rci for
i ∈ Chk, producing the set of garbled circuits GC ′i for i ∈ Chk. For each i ∈ Chk,
Cloud then hashes each check circuit H(GC ′i) = HC
′
i and checks that:
• each commitment COj,i for j = 1 · · ·n is well formed
• the value H(βb,j,i) is associated with the input value b for Application’s jth
input wire
• the value H(δb,j,i) is associated with the input value b for Mobile’s jth input
wire
• for every bit value b and input wire j, the values committed in CMb,j,i and CAb,j,i
are correct
If any of these checks fail, Cloud immediately aborts. Otherwise, it sends the hash
values HC ′i for i ∈ Chk to Mobile. For every i ∈ Chk, Mobile checks if HCi = HC ′i
to ensure that the circuits were generated correctly. If any of the hash comparisons
fail, Mobile aborts.
Phase 2: Outsourced Oblivious Transfer (OOT)
1. Input encoding: For every bit j = 1 · · ·n in her input m, Mobile sets encoded input
emj as a random string of length ` such that em1,j ⊕ em2,j ⊕ · · · ⊕ em`,j = mj for
each bit in m. This new encoded input string em is of length ` · n.
2. OT setup: Mobile initializes an ` ·n×k matrix T with uniformly random bit values,
while Application initializes a random bit vector s of length k. See Figure 2 for a
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Inputs: Mobile has a string of encoded input bits em of length ` · n and Application
has pairs of input values (x0,j , x1,j) for j = 1 · · · ` · n.
1. Setup: Mobile generates random matrix T of size ` ·n× k, Application generates
random string s of length k.
2. Primitive OT: Mobile and Application execute k 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfers
with Mobile inputting (T i, T i⊕em) and Application inputting selection bits s (T i
denotes the ith column of the T matrix). Application sets the resulting columns as
matrix Q.
3. Permuting the output: Mobile generates random string p of length ` ·n and sends
it to Application.
4. Encrypting the output: Application sets the encrypted output pairs y0,j , y1,j
where yb,j = xb,j ⊕ H1(j,Qj ⊕ (b · s)) (Qj denotes the jth row of the matrix Q and
(b · s) denotes component-wise multiplication by b).
5. Permuting the outputs: Application permutes the encrypted output pairs using
p as y0⊕pj ,j , y1⊕pj ,j and sends the resulting set of pairs Y to Cloud.
6. Decrypting the output: Mobile sends h = em ⊕ p and T to Cloud. Cloud
recovers xemj ,j = yhj ,j ⊕H1(j, Tj) for j = 1 · · · ` · n (Tj denotes the jth row of the T
matrix).
Figure 2: The Outsourced Oblivious Transfer protocol
more concise view.
3. Primitive OT operations: With Mobile as the sender and Application as the
chooser, the parties initiate k 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfers. Mobile’s input to the ith
instance of the OT is the pair (T i, T i⊕ea) where T i is the ith column of T , while Ap-
plication’s input is the ith selection bit from the vector s. Application organizes
the k selected columns as a new matrix Q.
4. Permuting the selections: Mobile generates a random bit string p of length ` · n,
which she sends to Application.
5. Encrypting the commitment keys: Application generates a matrix of keys that will
open the committed garbled input values and proofs of consistency as follows: for
28
Mobile’s jth input bit, Application creates a pair (x0,j , x1,j), where
xb,j =[mkb,j,Evl1 ,mkb,j,Evl2 , · · · ,mkb,j,Evle ]||[γbj ,j,Evl2 ? (γbj ,j,Evl1)
−1,
γbj ,j,Evl3 ? (γbj ,j,Evl1)
−1, · · · , γbj ,j,Evle ? (γbj ,j,Evl1)
−1]
and Evli denotes the i
th index in the set of evaluation circuits. For j = 1 · · · ` · n,
Application prepares (y0,j , y1,j) where yb,j = xb,j ⊕ H(j,Qj ⊕ (b · s)). Here, Qj
denotes the jth row in the Q matrix and (b ·s) denotes component-wise multiplication
by the bit b. Application permutes the entries using Mobile’s permutation vector
as (y0⊕pj ,j , y1⊕pj ,j). Application sends this permuted set of ciphertexts Y to Cloud.
6. Receiving Mobile’s garbled inputs: Mobile blinds her input as h = em⊕p and sends
h and T to Cloud. Cloud recovers the commitment keys and consistency proofs
xb,j = yhj ,j ⊕H(j, Tj) for j = 1 · · · ` · n. Here, hj denotes the jth bit of the string h
and Tj denotes the j
th row in the T matrix. Since for every j ∈ Evl, Cloud only has
the commitment key for the b garbled value (not the b⊕ 1 garbled value), Cloud can
correctly decommit only the garbled labels corresponding to Mobile’s input bits.
7. Verifying consistency across Mobile’s inputs: Given the decommitted values
[δb,1,i, · · · , δb,`·n,i] and the modified pre images [γbj ,j,Evl2 ? (γbj ,j,Evl1)−1, γbj ,j,Evl3 ?
(γbj ,j,Evl1)
−1, · · · , γbj ,j,Evle ? (γbj ,j,Evl1)−1], Cloud checks that:
δbj ,j,i = δbj ,j,Evl1 RCLW (I, γbj ,j,i ? (γbj ,j,Evl1)
−1)
for i = 2 · · · e. If any of these checks fails, Cloud aborts the protocol. Otherwise,
Cloud now has garbled versions of Mobile’s inputs gmi for i ∈ Evl.
Phase 3: Generator input consistency check
1. Delivering inputs: Application decommits the hash seeds for each of his garbled
input values by sending akai,j,i to Cloud for j = 1 · · ·n and i ∈ Evl. Cloud recovers
the hash seeds [βa1,1,i, βa2,2,i, · · · , βan,n,i] for every evaluation circuit i ∈ Evl and
forwards a copy of these values to Mobile. Application then proves the consistency
of his inputs by sending the modified preimages [αaj ,j,Evl2 ? (αaj ,j,Evl1)
−1, αaj ,j,Evl3 ?
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(αaj ,j,Evl1)
−1, · · · , αaj ,j,Evle ? (αaj ,j,Evl1)−1] such that FCLW (ai, I, αai,j,i) = βai,j,i for
j = 1 · · ·n and i ∈ Evl such that GCi was generated with the claw-free function pair
indexed at I.
2. Check consistency: Mobile then checks that all the hash seeds were generated by the
same function by checking if:
βaj ,j,i = βaj ,j,Evl1 RCLW (I, αaj ,j,i ? (αaj ,j,Evl1)
−1)
for i = 2 · · · e. If any of these checks fails, Mobile aborts the protocol. Otherwise,
Cloud now has garbled versions of Application’s inputs gai for i ∈ Evl.
Phase 4: Circuit evaluation
1. Evaluating the circuit: For each evaluation circuit, Cloud evaluates GCi(gmi, gai)
for i ∈ Evl in the pipelined manner described by Kreuter et al. [103]. Each circuit
produces two garbled output strings, (gfmi, gfai).
2. Checking the evaluation circuits: Once these output have been computed, Cloud
hashes each evaluation circuit as H(GCi) = HC
′
i for i ∈ Evl and sends these hash
values to Mobile (this hash is performed in parallel with the previous step). Mobile
checks that for every i,HCi = HC
′
i. If any of these checks do not pass, Mobile
aborts the protocol.
Phase 5: Output check and delivery
1. Committing the outputs: Cloud then generates random commitment keys kmi, kai
and commits the output values to their respective parties according to the commitment
scheme defined by Kiraz and Schoenmakers [98], generating
CMj,i = comO(kmj,i, gfmj,i) and CAj,i = comO(kaj,i, gfaj,i) for j = 1 · · ·n and
i = 1 · · · e. Cloud then sends all CM to Mobile and CA to Application.
2. Selection of majority output: Application opens the commitments COj,i for j =
1 · · ·n and i = 1 · · · e for both Mobile and Cloud. These commitments contain the
mappings from the hash of each garbled output wire H(wb,j,i) to real output values
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bj,i for j = 1 · · ·n and i = 1 · · · e (note that the result of computation is still blinded
from Cloud by mr and ar). Cloud selects a circuit index maj such that the output
of that circuit matches the majority of outputs for both Mobile and Application.
That is, fmmaj = fmi and famaj = fai for i in a set of indices IND that is of size
|IND| > e2
3. Proof of output consistency: Using the OR-proofs as described by Kiraz and Schoen-
makers [98], Cloud proves to Application that CB contains valid garbled output bit
values based on the de-committed output values from the previous step. Cloud then
performs the same proof to Mobile for her committed values CM . Note that these
proofs guarantee the output was generated by one of the circuits, but the value maj
remains hidden from both Mobile and Application, which prevents Application
from learning anything based on knowledge of how circuit maj was constructed.
4. Output release: Cloud then decommits gfmmaj to Mobile and gfamaj to Appli-
cation. Given these garbled outputs and the bit values corresponding to the hash of
each output wire, Mobile recovers her output string fm, and Application recovers
his output string fa.
5. Output decryption: Mobile recovers her output fM (m, a) = fm⊕mr, while Appli-
cation recovers fA(m, a) = fa⊕ ar.
3.3.4 Asymptotic Evaluation
When considering the performance of our outsourcing scheme, our goal is to optimize the
workload on the mobile device. Because this device will always be more limited in computing
capability than Cloud, we need to minimize the overhead at this bottleneck. The domi-
nating operations on the mobile device can be summarized in three categories: the OOT
protocol, which requires k oblivious transfers and O(|m|) symmetric operations to generate
the matrix T ; the input consistency check, which requires O(λ|b|) group operations; and the
output verification proof, which requires O(λ|fM (m, a)|) additive homomorphic operations
(i.e., Diffie-Hellman group operations) in the OR-proof and |fM (m, a)| XOR operations to
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Table 1: Asymptotic analysis of the operations required on the mobile device for each
outsourcing protocol. Here, SYM is symmetric cryptographic operations, GROUP is group
algebraic operations, and OT is oblivious transfers. Recall that k is the security parameter,
λ is the number of circuits generated, m is Mobile’s input, and a is Application’s input.
Protocol SYM GROUP OT
CMTB O(|m|) O(λ(|a|+ |fM (m,a)|)) k
Salus O(λ(|m|+ |a|+ |fM (m,a)|)) - -
decrypt the output (this single operation is dominated by the O(λ|fM (m, a)|) operations
in the OR-proof and is omitted from our total). These operations produce an overall com-
plexity of O(λ(|b| + |fM (m, a)|) + |m| + k). When compared to the outsourcing technique
developed by Kamara et al. [91, 92], which incurs an overhead of O(λ(|m|+ |a|+ |f(m, a)|))
on the mobile device, our protocol has comparable asymptotic performance overall, and
better asymptotic performance when the mobile input m is large. However, because Salus
is implemented exclusively with symmetric cryptographic operations and our protocol re-
quires several group operations, our improved asymptotic performance would not produce
real-time performance improvements unless the size of m is very large. These values are
summarized in Table 3.
3.4 Security Guarantees
In this section, we provide a summary of the security mechanisms used in our protocol
and an informal discussion of the security guarantees of our outsourced oblivious transfer
construction. While all of the basic consistency checks already exist in previous work, our
protocol demonstrates how these checks can be modified to allow for secure computation in
the outsourced model. In combination with our novel outsourced oblivious transfer protocol,
this construction provides a significant step towards practical SFE on mobile devices that
is secure against malicious adversaries.
Recall from Section 3.2 that there are generally four security concerns when evaluating
garbled circuits in the malicious setting. To solve the problem of malicious circuit gener-
ation, we apply the random seed check variety of cut-and-choose developed by Goyal et
al. [72]. To solve the problem of selective failure attacks, we employ the input encoding
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technique developed by Lindell and Pinkas [112]. To prevent an adversary from using in-
consistent inputs across evaluation circuits, we employ the witness-indistinguishable proofs
from shelat and Shen [150]. Finally, to ensure the majority output value is selected and not
tampered with, we use the XOR-and-prove technique from Kiraz and Schoenmakers [98] as
implemented by Kreuter et al. [103]. In combination with the standard semi-honest secu-
rity guarantees of Yao garbled circuits, these security extensions secure our scheme in the
malicious security model.
3.4.1 Garbled Circuit Generation
To ensure the evaluated circuits are generated honestly, we require two properties. First,
we limit the generator Application’s ability to trick Mobile into evaluating a corrupted
circuit using a cut-and-choose technique similar to a typical, two-party garbled circuit eval-
uation. Second, we ensure that a lazy Cloud attempting to conserve system resources
cannot bypass the circuit checking step without being discovered. We call this Cloud’s
“proof-of-work”.
Claim 1. Security: Assuming that the hash function H(·) is a one-way, collision-resistant
hash and that the commitment scheme used is fully binding, then the generator Appli-
cation has at best a 2−0.32λ probability of tricking Mobile into evaluating a majority of
corrupted circuits, where λ is the number of circuits generated.
shelat and Shen [150] perform a rigorous analysis of the optimal cut-and-choose strategy
for evaluating garbled circuits in the malicious setting. Given that the generator prepares




2 , which is found in previous schemes. By their analysis, this provides a
security level of 2−0.32λ. Since our scheme is built on the implementation by Kreuter et
al. [103], which uses the same cut-and-choose parameter as shelat and Shen, our garbled
circuit check also provides a security parameter of 2−0.32λ which is non-polynomial and
negligible for large λ.
Claim 2. Proof-of-work: Assuming the hash function H is one-way and collision resistant,
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Cloud has a negligible probability in the security parameter k of producing a check hash
that passes the seed check without actually generating the check circuit.
As previously stated, before the circuit check begins the generator Application sends
the evaluator Mobile λ hashed circuit values H(GCi). Once the evaluation circuits are
selected, Cloud must generate λ circuits and hash them into check hashes H(GC ′i). We
assume that Cloud does not collude with the generator (i.e. share any of the hash values
sent to Mobile). If Cloud attempts to skip the generation of the check circuits, it must
generate hash values H ′i = Hi for i ∈ Chk. Based on security guarantees of the hash
with output length k, Cloud has a negligible probability of correctly generating these hash
values.
3.4.2 Validity of Evaluator Inputs
To assure that the generator cannot learn anything about the evaluator’s inputs by corrupt-
ing the garbled values sent during the OT, we employ the random input encoding technique
by Lindell and Pinkas [112], which is built into the implementation by Kreuter et al. [103].
This technique allows the evaluator to encode each input bit as the XOR of a set of in-
put bits. Thus, if the generator corrupts one of those input bits as in a selective failure
attack, it reveals essentially nothing about the evaluator’s true input. Additionally, we use
the commitment technique employed by Kreuter et al. [103] to ensure that Application
cannot swap garbled input wire labels between the zero and one value. To accomplish this,
the generator commits to the wire labels before the cut-and-choose. During the cut and
choose, the input labels for the check circuits are opened to ensure that they correspond
to only one value across all circuits. Then, during the OOT, the commitment keys for
the labels that will be evaluated are sent instead of the wire labels themselves. Because
our protocol implements this technique directly from the literature, we do not make any
additional claims of security.
3.4.3 Input Consistency
The security of our input consistency check is based on two schemes, one for the evaluator’s
input and one for the generator’s input. To assure the evaluator’s inputs are consistent
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across circuits, we use the approach from Lindell and Pinkas [112], which is built into the
implementation of Kreuter et al. [103]. Since the evaluator only performs one oblivious
transfer for all the evaluation circuits, her received garbled inputs will all represent her
input to the OT.
To assure that the generator’s inputs are consistent, we employ the malleable claw-free
collection approach from shelat and Shen [150]. However, we modify the zero-knowledge
proof to provide some guarantee that Cloud actually possesses well-formed inputs:
Claim 3. Assuming the witness-indistinguishable proof used in the malleable claw-free col-
lection input check catches inconsistent inputs except for a negligible probability, the gen-
erator in our protocol cannot trick the evaluator into using different inputs for different
evaluation circuits with greater than negligible probability.
During the witness-indistinguishable proof, the generator sends the modified pre-image
values to the mobile device, while Cloud sends the garbled input values of each evaluation
circuit to the mobile device. The device then checks that all input values for each individual
input wire were generated by the same function in the malleable claw-free pair. Based on the
assumption that the generator and Cloud will not collude, the probability of a malicious
generator providing inconsistent modified pre-image values that match the garbled inputs
possessed by Cloud is negligible in the security parameter of the malleable claw-free pair.
3.4.4 Output Consistency
To ensure that Cloud cannot learn either party’s output or tamper with either party’s
output from the garbled circuit, we implement the technique of blinding and proving the
garbled output values from the protocol by Kiraz and Schoenmakers [98]. The privacy and
correctness of the generator’s output is guaranteed based on the security of this construc-
tion in Kiraz’s two-party secure function evaluation protocol. By the same proof for the
generator’s output remaining secure, we argue that the evaluator’s output is also secure
and correct. By using the same construction for both parties’ outputs, we guarantee output
privacy and consistency, even in the presence of a malicious Cloud. Note that to main-
tain security, this construction only provides Application and Mobile with the output
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of computation, not the index of the majority evaluation circuit.
3.4.5 Outsourced Oblivious Transfer
Our outsourced oblivious transfer is an extension of a technique developed by Naor et
al. [131] that allows the chooser to select entries that are forwarded to a third party rather
than returned to the chooser. By combining their concept of a proxy oblivious transfer with
the semi-honest OT extension by Ishai et al. [87], our outsourced oblivious transfer provides
a secure OT in the malicious model. We achieve this result for four reasons:
1. First, since Mobile never sees the outputs of the OT protocol, she cannot learn
anything about the garbled values held by the generator. This saves us from having
to implement Ishai’s extension to prevent the chooser from behaving maliciously.
2. Since Cloud sees only random garbled values and Mobile’s input blinded by a
one-time pad, Cloud learns nothing about Mobile’s true inputs.
3. Since Application’s view of the protocol is almost identical to his view in Ishai’s
standard extension, the same security guarantees hold (i.e., security against a mali-
cious sender).
4. Finally, if Mobile does behave maliciously and uses inconsistent inputs to the prim-
itive OT phase, there is a negligible probability that those values will hash to the
correct one-time pad keys for recovering either commitment key, which will prevent
Cloud from de-committing the garbled input values.
It is important to note that this particular application of the OOT allows for this efficiency
gain since the evaluation of the garbled circuit will fail if Mobile behaves maliciously. By
applying the maliciously secure extension by Ishai et al. [87], this primitive could be applied
generally as an oblivious transfer primitive that is secure in the malicious model. Further
discussion and analysis of this general application is outside the scope of this work.
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3.5 Proof of Security
We formally prove the security of our protocol with the following theorem, which gives
security guarantees identical to the Salus protocol by Kamara et al. [92].
Theorem 1. The outsourced two-party SFE protocol securely computes a function f(a, b)
in the following two corruption scenarios: (1) Cloud is malicious and non-cooperative
with respect to the rest of the parties, while all other parties are semi-honest, (2) Cloud is
semi-honest and exactly one other party is malicious.
Proof. To demonstrate that:
{REAL(i)(k, x; r)}k∈N
c
≈ {IDEAL(i)(k, x; r)}k∈N
for all i ∈ [M,A,C], we consider separately the cases when Mobile, Application, and
Cloud deviate from the protocol.
3.5.1 Malicious evaluator Mobile M∗
In this scenario, both Application and Cloud participate honestly in the protocol. Note
that during the protocol execution, Mobile only exchanges messages with the other par-
ticipants at five points: the coin-flip during the cut-and-choose, the primitive oblivious
transfer, sending decryption information at the end of the OOT, checking Application’s
input consistency, and receiving the proof of validity and output from the garbled circuit.
Thus, our simulator needs only ensure that these sections of the protocol are indistinguish-
able to the adversary M∗ with respect to the security parameter k. Consider the following
hybrid experiments and lemmas.
Simulating the coin-flip (Phase 1):
Hybrid1(M)(k,x; r): This experiment is the same as REAL(M)(k, x; r) except that in-
stead of running a fair coin toss protocol with M∗, the experiment chooses a random string
ρ, and a coin-flipping simulator SCF (ρ, 1
k) produces the protocol messages that output ρ.
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Lemma 2. REAL(M)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid1(M)(k, x; r)
Proof. Based on the security of the fair coin toss protocol, we know that there exists a
simulator SCF (·, ·) such that an interaction with SCF (·, ·) is indistinguishable from a real
protocol interaction. Since everything else in Hybrid1(M)(k, x; r) is exactly the same as in
REAL(M)(k, x; r), this proves the lemma.
Simulating the primitive OT (Phase 2):
Hybrid2(M)(k,x; r): This experiment is the same as Hybrid1(M)(k, x; r) except that dur-
ing the Outsourced Oblivious Transfer, the experiment invokes a simulator SOT to simulate
the primitive oblivious transfer operation with M∗. The simulator sends M∗ a random
string s and receives the columns of the matrix Q∗.
Lemma 3. Hybrid1(M)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid2(M)(k, x; r)
Proof. Based on the malicious security of the OT primitive, we know that there exists a
simulator SOT such that an interaction with this simulator is indistinguishable from a real
execution of the oblivious transfer protocol. Since everything else in Hybrid2(M)(k, x; r) is
identical to Hybrid1(M)(k, x; r), this proves the lemma.
Checking the output of OOT (Phase 2):
Hybrid3(M)(k,x; r): This experiment is the same as Hybrid2(M)(k, x; r) except that the
experiment aborts if the matrix Q∗ is not formed correctly (that is, if M∗ used inconsistent
input values em∗ for any column in generating Q∗).
Lemma 4. Hybrid2(M)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid3(M)(k, x; r)
Proof. Consider that in Hybrid2(M)(k, x; r), if for some value of i, M∗ sends the column
value T i ⊕ em′ for some em′ 6= em∗ such that the ith bit is b in em∗ and b ⊕ 1 in em′.
Then for every row in Q∗, the ith bit will be encrypted in the b ⊕ 1 entry. However, when
M∗ sends the value em∗ ⊕ p∗ to Cloud for decryption, when Cloud decrypts the ith
38
choice, it will decrypt the b ⊕ 1 entry instead of the b entry, which will yield an invalid
decryption with probability 1 − ε for a negligible value of ε. Since, with high probability,
this decryption is not a valid commitment key, the garbled input values will not decommit
properly and Cloud will abort. In Hybrid3(M)(k, x; r), since the experiment observes the
messages Q∗, p∗, and em∗ ⊕ p∗, it can recover em∗ and check Q∗ for consistency, aborting
if an inconsistency is found.
Simulating consistency check and substituting inputs (Phase 3):
Hybrid4(M)(k,x; r): This experiment is the same as Hybrid3(M)(k, x; r) except that the
experiment provides a string of 2 · n zeros, denoted {0}2·n, during the consistency check to
replace Application’s input a.
Lemma 5. Hybrid3(M)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid4(M)(k, x; r)
Proof. Here we cite Lemma 5 from the proof of shelat and Shen’s scheme [150]. Since the
messages sent in our scheme are identical to theirs in content, we simply change the entity
sending the message in the experiment and the lemma still holds.
Simulating the output proof (Phase 5):
Hybrid5(M)(k,x; r): This experiment is the same as Hybrid4(M)(k, x; r) except that
instead of returning the output of the circuit, the experiment provides M∗ with the result
sent from the trusted external oracle.
Lemma 6. Hybrid4(M)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid5(M)(k, x; r)
Proof. Based on the security of the garbled circuit construction being used, the trusted third
party output and the circuit output will be indistinguishable when provided with M∗s input
em∗, which the experiment can recover because of the change made in Hybrid3(M)(k, x; r).
In addition, since the experiment can observe the random seeds used to construct the proofs
of output consistency used when generating the evaluation circuits, the experiment can
reproduce valid proofs of consistency for the output value fM (m
∗, a) provided by the oracle.
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Based on the security proofs of these consistency checks by Kiraz and Schoenmakers [98],
indistinguishability holds.
Lemma 7. Hybrid5(M)(k, x; r) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. Since M∗ is strictly a polynomial-time adversary and all of the operations in the
REAL protocol are polynomial time, most of the operations performed can be summarized
into a runtime p(k). The two simulators SOT and SCF (·, ·) are assumed to be polynomial
in runtime since they are computationally secure simulators for their respective roles. Since
they are both only executed once, the total running time can be expressed as p(k) + rOT +
rCF , where rOT is the runtime of the polynomial simulator SOT and rCF is the runtime of
the polynomial simulator SCF (·, ·). Since all of these individual components are polynomial,
the total runtime is also polynomial.
Hybrid5(M)(k, x; r) is exactly the experiment run by the simulator SM in the ideal
world. Should M∗ ever abort the protocol, the simulator SM will forward the abort to the
trusted third party. Otherwise, it will follow Hybrid5(M)(k, x; r), controlling Application
and Cloud, and outputs whatever M∗ outputs. By Lemma 2-7, this simulator proves
Theorem 1 when Mobile is malicious.
3.5.2 Malicious generator Application A∗
In this scenario, both Mobile and Cloud participate honestly in the protocol. Note that
in the protocol, the generator exchanges messages with both parties at five critical points:
circuit cut-and-choose, the primitive OT, the OOT result delivery, the input consistency
check, and the output proof of integrity and delivery. Consider the following hybrid exper-
iments and lemmas.
Simulating the cut-and-choose (Phase 1):
Hybrid1(A)(k,x; r): This experiment is the same as REAL(A)(k, x; r) except that if A∗
successfully passes the first cut-and-choose test, the experiment repeatedly rewinds A∗,
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repeating the coin flip protocol and the verification of the circuit hashes and commitments
until A∗ passes for a second time. Let Chki be the set of check circuit indices for the i
th
successful cut-and-choose. If Chk1 = Chk2, then the experiment aborts.
Lemma 8. REAL(A)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid1(A)(k, x; r)
Proof. Here we cite Lemma 8 from shelat and Shen’s protocol proof [150]. The idea in
their proof is that if A∗ never passes the cut-and-choose, then both the real and hybrid
experiments will abort. However, if A∗ passes once, they demonstrate that the probability
of A∗ passing again with the exact same set of check circuits is negligible within a polynomial
number of rewinds. Since their cut-and-choose is identical to ours, indistinguishability holds
in this setting.
Checking input consistency and recovering inputs (Phase 3):
Hybrid2(A)(k,x; r): This experiment is the same as Hybrid1(A)(k, x; r) except that the
experiment recovers A∗’s input a∗ during the input consistency check using the random seed
recovered in Hybrid1(A)(k, x; r). Since the experiment is running with a set of evaluation
circuits Evl2 produced during the second successful cut-and-choose, it possesses the random
coins used to generate at least one of these circuits since Evl1 6= Evl2. If the consistency
check does not pass or if A∗’s input cannot be recovered, the experiment immediately aborts.
Lemma 9. Hybrid1(A)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid2(A)(k, x; r)
Proof. Based on the security of shelat and Shen’s claw-free collections technique for checking
the consistency of A∗’s inputs across evaluation circuits, then A∗ can find a claw and change
its input for one evaluation circuit with negligible probability. In Hybrid2(A)(k, x; r), since
the experiment possesses at least one set of random coins rci that was used to generate a
circuit in the set Evl2, it can recover the input wire labels for that circuit and recover A
∗’s
input. If the input is invalid (i.e., does not correspond to an input label), the circuit would
fail to evaluate and would generate an abort in both hybrids. Thus, indistinguishability
holds.
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Simulating the output proof (Phase 5):
Hybrid3(A)(k,x; r): This experiment is the same as Hybrid2(A)(k, x; r) except that dur-
ing the output phase the experiment prepares the result f(m, a∗) received from the trusted
third party as the output instead of the output from the circuit f(m, a∗). If no majority
values fa′ are found from the circuit, the experiment aborts. Otherwise, it uses the random
coins rci recovered from Hybrid1
(A)(k, x; r) to prove the validity of the output for some
circuit.
Lemma 10. Hybrid2(A)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid3(A)(k, x; r)
Proof. Based on the security of the garbled circuit construction being used, the trusted
third party output and the circuit output will be indistinguishable when provided with
A∗’s input a∗, which the experiment can recover using the random coins rci obtained in
Hybrid1(A)(k, x; r). In addition, these random coins allow the experiment to construct the
proofs of output consistency used when generating one of the evaluation circuits, thus the
experiment can reproduce valid proofs of consistency for the output value fA(m, a
∗) provided
by the trusted third party. If no majority output value exists, in both hybrids the abort
message would be sent. Finally, based on the security proofs of the witness indistinguishable
consistency proofs developed by Kiraz and Schoenmakers [98], indistinguishability holds.
Simulating the primitive OT (Phase 2):
Hybrid4(A)(k,x; r): This experiment is the same as Hybrid3(A)(k, x; r) except that
rather than run the primitive oblivious transfer with Mobile, the experiment generates
a random input string m′ and a random matrix T , then runs a simulator SOT with A
∗,
which delivers to A∗ exactly one element from the pair (T i, T i ⊕ em′) depending on A∗’s
ith selection bit.
Lemma 11. Hybrid3(A)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid4(A)(k, x; r)
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Proof. Based on the security of the primitive OT scheme, we know that the simulator
SOT exists, that it can recover A
∗’s selection bits s∗ from the interaction, and that an
interaction with it is indistinguishable from a real execution of the OT. Since A∗ cannot
learn any distinguishing information from Mobile’s input, again based on the security of
the OT primitive, then indistinguishability holds between the hybrid experiments. Note
that the ordering of hybrids 4 and 5 is critical. If the Phase 2 hybrids were included in
protocol order, the adversary A∗ would receive the output fA(m
′, a∗) instead of fA(m, a
∗),
which would allow him to distinguish between the real and ideal worlds.
Checking the output of OOT (Phase 2):
Hybrid5(A)(k,x; r): This experiment is the same as Hybrid4(A)(k, x; r) except that the
experiment checks the validity of A∗’s output from the OOT. Since the experiment possesses
T, em′, and s∗ (which was recovered by the oblivious transfer simulator SOT in the previous
hybrid), the experiment can check whether or not the encrypted set of outputs Y ∗ is well-
formed. If it is not, the experiment immediately aborts.
Lemma 12. Hybrid4(A)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid5(A)(k, x; r)
Proof. Recall that in Hybrid4(A)(k, x; r), if A∗ does not format the output of the OOT
correctly, Cloud will, with probability 1− ε fail to recover a valid commitment key, where
ε is negligible in the security parameter. Should this be the case, the committed gar-
bled circuit labels will fail to decrypt properly, and Cloud will abort the protocol. In
Hybrid4(A)(k, x; r), since the experiment has observed the values Q, s∗, em′, and Y ∗, it can
trivially observe if Y ∗ is correctly formed, and aborts if it is not. Additionally, for A∗ to
swap any of M ’s input labels in the commitments, A∗ must find a claw in the claw-free
collection used to generate those input labels. Based on the security of shelat and Shen’s
claw-free collections technique, used to check the consistency of M ’s input across evaluation
circuits in this phase, this will only happen with a negligible probability.
Lemma 13. Hybrid5(A)(k, x; r) runs in polynomial time.
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Proof. Since all of the steps in the protocol run in expected polynomial time, the only step
that must be verified is the rewinding phase. Based on Lemma 14 from shelat and Shen’s
proof [150], the total time for the rewinds is also polynomial in k. Thus, the composition
of all steps runs in polynomial time.
Hybrid5(A)(k, x; r) is exactly the experiment run by the simulator SA in the ideal world.
Should A∗ ever abort the protocol, the simulator SA will forward the abort to the trusted
third party. Otherwise, it will follow Hybrid5(A)(k, x; r), controlling Mobile and Cloud,
and outputs whatever A∗ outputs. By Lemma 8-13, this simulator proves Theorem 1 when
Application is malicious.
3.5.3 Malicious Cloud C∗
In this scenario, both Mobile and Application participate honestly in the protocol. Note
that in the protocol, Cloud participates in checking the circuits during the cut-and-choose,
decrypting Mobile’s inputs in the OOT, forwarding Application’s inputs for consistency
checking, evaluating the circuit, and proving and delivering the final output of computation.
Consider the following hybrid experiments and lemmas.
Replacing inputs for the OOT (Phase 2):
Hybrid1(C)(k,x; r): This experiment is the same as REAL(C)(k, x; r) except that during
the OOT, the experiment replaces Mobile’s input em with a string of zeros em′ = {0}2·`·n.
This value is then used to select garbled input values from Application in the OOT, which
are then forwarded to C∗ according to the protocol.
Lemma 14. REAL(C)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid1(C)(k, x; r)
Proof. In a real execution, C∗ will observe the random matrix T , the encrypted commitment
keys Y , and Mobile’s input XOR’d with the permutation string em⊕p. Based on the sta-
tistical indistinguishability of a value XOR’d with a random value, em⊕p
s
≈ p for any input
value em. Since T is randomly generated in both REAL(C)(k, x; r) and Hybrid1(C)(k, x; r),
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they are trivially indistinguishable. Considering the output pairs Y , half of the commit-
ment keys (those not selected by Mobile) will consist of the keys in xb,j ⊕H(j, s), which is
computationally indistinguishable from random, and the keys in xb,j can only be recovered
if C∗ can find a collision with the hash value H(j, s) without having Application’s ran-
dom value s. The remaining keys, which can be recovered by C∗, are permuted randomly,
such that their ordering is statistically indistinguishable from a random ordering. Since
the commitments are also permuted randomly, the same indistinguishability holds for the
ordering of the garbled input wire values. Thus, C∗ cannot distinguish an execution of
OOT with Mobile’s input em and the simulator’s input replacement em′. Since the rest
of the protocol follows REAL(C)(k, x; r) exactly, this proves the lemma.
Replacing inputs for the consistency check (Phase 3):
Hybrid2(C)(k,x; r): This experiment is the same as Hybrid1(C)(k, x; r) except that the
experiment replaces Application’s input a with all zeros {0}2·n. This value is then pre-
pared and checked according to the protocol for consistency across evaluation circuits.
Lemma 15. Hybrid1(C)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid2(C)(k, x; r)
Proof. In this hybrid, C∗ observes a set of garbled input wire values from Application.
Based on the security of Yao garbled circuits, observing one set of garbled input wire values
is indistinguishable from observing any other set of input wire values, such that C∗ cannot
distinguish between the garbled input for a and the garbled input for {0}2·n. Since the rest
of the hybrid is the same as Hybrid1(C)(k, x; r), this proves the lemma.
Checking the output of the circuit (Phase 5):
Hybrid3(C)(k,x; r): This experiment is the same as Hybrid2(C)(k, x; r) except that after
the circuit is evaluated, the experiment checks that the results output by C∗ matches the
expected results fM (m
′, a′) and fA(m
′, a′). If C∗ fails to produce a valid proof that the
output came from the circuit or if the result does not match, the experiment immediately
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aborts.
Lemma 16. Hybrid2(C)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid3(C)(k, x; r)
Proof. In Hybrid2(C)(k, x; r), C∗ can only modify the output without detection with prob-
ability 1 − ε for some negligible probability ε, based on the security guarantees of Kiraz’s
proof scheme [98]. In Hybrid3(C)(k, x; r) the experiment catches C∗ when it tries to change
the output of the circuit with probability 1, so the distributions are computationally indis-
tinguishable.
Lemma 17. Hybrid3(C)(k, x; r) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. Since the protocol itself requires only polynomially many steps, the time to run
REAL(C)(k, x; r) can be expressed as p(k). The experiment also evaluates the polynomial-
time function f(·, ·) over random inputs to check the output of C∗. We call this execution
time q(c), where c is the size of the circuit being evaluated. So, the total execution time is
p(k) + q(c), which is polynomial as a sum.
Hybrid3(C)(k, x; r) is exactly the experiment run by the simulator SC in the ideal world.
Should C∗ ever abort the protocol, the simulator SC will forward the abort to the trusted
third party. Otherwise, it will follow Hybrid3(C)(k, x; r), controlling Mobile and Appli-
cation. If the cut-and-choose, input consistency check, or output proof of correctness fail,
then SC aborts to both C∗ and the trusted third party. Otherwise, SC outputs whatever
C∗ outputs. By Lemma 14-17, this simulator proves Theorem 1 when Cloud is malicious.
Given the simulators SM , SA, and SC , this proves the security of our protocol as stated
in Theorem 1.
3.6 Performance Analysis
We now characterize how garbled circuits perform in the constrained mobile environment
with and without outsourcing. Two of the most important constraints for mobile devices are
computation and bandwidth, and we show that order of magnitude improvements for both
factors are possible with outsourced evaluation. We begin by describing our implementation
framework and testbed before discussing results in detail.
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3.6.1 Framework and Testbed
Our framework is based on the system designed by Kreuter et al. [103], hereafter referred
to as KSS for brevity. We selected this system as our foundation and as our benchmarking
comparison because it was the most efficient implementation of a two-party garbled circuit
protocol at the time of our original publication. We contacted the authors of the Salus
protocol [92] and requested the source code for their framework to compare the actual
performance of their scheme with ours, but they were unable to release their code. Thus,
an asymptotic comparison was the only fair comparison we could make to the only other
existing outsourced scheme.
Using KSS as a foundation, we implemented our outsourced protocol and performed
modifications to allow for the use of the mobile device in the computation. Notably, KSS
uses the Message Passing Interface (MPI), for communication between the multiple nodes
of the multi-core machines relied on for circuit evaluation. Our solution replaces MPI
calls on the mobile device with sockets that communicate directly with the Generator and
Proxy. To provide a consistent comparison, we revised the KSS codebase to allow for
direct evaluation between the mobile device (the Evaluator) and the cloud-based Generator.
The modifications required included removing the MPI library from the phone client and
functions, which did not exist on the phone. The largest difficulty was changing the Intel
specific instructions to generic instruction, which would work on the ARM processor of the
mobile device.
We also informed the original authors of KSS of several problems we noticed. They
in turn fixed the problems necessary for our trials. We found the following problems:
generator’s input consistency check was missing from one of the possible run environments,
arrays did not work correctly in some cases, nested if statements did not work correctly,
and for loops inside of if statements did not work correctly. We thank those authors for
their assistance.
Our deployment platform consists of two Dell R610 servers, each containing dual 6-core
Xeon processors with 32 GB of RAM and 300 GB 10K RPM hard drives, running the Linux
3.4 kernel and connected as a VLAN on an internal 1 Gbps switch. These machines perform
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the roles of the Generator and Proxy, respectively, as described in Section 3.3.1. The mobile
device acts as the Evaluator. We use a Samsung Galaxy Nexus phone with a 1.2 GHz dual-
core ARM Cortex-A9 processor and 1 GB of RAM, running the Android 4.0 “Ice Cream
Sandwich” operating system. We connect an Apple Airport Express wireless access point
to the switch. The Galaxy Nexus communicates to the Airport Express over an 802.11n
54Mbps WiFi connection in an isolated environment to minimize co-channel interference.
All tests are run 10 times with error bars on figures representing 95% confidence intervals.
We also ran tests using a 64-core server with 1 TB of memory where the phone was
connected over a standard local network, which included additional traffic other than just
our tests. This platform performed the roles of both the Generator and the Proxy. We
experienced small but noticeable time differences depending upon what other tasks were
being performed on the LAN.
When we use our 12-core servers both Mobile and Cloud each have their own 12-core
server. In contrast, both parties are run on the same 64-core server. Each circuit can use
two processes on our 64-core server or 1 process on each of our smaller 12-core servers. We
ran our tests with the same security parameters as KSS for 80-bit security, although we
vary the amount of circuits in our tests.
3.6.2 Execution Time
Our tests evaluated the following problems:
Millionaires: This problem models the comparison of two parties comparing their net
worth to determine who has more money without disclosing the actual values. We perform
the test on input values ranging in size from 4 to 8192 bits. In our circuit two comparisons
are performed, one for Mobile and one for Mobile. There is one bit of output for each
party.
Edit (Levenshtein) Distance: This is a string comparison algorithm that compares the
number of modifications required to covert one string into another. We performed the
comparison based on the circuit generated by Jha et al. [90] for strings sized between 4 and
















Figure 3: Execution time for the Edit Distance program of varying input sizes, with 2
circuits evaluated. On 12 core servers.
Set Intersection: This problem matches elements between the private sets of two parties
without learning anything beyond the intersecting elements. We base our implementation
on the SCS-WN protocol proposed by Huang et al. [81], and evaluate for sets of size 2 to
128. Each element in the set is 8 bits for 16 to 1024 bits of input per party. Each party
receives N ∗ 8 bits of output, the size of the largest possible result, where N is the size of
the set.
AES: We compute an AES encrypt operation with a 128-bit key length, based on a circuit
evaluated by Kreuter et al. [103]. One party enters in the key, 128 bits, and other party
enters in text to encrypt, which is also 128 bits.
Since our protocol specifies all outputs must be under blinds, we also need to input
output blinds, each of our circuits also inputs a blind for each party. The size of the blind
corresponds to the size of the party’s output.
Figure 3 shows the result of the edit distance computation for input sizes of 2 to 128
with two circuits evaluated. This comparison represents worst-case operation due to the
cost of setup for a small number of small circuits - with input size 2, the circuit is only
122 total gates in size. For larger input sizes, however, outsourced computation becomes
significantly faster. Note that the graph is logarithmic such that by the time strings of
size 32 are evaluated, the outsourced execution is over 6 times faster than non-outsourced
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Figure 4: Execution time for significant stages of garbled circuit computation for outsourced
and non-outsourced evaluation. The Edit Distance program is evaluated with variable input
sizes for the two-circuit case. On 12 core servers.
execution, while for strings of size 128 (comprising over 3.4 million total gates), outsourced
computation is over 16 times faster.
The reason for this becomes apparent when we examine Figure 4. There are three
primary operations that occur during the SFE transaction: the oblivious transfer (OT) of
participant inputs, the circuit commit (including the circuit consistency check), and the
circuit evaluation. As shown in the figure, the OT phase takes 292 ms for input size 2, but
takes 467 ms for input size 128. By contrast, in the non-outsourced execution, the OT phase
takes 307 ms for input size 2, but increases to 1860 ms for input size 128. The overwhelming
factor, however, is the circuit evaluation phase. It increases from 34 ms (input size 2) when
the evaluation is complete by the time the checks finish on the phone to 7320 ms (input
size 128) for the outsourced evaluation, a 215 factor increase. For non-outsourced execution
however, this phase increases from 108 ms (input size 2) to 98800 ms (input size 128), a
factor of 914 increase.
3.6.3 Evaluating Multiple Circuits
The security parameter for the garbled circuit check is 2−0.32λ [103], where λ is the number
















Figure 5: Execution time for the Edit Distance problem of size 32, with between 2 and 256
circuits evaluated. In the non-outsourced evaluation scheme, the mobile phone runs out of
memory evaluating 256 circuits. On 12 core servers.
circuit, 256 circuits must be evaluated. However, there are increasing execution costs as
increasing numbers of circuits are generated. Figure 5 shows the execution time of the
Edit Distance problem of size 32 with between 2 and 256 circuits being evaluated. In the
outsourced scheme, costs rise as the number of circuits evaluated increases. Linear regression
analysis shows we can model execution time T as a function of the number of evaluated
circuits λ with the equation T = 243.2λ+334.6 ms, with a coefficient of determination R2 of
0.9971. However, note that in the non-outsourced scheme, execution time increases over 10
times as quickly compared to outsourced evaluation. Regression analysis shows execution
time T = 5435.7λ + 961 ms, with R2 = 0.9998. Because in this latter case, the mobile
device needs to perform all computation locally as well as transmit all circuit data to the
remote parties, these costs increase rapidly. Figure 7 confirms this trend in all of our test
programs, which clearly show that execution times for our protocol tend to be faster and
increase at a slower rate than the execution times of KSS. Figure 6 provides more detail
about each phase of execution. Note that the OT costs are similar between outsourced and
non-outsourced execution for this circuit size, but that the costs of consistency checks and
evaluation vastly increase execution time for non-outsourced execution.
Note as well that in the non-outsourced scheme, there are no reported values for 256
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Figure 6: Microbenchmarks of execution time for Edit Distance with input size 32, evaluat-
ing from 2 to 256 circuits. Note that the y-axis is log-scale; consequently, the vast majority
of execution time is in the check and evaluation phases for non-outsourced evaluation. On
12 core servers.
circuits, as the Galaxy Nexus phone ran out of memory before the execution completed.
We observe that a single process on the phone is capable of allocating 512 MB of RAM
before the phone would report an out of memory error, providing insight into how much
intermediate state is required for non-outsourced evaluation. Thus, to handle circuits of
any meaningful size with enough check circuits for a strong security parameter, the only
way to be able to perform these operations is through outsourcing.
Our experiments span circuits from small to large input size, and from 8 circuits eval-
uated to the 256 circuits required for a 2−80 security parameter. Note that in many cases
it is impossible to evaluate the non-outsourced computation because of the mobile device’s
inability to store sufficient amounts of state. Note as well that particularly with complex
circuits such as set intersection, even when the non-outsourced evaluation is capable of
returning an answer, it can require orders of magnitude more time than with outsourced
evaluation. For example, evaluating the set intersection problem with 128 inputs over 32
circuits requires just over 55 seconds for outsourced evaluation but over an hour and a half
with the non-outsourced KSS execution scheme. Outsourced evaluation represents a time
















Figure 7: Execution time for all problems tested, with between 2 and 64 circuits evaluated.
In the non-outsourced evaluation scheme, the mobile phone runs out of memory evaluat-
ing128 and 256 circuits. Observed that with the exception of a few programs with small
input sizes, the execution times of the non-outsourced test programs cluster higher than
the outsourced programs. This shows an overall execution time reduction achieved through
outsourcing. On 12 core servers.
a comparison point.
Multicore Circuit Evaluation We briefly note the effects of multicore servers for circuit
evaluation. The servers in our evaluation each contain dual 6-core CPUs, providing 12 total
cores of computation. The computation process is largely CPU-bound: while circuits on
the servers are being evaluated, each core was reporting approximately 100% utilization.
This is evidenced by regression analysis when evaluating between 2 and 12 circuit copies;
we find that execution time T = 162.6λ + 1614.6 ms, where λ is the number of circuits
evaluated, with a coefficient of determination R2 of 0.9903. As the number of circuits to be
evaluated increases beyond the number of available cores, the incremental costs of adding
new circuits becomes higher; in our observation of execution time for 12 to 256 circuits, our
regression analysis provided the equation T = 247.4λ − 410.6 ms, with R2 = 0.998. This
demonstrates that evaluation of large numbers of circuits is optimal when every evaluated
circuit can be provided with a dedicated core.
The results above show that as many-way servers are deployed in the cloud, it becomes
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easier to provide optimal efficiency computing outsourced circuits. A 256-core machine
would be able to evaluate 256 circuits in parallel to provide the accepted standard 2−80
security parameter. Depending on the computation performed, there can be a trade-off
between a slightly weaker security parameter and maintaining optimal evaluation on servers
with lower degrees of parallelism. In our testbed, optimal evaluation with 12 cores provides
a security parameter of 2−3.84. Clearly more cores would provide stronger security while
keeping execution times proportional to our results. A reasonable trade-off might be 32
circuits, as 32-core servers are readily available. Evaluating 32 circuits provides a security
parameter of 2−10.2, equivalent to the adversary having less than a 1512 chance of causing the
evaluator to compute over a majority of corrupt circuits. Stronger security guarantees on
less parallel machines can be achieved at the cost of increasing execution time, as individual
cores will not be dedicated to circuit evaluation. However, if a 256-core system is available,
it will provide optimal results for achieving a 2−80 security parameter.
Different programs have different bottlenecks that affect the performance. When the
bottleneck of the execution is on the mobile device, the speed of the computation cannot
benefit by having more cores. Our analysis of the results revealed this occurs when a
circuit has a high amount of inputs, relatively few gates in the circuit, and uses many cores
working in parallel. In the aforementioned cases the gate execution completes before the
mobile device completes the generator’s input consistency. At 32 circuits the bottleneck
is the input when we use our 12-core servers for AES, all millionaires programs, all set
intersection programs other than size 128, edit distance 2,4, and 8. On our 64-core test
server input is the bottleneck at 32 circuits for AES, all millionaires programs, all set
intersection programs other than size 128, and edit distance 2,4,8, and 16.
In our tests we used the standard KSS implementation in our phone client for our non-
outsourced tests. If we had used a more memory efficient implementation like PCF [104]
and combined it with other memory optimizations we would have been able to evaluate
all of our programs directly on a mobile phone. However, if this were the case our results
























Figure 8: Bandwidth measurements from the phone to remote parties for the Edit Distance
problem with varying input sizes, executing two circuits. On 12 core servers.
3.6.4 Bandwidth
For a mobile device, the costs of transmitting data are intrinsically linked to power con-
sumption, as excess data transmission and reception reduces battery life. Bandwidth is
thus a critical resource constraint. In addition, because of potentially uncertain commu-
nication channels, transmitting an excess of information can be a rate-limiting factor for
circuit evaluation. Figure 8 shows the bandwidth measurement between the phone and
remote parties for the edit distance problem with 2 circuits. When we compared execution
time for this problem in Figure 3, we found that trivially small circuits could execute in less
time without outsourcing. Note, however, that there are no cases where the non-outsourced
scheme consumes less bandwidth than with outsourcing. Our other test programs showed
similar results (see Figure 9), with the non-outsourced execution trending exclusively higher
in bandwidth use than the outsourced protocol.
This is a result of the significant improvements garnered by using our outsourced obliv-
ious transfer (OOT) construction described in Section 3.3. Recall that with the OOT
protocol, the mobile device sends inputs for evaluation to the generator; however, after this
occurs, all further evaluation until the final output verification from the cloud proxy occurs





















Figure 9: Bandwidth measurements from the phone to remote parties for all problems with
varying input sizes, executing between 2 and 64 circuits. Note that the non-outsourced
measurements cluster higher than the outsourced measurements, indicating that outsourcing
the computation consistently saves bandwidth across the tested applications. On 12 core
servers.
by the mobile device. Figure 8 shows that the amount of data transferred increases only
nominally compared to the non-outsourced protocol. Apart from the initial set of inputs
transmitted to the generator, data demands are largely constant. In particular, for large,
complex circuits, the savings are vast: outsourced AES-128 requires 96.3% less bandwidth,
while set intersection of size 128 requires 99.7% less bandwidth than in the non-outsourced
evaluation. Remarkably, the edit distance 128 problem requires 99.95%, over 1900 times
less bandwidth, for outsourced execution.
We performed an analytical analysis of what affects the amount of bandwidth. We
determined input size is the only aspect of a program, which affects the amount of bandwidth
used by the mobile device. The amount of gates in a circuit does not affect the amount of
bandwidth used by the mobile device. Mobile’s input (OTs) and Application’s input
(consistency checks) both use bandwidth.
3.6.5 Network Latency
As network latency is a limiting factor on mobile phones, we wanted to see how our out-















Figure 10: Execution time over varying network latency for the Edit Distance problem with
varying input sizes, executing between 256 circuits. On 12 core servers.
execution system with two different amounts of latency added, 100ms and 500ms. We used
Linux’s tc command to emulate different latency amounts. It was found by Huang [78] that
the median ping latency to a landserver on a 3G connection was between 180ms to 250ms.
In Figure 10 we present the results of our latency tests. The slowdown of added latency
is not uniform across all of our tests. With the Millionaires 8192, we observed a slowdown
of about 1.9X to 1.2X from 0 latency to 100ms latency, depending on the amount of circuits
executed. Whereas Set Intersection 16 had a slowdown of 2.8X to 2X when we added 100ms
of latency. Making the transition from 0 latency to 500 ms makes the differences more
apparent. We observed a slowdown of 3.7X to 2.8X for Millionaires 8192. Correspondingly,
the Set Intersection 16 had an observed slowdown between 9.7X to 6.4X.
The reason for the difference in the slowdown is due to the different bottlenecks different
programs have in our system. For some programs the bottleneck will be at the phases
necessary for input for the different parties, the oblivious transfer (large mobile input) and
consistency check (large generator input). For other programs the bottleneck will be the
garbled circuit generation and evaluation. A future goal is to improve the performance of











Figure 11: Execution time for the large circuit test applications with varying input sizes,
executing 128 circuits. On 64 core servers.
Table 2: Bandwidth of 128-bit RSA and Dijkstra 20, 50, and 100. All entries are in Bytes.
32 Circuits 64 Circuits 128 Circuits
RSA128 334629 672067 1346943
Dijkstra20 3862280 7770598 15587234
Dijkstra50 9575622 19266732 38648952
Dijkstra100 19087192 38405622 77042482
3.7 Evaluating Large Circuits
Beyond the standard benchmarks for comparing garbled circuit execution schemes, we aimed
to provide compelling applications that exploit the mobile platform with large circuits that
would be used in real-world scenarios. Based on our initial testing, these circuits are too
large to evaluate directly on the mobile device using KSS due to the significant memory
requirements. These experiments highlight the main practical contribution of our protocol,
that we can now evaluate circuits that are orders of magnitude larger than was possible
using previously existing techniques.
We discuss public-key cryptography and the Dijkstra shortest path algorithm, then
describe how the latter can be used to implement a privacy-preserving navigation application
for mobile phones.
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3.7.1 Large Circuit Benchmarks
Figure 11 shows the execution time required for a blinded RSA circuit of input size of 128.
For these tests we used our more powerful 64-core server. As described in Section 5.6, larger
testbeds capable of executing 128 or 256 cores in parallel would be able to provide similar
results for executing the 256 circuits necessary for a 2−80 security parameter as they could
evaluate the added circuits in parallel. The main difference in execution time would come
from the multiple OTs from the mobile device to the outsourced proxy. The RSA circuit
has been previously evaluated with KSS, but never from the standpoint of a mobile device.
The RSA circuit inputs 128 bits each both parties as well the necessary output blinds.
Both parties receive output 130 bits. The RSA circuit is the same circuit used in KSS12,
which principally calculates a single modular exponentiation.
We only report the outsourced execution results, as the circuits are far too large to
evaluate directly on the phone. As with the larger circuits described in Section 5.6, the
phone runs out of memory from merely trying to store a representation of the circuit. Prior
to optimization, the blinded RSA circuit is 192, 537, 834 gates and afterward, comprises
116, 083, 727 gates, or 774 MB in size.
Our Dijkstra’s circuit assumes each node has a maximum degree of 4. Each edge weight
is represented internally with 16 bits. Each node is internally represented with 8 bits. The
program performs N − 1 iterations of the algorithm in the circuit as it starts with the
shortest path to the start node and adds the shortest path to a single node for every each
iteration, where N is the number of nodes. The circuit inputs N ∗ 96 bits of input from
Mobile, the map information, and 16 bits of input from Mobile, the starting and ending
nodes. The circuit outputs 8 ∗N bits to Mobile, the shortest path. The program and also
inputs the necessary bits for the output blinds as well.
The implementation of Dijkstra’s shortest-path algorithm results in very large circuits.
The pre-optimized size of the shortest path circuit for 20 vertices is 20, 288, 444 gates and
after optimization is 1, 653, 542 gates. The 100-node graph is even larger, with 168, 422, 382
gates post optimization, 1124 MB in size. While it may be possible for existing protocols to
evaluate circuits of similar size, it is significant that we are evaluating comparably massive
59
(a) 20 identified intersections. (b) 50 identified intersections. (c) 100 identified intersections.
Figure 12: Map of potential presidential motorcade routes through Washington, DC. As
the circuit size increases, a larger area can be represented at a finer granularity.
circuits from a resource-constrained mobile device. Table 2 gives the amount of bandwidth
these larger programs use.
3.7.2 Privacy-Preserving Navigation
Mapping and navigation are some of the most popular uses of a smartphone. Consider how
directions may be given using a mobile device and an application such as Google Maps,
without revealing the user’s current location, their ultimate destination, or the route that
they are following. That is, the navigation server should remain oblivious of these details
to ensure their mutual privacy and to prevent giving away potentially sensitive details if
the phone is compromised. Specifically, consider planning of the motorcade route for the
recent Presidential inauguration. In this case, the route is generally known in advance but
is potentially subject to change if sudden threats emerge. A field agent along the route
wants to receive directions without providing the navigation service any additional details,
and without sensitive information about the route loaded to the phone. Moreover, because
the threats may be classified, the navigation service does not want the holder of the phone
to be given this information directly.
To model this scenario, we overlay a graph topology on a map of downtown Washington
D.C., encoding intersections as vertices. Edge weights are a function of their distance and
heuristics such as potential risks along a graph edge. Figure 12 shows graphs generated
based on vertices of 20, 50, and 100 nodes, respectively. Note that the 100-node graph
(Figure 12c) encompasses a larger area and provides finer-grained resolution of individual








Figure 13: Motorcade route with hazards along the route. The dashed line represents the
optimal route, while the dotted line represents the modified route that takes hazards into
account.
There is a trade-off between detail and execution time, however; as shown in Figure 11, a
20-vertex graph can be evaluated in 1 minute 46 seconds, while a 100-vertex graph requires
almost 43 minutes with 128 circuits in our 64-core server testbed. We anticipate that based
on the role a particular agent might have on a route, they will be able to generate a route
that covers their particular geographical jurisdiction and thus have an appropriately-sized
route, with only certain users requiring the highest-resolution output. Additionally, as
described in Section 3.6.3, servers with more parallel cores can simultaneously evaluate
more circuits, giving faster results.
Figure 13 reflects two routes. The first, overlaid with a dashed line, is the shortest
path under optimal conditions that is output by our directions service, based on origin and
destination points close to the historical start and end points of the past six presidential
inaugural motorcades. Now consider that incidents have happened along the route, shown
in the figure as a car icon in a hazard zone inside a red circle. The agent recalculates the
optimal route, which has been updated by the navigation service to assign severe penalties
to those corresponding graph edges. The updated route returned by the navigation service
is shown in the figure as a path with a dotted line. In the 50-vertex graph in Figure 12,
the updated directions would be available in just over 135 seconds for 32-circuit evaluation,
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and 196 and a half seconds for 64-circuit evaluation.
3.8 Conclusion
While garbled circuits offer a powerful tool for privacy-preserving computation, they typi-
cally assume participants with massive computing resources. Our first protocol solves this
problem by outsourcing the most costly operations in garbled circuit evaluation from a
resource-constrained mobile device to a cloud provider in the malicious setting. By ex-
tending existing garbled circuit evaluation techniques, this protocol significantly reduces
both computational and network overhead on the mobile device while still maintaining the
necessary checks for malicious or lazy behavior from all parties. Our outsourced oblivious
transfer construction significantly reduces the communication load on the mobile device and
can easily accommodate more efficient OT primitives as they are developed. The perfor-
mance evaluation of this protocol shows dramatic decreases in required computation and
bandwidth. For the edit distance problem of size 128 with 32 circuits, computation is re-
duced by 98.92% and bandwidth overhead reduced by 99.95% compared to non-outsourced
execution. These savings are illustrated in our privacy-preserving navigation application,
which allows a mobile device to efficiently evaluate a massive garbled circuit securely through
outsourcing. These results demonstrate that the recent improvements in garbled circuit ef-




OUTSOURCING GARBLED CIRCUIT GENERATION
4.1 Introduction
Our first outsourcing protocol, which we described in Chapter 3 and refer to as the CMTB
protocol, established the techniques necessary to outsource the evaluation of a garbled cir-
cuit. As our evaluation showed, this protocol for outsourcing allowed for significant efficiency
savings on the mobile device, and turned previously infeasible computation problems into
reality on the mobile platform. However, the CMTB protocol still required extended execu-
tion time for the larger test circuits due to several bottlenecks caused by the mobile device.
Specifically, two phases of the protocol comprised an excessive portion of the execution:
the OOT protocol and the claw-free input consistency checks. While the OT extensions by
Ishai et al. allowed us to reduce the number of oblivious transfers required at the mobile
device, these operations still require a significant amount of computation and act as a severe
bottleneck on low-latency networks. Second, the group algebraic operations required for the
claw-free consistency checks incur a significant execution time, and transmitting large group
elements is a burden on the mobile bandwidth requirements.
In this chapter, we develop a new protocol for securely outsourcing garbled circuit gen-
eration rather than evaluation. We construct a protocol that offloads the role of generating
the garbled circuit from the mobile device to the Cloud without exposing any private inputs
or outputs. By building on the garbled circuit protocol of shelat and Shen [151] and choosing
to outsource the circuit generation portion of the protocol, we eliminate a significant number
of expensive public-key cryptography operations and rounds of communication used in both
the OOT protocol and the input consistency check. The result is a more computationally
and bandwidth efficient outsourcing protocol with stronger security guarantees.
Our Whitewash protocol and the following evaluation make the following contributions:
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• Develop a new outsourcing protocol: We develop the Whitewash1 outsourcing
protocol, which allows a mobile device participating in a two-party secure function
evaluation to outsource the generation of the garbled circuit. Our protocol assigns the
mobile device the role of circuit generator instead of circuit evaluator, outsourcing a
completely different set of operations from our previous outsourcing protocol and the
malicious secure protocol of Kamara et al. [92]. By reversing the functions of the two
players, we fully eliminate the requirement for any oblivious transfers, outsourced or
otherwise, to or from the mobile device. This “simple” role reversal requires funda-
mentally redesigning the outsourcing techniques used in previous work, as well as new
security proof formulations.
• Formal verification and analysis: We formally prove the security of our outsourc-
ing techniques in the malicious model defined by Kamara et al. [92]. Unlike previous
work, our protocol provides security when the mobile device is colluding with its Cloud
provider against the application server. We then provide an analysis of the reduction
in operations between our work and the outsourced oblivious transfer used in Chap-
ter 3, as well as the Salus framework by Kamara et al. [92]. Specifically, our protocol
requires more executions of a pseudorandom number generator in exchange for fewer
algebraic group operations and zero-knowledge proofs. Moreover, we significantly
reduce the number of rounds of communication required to the mobile device.
• Implement and evaluate the performance of our protocol: In our performance
evaluation, we demonstrate a maximum improvement of 98% in execution time and
92% improvement in bandwidth overhead compared to our first protocol in Chapter 3
(with 75% and 60% average improvement, respectively). For a different test applica-
tion, when compared to performing computation directly on the mobile device [103],
we demonstrated a 96% and 90% improvement in execution time and bandwidth,
1A reference to Tom Sawyer, who “outsourced” his chores to his friends without ever revealing the true
nature of the work.
64
respectively. These improvements allow for the largest circuits evaluated on any plat-
form to be computed from a mobile device efficiently and with equivalent security
parameters to non-mobile protocols.
This work was originally published at the Annual Computer Security Applications Con-
ference [33].
4.2 Overview and Definitions
4.2.1 Protocol Goals and Summary
The primary reason for developing an outsourcing protocol for secure function evaluation
is to allow two parties of asymmetrical computing ability to securely compute some result.
Current two-party computation protocols assume both parties are equipped with equiva-
lent computing resources and so require both parties to perform comparable operations.
However, when a mobile device is taking part in computation with an application server,
some technique is necessary to reduce the complexity of the operation on the mobile device.
Ideally, we can make the mobile device perform some small number of operations that is
independent of the size of the circuit being evaluated.
In constructing such a protocol, there are four goals that we would like to satisfy. The
first of these goals is correctness. It is necessary that an outsourcing protocol must produce
correct output even in the face of malicious players attempting to corrupt the computation.
The second desirable guarantee is security. SFE protocols frequently use a simulation-based
approach to defining and proving security, which we outline in detail below. Essentially,
the goal is to show that each party can learn the output of the computed function and
nothing else. Third, an ideal protocol would provide some guarantee of fair release. This
guarantee ensures that either both parties receive their outputs from the computation, or
neither party receives their output. Our protocol achieves this in all but one corruption
scenario by treating the Cloud as an arbiter, who will simultaneously and fairly release
the outputs of the protocol using one-time pads. In the scenario where the mobile device
and Cloud are colluding, it is possible for the Cloud to terminate the protocol after the
mobile device receives output but before the application server receives output. However,
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this is inherently possible in most two-party garbled circuit protocols. The fourth goal of
our protocol is efficiency. Our outsourcing protocol balances a minimal set of operations
on the mobile device with efficient multiparty computation operations on the application
server and Cloud.
Given these goals, we build our protocol in the two-party server-aided multiparty compu-
tation setting. This setting is composed of two parties, the mobile device and an application
server, who wish to run a two-party secure computation while keeping both of their inputs
private. To assist the mobile device, the server-aided setting adds a third party Cloud
provider, which is independent and non-colluding with the application server (more on non-
collusion in the following section). The Cloud performs cryptographic operations for the
mobile device, but is not allowed to see any party’s input or output from the computation.
To achieve our goals in this setting, we first select the most efficient two-party garbled
circuit computation protocol to date that provides guarantees of correctness and security
in the malicious model. We assign the mobile device the role of circuit generator in this
protocol, and the application server is assigned the role of circuit evaluator. To outsource the
circuit generation operations from the mobile device, we allow the device to generate short
random seeds and pass these values to a Cloud computation provider, which then generates
the garbled circuits using these seeds to generate randomness. Thus, the mobile device’s
work is essentially reduced to (1) generating random strings on the order of a statistical
security parameter, and (2) garbling and sending its input values to the evaluating party.
In this way, we develop a secure computation protocol where the mobile device performs
work that is independent of the size of the function being evaluated.
4.2.2 Security Constructions
In the two-party computation protocol underlying our work, shelat and Shen implement
a number of new and efficient cryptographic checks to ensure that none of the parties
participating in the computation behave maliciously. We provide an overview of these
security checks in the following section. We refer the reader to shelat and Shen’s work for
more formal definitions and proofs [151].
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4.2.2.1 k-probe-resistant input encoding
When working with garbled circuit protocols in the malicious model, the generator has the
ability to learn information about the evaluator’s input by corrupting the wire labels sent
during the oblivious transfer. This attack, known as selective failure, was first proposed
by Mohassel and Franklin [123] as well as Kiraz and Schoenmakers [98]. In the server-
aided setting, it is possible that the mobile device and the Cloud could collude and carry
out this attack to recover the application server’s input. To prevent this attack, shelat
and Shen [151] implement an improved version of the k-probe-resistant input encoding
mechanism originally proposed by Lindell and Pinkas [112]. In their protocol, the evaluator
does not input her real input y to the computation, but chooses her input y such that
M ·y = y for a k-probe resistant matrix M. Intuitively, the idea is that the generator would
have to probe the evaluator’s input approximately 2k times before learning anything about
her input y.
4.2.2.2 2-Universal Hash Function
A second concern with garbled circuits in the malicious model is that the generator may
send different input values for each of the evaluated circuits from the cut-and-choose. As
in the two-party setting, it is possible for the mobile device to submit inconsistent inputs
to the application server in the server-aided setting. To ensure that the generator’s inputs
are consistent across evaluation circuits, shelat and Shen implement an efficient witness-
indistinguishable proof, which computes a randomized, 2-universal hash of the input value
using only arithmetic operations on matrices. Because of the regularity guarantees of a
2-universal hash, the outputs of these hash operations can be seen by the evaluator without
revealing any information about the generator’s inputs. However, if any of the hashed input
values is inconsistent across evaluation circuits, the evaluator can infer that the generator
provided inconsistent inputs, and can terminate the protocol.
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4.2.2.3 Output proof of consistency
When a function being evaluated using garbled circuits has separate, private outputs for the
generating and evaluating parties, it is necessary to ensure that the evaluating party does
not tamper with the generating party’s output. Since the output must be decoded from
the garbled output wires for the majority check at the end of the protocol, if the output
is only blinded with a one-time pad, this allows the evaluator the opportunity to change
bits of the generator’s output. Our setting faces the same potential for attack from the
application server, who is responsible for evaluating the circuit and distributing the blinded
output. Several techniques for preventing this kind of tampering have been proposed, but
shelat and Shen’s latest protocol [151] implements a witness-indistinguishable proof that
uses only symmetric key cryptographic operations. After the evaluator sends the blinded
output of computation to the generator, the proof guarantees to the generator that the
output value he received was actually generated by one of the garbled circuits he generated.
However, it keeps the index of the circuit that produced the output hidden, as this could
leak information to the generator.
4.2.3 Security Model and non-collusion assumptions
Our definition of security is based on the definition proposed by Kamara et al. [92], which we
specify for the two-party setting as in Chapter 3. As with our first protocol and other work
in this area, we assume that the circuit evaluating server and circuit generating Cloud do
not collude against the mobile device. However, while previous protocols restrict collusion
between the Cloud and any party, the sub-linear work implication described in Chapter 3
only applies to cases when the Cloud is generating circuits and colludes with the evaluating
party, or vice versa. In the Whitewash protocol, we prove security when the mobile device
colludes with the Cloud against the evaluating web application. While this collusion scenario
removes the fair release guarantee of our protocol, it in no way compromises the security
guarantees of confidentiality of participant’s inputs and outputs. Essentially, it reduces to
the two-party computation scenario that the underlying protocol is proven to be secure in.











Figure 14: The complete Whitewash protocol. Note that Mobile performs very little work
compared to Application and Cloud.
more realistic assumption to assume that a Cloud provider could collude maliciously with
the paying customer, and note that our protocol is the first outsourcing protocol to provide
any security guarantees in the face of collusion with the Cloud.
4.3 Protocol
4.3.1 Participants
Given a mobile device and a web or application server who wish to jointly compute a func-
tion, the three parties in this protocol correspond to the parties described in Section 3.3.1.
However, we make an important distinction in the roles of the participants in the circuit
garbling and evaluation. In the Whitewash protocol, Mobile is tasked with garbling the
circuit to be evaluated by Application. We show how to outsource these garbling opera-
tions to Cloud.
4.3.2 Protocol
Common Inputs: Security parameters k (key length) and λ (the number of circuits
generated for the cut-and-choose); a commitment scheme com(x; c) with committed value
x and commitment key c; and a function f(x, y).
Private Inputs: Mobile inputs x and Application inputs y.
Outputs: Two outputs fa, fm for Application and Mobile, respectively.
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Phase 1: Pre-computation
1. Preparing inputs: Mobile randomly generates r ∈ {0, 1}2k+log(k) as his input to
the 2-universal circuit. He also generates e ∈ {0, 1}|fm| as a one-time pad for his
output. Application computes her k-probe-resistant matrix M and y such that
M ·y = y. Mobile’s input to the circuit will be x = x‖e‖r and Application’s input
will be y. We denote the set of indices [ma] = {1, · · · , |y|} and [mm] = {1, · · · , |x|}.
2. Preparing circuit randomness: Mobile generates random seeds {ρ(j)}j∈[λ] for
generating the circuits and sends them to Cloud.
Phase 2: Input commitments
1. Committing to Mobile’s inputs: For each circuit j ∈ [λ], input bit i ∈ [mm],
and b ∈ {0, 1} Mobile uses ρ(j) to generate commitment keys θ(j)i,b . Using the same
random seeds, these keys will later be generated by Cloud to commit to the input
wire labels corresponding to Mobile’s input. Mobile then commits to his own inputs
as {Γ(j)}j∈[λ] as:
Γ(j) = {com(θ(j)i,xi ; γ
(j)
i )}i∈[mm]
using independently generated random commitment keys γ
(j)
i . Mobile sends {Γ(j)}j∈[λ]
to Application and the commitment keys {γ(j)i }i∈[mm],j∈[λ] to Cloud.
2. Committing to Cloud’s inputs: To allow for a fair release of the outputs, Cloud
inputs one-time pads to blind both parties’ outputs. Cloud randomly generates
pa ∈ {0, 1}|fa| and pm ∈ {0, 1}|fm|, as well as rc ∈ {0, 1}2k+log(k) as its input to the
2-universal circuit. We denote Cloud’s input as z = pa‖pm‖rc, and the indices of
Cloud’s input wires as [mc] = {1, · · · , |z|}.
For each circuit j ∈ [λ] and input bit i ∈ [mc], Cloud uses {ρ(j)}j∈[λ] to generates










i,1 ∈ {0, 1}k and the
permutation bit π
(j)
i ∈ {0, 1}. To locate the correct key for bit b on input wire wi of








Let {wma+i}i∈[mc] be the input wires for Cloud. Cloud then commits to the label
pairs for its input wires as {Ψ(j)}j∈[λ], where












using commitment keys ψ
(j)
i,b generated with the random seed ρ
(j). Cloud then com-
mits to its inputs as {Ξ(j)}j∈[λ] as:
Ξ(j) = {com(ψ(j)i,zi ; ξ
(j)
i )}i∈[mc]
using independently generated random commitment keys. Cloud sends {Ψ(j)}j∈[λ]
and {Ξ(j)}j∈[λ] to Application.
Phase 3: Circuit construction
1. Constructing the objective circuit: Application sends M to Cloud, then Ap-
plication and Cloud run a coin flipping protocol to randomly determine the 2-
universal hash matrix H ∈ {0, 1}k×mm . These two matrices can be used to generate
the new circuit C that computes the function g : (x, y)→ (⊥, (hm, hc, ca, cm)), where
hm = H · x, hc = H · z, gm = fa(x,M · y), cm = gm ⊕ e ⊕ pm, ga = fs(x,M · y), and
ca = ga ⊕ pa. Mobile will need the values hc‖cm to recover his output. We denote
the set of indices corresponding to these values as Om = {1, · · · , |hc|+ |cm|}.
2. Committing to input and output wire label pairs: Using the same method
as in Phase 2, Cloud uses {ρ(j)}j∈[λ] to generate the input wire keys for both Ap-
plication and Mobile’s input as well as the output wire keys for Mobile’s out-
put (these output keys must be committed for the witness indistinguishable proof
of Mobile’s output correctness). Let {wi}i∈[mm] be the input wires for Mobile,
{wmm+i}i∈[ma] be the input wires for Application, and {wi}i∈Om . Cloud then
commits to the label pairs in Mobile’s input, Application’s input, and Mobile’s
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using commitment keys generated with the random seed ρ(j). Cloud then sends these
commitments to Application.
Phase 4: Oblivious transfers (OT)
1. Oblivious transfers: Cloud and Application execute ma input oblivious transfers
and λ circuit oblivious transfers as follows:
















while Application inputs yi. Once Application receives all of her garbled
input wire labels, she uses the decommitment keys obtained in the OTs to check
the committed wire values in {Ω(j)}j∈[λ]. If any of the labels received in the OT
do not match the committed wire labels, Application terminates the protocol.
(b) Circuit: Application selects a set of circuits to be evaluated S ⊂ [λ] such
that |S| = 2λ5 , as in shelat and Shen’s protocol [150]. She represents this set
with a bit string s ∈ {0, 1}λ such that the jth bit sj = 1 if j ∈ S and sj = 0





-OTs where, for every j ∈ [λ],
Cloud inputs (ρ(j), ({γ(j)i }i∈[mm]‖{Ξ
(j)
i }i∈[mc])), while Application inputs sj .
This allows Application to learn either the randomness used to generate the
check circuits or Mobile and Cloud’s inputs for the evaluation circuits without
Cloud knowing which circuits are being checked or evaluated.
Phase 5: Evaluation
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1. Circuit evaluation: Using ρ(j), Cloud garbles the objective circuit C as G(C)(j) for
all j ∈ [λ] and pipelines these circuits to Application using Huang’s technique [82].
Depending on whether the circuit is a check circuit or an evaluation circuit, Appli-
cation performs one of two actions:
(a) Check: For each j ∈ [λ]\S, Application checks to see if ρ(j) can correctly re-
generate the committed wire values {Θ(j),Ω(j),Φ(j),Ψ(j)} and the circuitG(C)(j).
(b) Evaluate: For each j ∈ S, Application checks that she can correctly decommit
Mobile’s input by recovering half of Θ(j) from the keys committed in Γ(j). She
does the same for Cloud’s input, recovering half of Ψ(j) from the keys committed
in Ξ(j)
If any of the above checks fail, Application aborts the protocol. Otherwise, she eval-









for j ∈ [λ]\S.
2. Majority output selection and consistency check: Let
(hm, hc, ca, cm) be the output of the majority of the evaluated circuits. If no majority





c = hc for all j ∈ [λ]\S. If any of Mobile or Cloud’s hashed input values do
not match, Application aborts the protocol.
Phase 6: Output proof and release
1. Proof of output authenticity: Application and Mobile perform the proof of
output authenticity from shelat and Shen’s protocol [151] using the commitments to
Mobile’s output wires {Φ(j)}j∈[λ]\S and the values hc‖cm.
2. Output release: Cloud simultaneously releases the input one-time pads pa and pm
to Application and Mobile. Application and Mobile then hash the pads and
check to see if the hash values output by the circuit hc = H · pa‖pm. If the hashes do
not match, Application and Mobile abort the protocol. Otherwise, Application
receives ca ⊕ pa as her output and Mobile receives cm ⊕ pm ⊕ e as his output.
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4.4 Proof of Security
Following the security definition from Section 5.2, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The Whitewash outsourced two-party SFE protocol securely computes a func-
tion f(x, y) in the following three corruption scenarios: (1) Cloud is malicious and non-
cooperative with respect to the rest of the parties, while all other parties are semi-honest; (2)
All but one party providing input is malicious, while Cloud is semi-honest; or (3) Cloud
and Mobile are malicious and colluding, while Application is semi-honest.
Note that previous outsourcing schemes [92] are only secure in corruption scenarios (1)
and (2).
4.4.1 Malicious Application A∗
Consider when Application can perform arbitrarily malicious actions while Mobile and
Cloud follow the protocol in a semi-honest manner. We note that the operations performed
by A∗ and the messages received by A∗ are nearly identical to the malicious evaluator P ∗2
from shelat and Shen’s proof of their two-party computation scheme [151]. We note here
four slight alterations necessary to their simulator S2, none of which change their proof of
security. We call the modified simulator SA.
1. Input generation: When SA generates a random input x
′ for Mobile, it also gen-
erates a random input z′ for Cloud. Because this input is chosen from a uniform
distribution in both the real and the ideal world, it is statistically indistinguishable.
2. Input commitments: When SA generates the input commitments {Γ(j)}j∈λ, it also
generates commitments {Ξ(j)}j∈λ to commit to Cloud’s input.
3. Wire label commitments: When SA generates the commitments to its input wires
{Θ(j)}j∈λ, it also generates commitments to Cloud’s input wire labels {Ψ(j)}j∈λ.
4. Output proof: If A∗ successfully proves the correctness of Mobile’s output, the
simulator SA delivers the random input z
′ to A∗. As stated above, this input is
statistically indistinguishable from Cloud’s input in the real world.
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Given the existence of the simulator SA, this proves security when the evaluating party
A∗ is malicious (scenario 2).
4.4.2 Malicious Mobile M∗
Consider when Mobile can perform arbitrarily malicious actions while Application and
Cloud follow the protocol in a semi-honest manner. We construct a simulator SM in the
ideal world to simulate Mobile’s view of a real execution of the protocol. Note that the sim-
ulator does not have the other parties’ inputs, nor does it know what input the malicious M∗
will use. Thus, Mobile’s inputs and commitments must be checked, and the output proof
and result of computation must be simulated. Consider the following hybrid of experiments.
Hybrid1(M)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experiment REAL(M)(k, x; r)
except that the experiment receives the values {ρ(j)}j∈λ, {γ(j)}j∈λ, and {Γ(j)}j∈λ from M∗
and uses them to recover M∗s input. If for any j ∈ S, the decommitment Γ(j) cannot reveal
M∗s input x∗(j), the simulator aborts.
Lemma 18. REAL(M)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid1(M)(k, x; r)
Proof. Because the experiment is in control of Application and Cloud, for any j ∈ λ we
know that the commitment Θ(j) is constructed correctly using ρ(j). Thus, the only possible
way that the experiment will not uncover the value for some x∗(j) is if {θ(j)i,x∗i }i∈[mm], when
decommitted from Γ(j) using γ(j) correctly decommits the i⊕ 1 half of Θ(j), which happens
with negligible probability based on the binding property of the commitment. Otherwise,
at least one of the two commitments Γ(j) or Θ
(j)
i must fail to decommit, in which case both
experiments abort.
Hybrid2(M)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experiment Hybrid1(M)(k, x; r)
except that if the extracted inputs are inconsistent, the experiment aborts.
Lemma 19. Hybrid1(M)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid2(M)(k, x; r)
Proof. This follows from the 2-universal hash check of consistency. Since all of the circuits
are generated by the experiment as Cloud, they are all constructed correctly. Following
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from Lemma G.10 in shelat and Shen’s proof [151], indistinguishability holds here.
Hybrid3(M)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experiment Hybrid2(M)(k, x; r)
except that the experiment passes x∗ to the trusted third party and receives fm(x
∗, y) in
return. It then randomly selects an evaluated circuit G(C)(j) and uses the output keys from
that circuit to run the output proof of correctness for fm(x
∗, y)⊕ e∗ ⊕ pm with M∗.
Lemma 20. Hybrid2(M)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid3(M)(k, x; r)
Proof. This follows from the witness-indistinguishability property of the output proof, which
guarantees that the index of the circuit output being sent remains hidden. Indistinguisha-
bility follows directly from Lemma G.12 in shelat and Shen’s proof [151].
Hybrid4(M)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experiment Hybrid3(M)(k, x; r)
except that the experiment selects random inputs for Application a′ and Cloud z′ fol-
lowing the parameters of the protocol.
Lemma 21. Hybrid3(M)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid4(M)(k, x; r)
Proof. This follows from the security guarantees of the garbled circuit itself. Since the out-
put of the circuit in the real world matches the output of the trusted third party in the ideal
world, M∗ learns nothing from the output received. Since the output produced by replacing
Application’s input with random inputs is never returned to M∗, he cannot distinguish
between Application’s real inputs and the random inputs. Finally, since Cloud’s input
is two pseudorandom strings in the real protocol, it is statistically indistinguishable from
the experiment’s choice of z′. Thus, indistinguishability holds even when z′ is revealed in
the output release phase.
Lemma 22. Hybrid4(M)(k, x; r) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. This follows trivially from the fact that the main protocol runs in polynomial time.
Since the experiment does not perform any additional actions beyond the main protocol, it
also runs in polynomial time.
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Hybrid4(M)(k, x; r) is identical to the simulator SM running in the ideal world. The
simulator runs M∗ and controls Application and Cloud. If any of the consistency checks
fails, SM terminates the protocol. Otherwise, it delivers M
∗s input to the trusted third
party in Hybrid3(M)(k, x; r), and outputs whatever M∗ outputs. By Lemma 18-22, this
simulator proves Theorem 2 when the mobile device is malicious (scenario 2).
4.4.3 Malicious Cloud C∗
Consider when Cloud can perform arbitrary malicious actions while Application and
Mobile follow the protocol in a semi-honest manner. We construct a simulator SC in the
ideal world to simulate Cloud’s view of a real execution of the protocol. Note that since
the simulator does not have the other parties’ inputs, nor does it know what input the ma-
licious C∗ will use. Thus, the inputs, commitments, and circuits generated by the Cloud
must be checked, and the oblivious transfers must be simulated. Consider the following
hybrid of experiments.
Hybrid1(C)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experiment REAL(C)(k, x; r)
except that instead of running the circuit oblivious transfers, the experiment invokes the
simulator SOT , which recovers both of C
∗s inputs to the oblivious transfer (i.e., the random
coins {ρ(j)}j∈λ and the commitment keys {ξ(j)}j∈λ).
Lemma 23. REAL(C)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid1(C)(k, x; r)
Proof. Based on the malicious security of the oblivious transfer primitive, we know that
SOT exists. The proof of this lemma follows directly from Lemma G.7 in shelat and Shen’s
security proof [151].
Hybrid2(C)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experiment Hybrid1(C)(k, x; r)
except that if more than λ/5 circuits are incorrectly constructed, then the experiment
aborts.
Lemma 24. Hybrid1(C)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid2(C)(k, x; r)
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Proof. For a circuit to be incorrectly constructed means that the commitments
{Θ(j),Ω(j),Φ(j),Ψ(j)} and the circuit G(C)(j), for j ∈ λ, cannot be reconstructed given
the objective circuit C and the randomness ρ(j). Again, this lemma follows directly from
Lemma G.8 in shelat and Shen’s proof [151].
Hybrid3(C)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experiment Hybrid2(C)(k, x; r)
except that the experiment will abort if C∗s private inputs cannot be recovered for at least
λ/5 of the evaluation circuits.
Lemma 25. Hybrid2(C)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid3(C)(k, x; r)
Proof. From the previous lemma, we know that 4λ/5 of the circuits are correctly con-
structed. This implies that of the 2λ/5 circuits chosen to be evaluated, at least λ/5 are
“good” circuits. Let these “good” circuits be denoted as G, where |G| ≥ λ/5. Assume for
contradiction that there is some j ∈ G where z∗(j) cannot be recovered. The only possible
way that the experiment will not uncover the value for some z∗(j) is if {ψ(j)i,z∗i }i∈[mc], when
decommitted from Ξ(j) using ξ(j) correctly decommits the i⊕ 1 half of Ψ(j), which happens
with negligible probability based on the binding property of the commitment. Otherwise,
at least one of the two commitments Ξ(j) or Ψ
(j)
i must fail to decommit, in which case both
experiments abort.
Hybrid4(C)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experiment Hybrid3(C)(k, x; r)
except that the experiment aborts if any of C∗s inputs to the good circuits in G is incon-
sistent.
Lemma 26. Hybrid3(C)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid4(C)(k, x; r)
Proof. Informally, this proof follows from the 2-universal hash check used in the circuit.
This lemma follows directly from Lemma G.10 in shelat and Shen’s proof [151].
Hybrid5(C)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experiment Hybrid4(C)(k, x; r)
except that the experiment chooses a random input for Application y′ and computes y′
such that M · y′ = y′ and uses that as input to the input oblivious transfers.
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Lemma 27. Hybrid4(C)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid5(C)(k, x; r)
Proof. Informally, this proof follows from the choose security of the OT primitive. This
lemma follows directly from Lemma G.14 in shelat and Shen’s proof [151].
Hybrid6(C)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experiment Hybrid5(C)(k, x; r)
except that the experiment chooses a random input for Mobile x′ and computes x′ by con-
catenating random strings e′ and r′ to x′ and uses these inputs as input to the computation.
Lemma 28. Hybrid5(C)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid6(C)(k, x; r)
Proof. Because C∗ never receives Mobile’s inputs in any form, or output from the compu-
tation, he cannot distinguish between using Mobile’s real inputs and random inputs chosen
by the experiment. Since C∗ only ever sees Mobile’s input commitment keys {γ(j)}j∈λ,
which are pseudorandom strings in both experiments, these strings are statistically indis-
tinguishable as well.
Hybrid7(C)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experiment Hybrid6(C)(k, x; r)
except that the simulator runs the function f(x′, y′) for the inputs randomly chosen in the
previous lemma. If fm(x
′, y′)⊕ e∗ ⊕ pm and fa(x′, y′)⊕ pa do not match a majority of the
evaluation outputs, the experiment aborts.
Lemma 29. Hybrid6(C)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid7(C)(k, x; r)
Proof. This follows trivially from the fact that at least λ/5 circuits are correctly constructed
and that C∗s inputs to those circuits are consistent. Thus, the majority output will be
exactly fm(x
′, y′)⊕ e∗ ⊕ pm and fa(x′, y′)⊕ pa.
Hybrid8(C)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experiment Hybrid7(C)(k, x; r)
except that when C∗ returns the one-time pads w∗ in the output release, the experiment
aborts if w∗ 6= z∗, where z∗ is the consistent input to the good circuits in G. Otherwise,
the experiment sends z∗ to the trusted third party as C∗s input.
Lemma 30. Hybrid7(C)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid8(C)(k, x; r)
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Proof. This follows from the collision-resistance of the 2-universal hash family. C∗ can
only return a value w∗ such that H · w∗ = H · z∗ with negligible probability, and so the
experiments are indistinguishable.
Lemma 31. Hybrid8(C)(k, x; r) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. This follows trivially from the fact that the main protocol runs in polynomial time.
Since the experiment only evaluates f(·, ·) (which is also polynomial time) in addition to
the main protocol, it also runs in polynomial time.
Hybrid8(C)(k, x; r) is identical to the simulator SC running in the ideal world. The
simulator runs C∗ and controls Application and Mobile. If any of the consistency checks
fails, SC terminates the protocol. Otherwise, it delivers C
∗s input to the trusted third party
when it is completes Hybrid8(C)(k, x; r), and outputs whatever C∗ outputs. By Lemma 23-
31, this simulator proves Theorem 2 when Cloud is malicious (scenario 1).
4.4.4 Malicious and colluding Mobile and Cloud MC∗
Consider when Mobile and Cloud can perform arbitrary malicious actions and share ar-
bitrary information while Application follows the protocol in a semi-honest manner. We
observe that this scenario is equivalent to a malicious generator P ∗1 in shelat and Shen’s
proof of security [151], with some modifications to the lemmas to account for communicat-
ing with two parties and to account for Cloud’s added input. We also note that in this
scenario, the malicious and colluding MC∗ may terminate the protocol early, preventing
Application from receiving her output. However, this is possible on the evaluator’s side
in shelat and Shen’s protocol, so we consider fair release a separate guarantee from security.
We describe the changes to each hybrid experiment in shelat and Shen’s proof below, as
well as noting slight changes to the proofs of each lemma.
Hybrid1(MC)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experiment REAL(MC)(k, x; r)
except that instead of running the circuit oblivious transfers, the experiment invokes the
simulator SOT , which recovers both of C
∗s inputs to the oblivious transfer (i.e., the random
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coins {ρ(j)}j∈λ and the commitment keys {γ(j)}j∈λ, {ξ(j)}j∈λ).
The proof of this hybrid follows directly from shelat and Shen, only it is extended to
recover the commitments to C∗s input as well as M∗s.
Hybrid2(MC)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experimentHybrid1(MC)(k, x; r)
except that if more than λ/5 circuits are incorrectly constructed, then the experiment
aborts.
Again, this follows directly from shelat and Shen. However, the commitments to the
Cloud’s input wires {Ψ(j)}j∈λ must also be checked.
Hybrid3(MC)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experimentHybrid2(MC)(k, x; r)
except that the experiment will abort if both M∗ and C∗s private inputs cannot be recovered
for at least λ/5 of the evaluation circuits.
Lemma 32. Hybrid2(MC)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hybrid3(MC)(k, x; r)
Proof. This lemma holds in the same manner as Lemma 25 when only the Cloud is ma-
licious. Since the commitments Θ(j) and Ψ(j) are constructed correctly, the only way that
the input of either M∗ or C∗ cannot be recovered is if the decommited values from Γ(j) and
Ξ(j) decommitted the wrong halves of the commitments Θ(j) and Ψ(j) respectively. This
would imply that M∗ or C∗ was able to break the binding property of the commitment,
which can only happen with negligible probability.
Hybrid4(MC)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experimentHybrid3(MC)(k, x; r)
except that the experiment aborts if any of M∗ or C∗s inputs to the good circuits in G are
inconsistent.
Again, this follows directly from shelat and Shen, expanded to handle the inputs of both
malicious parties.
81
Hybrid5(MC)(k,x; r): This experiment is identical to the experimentHybrid4(MC)(k, x; r)
except that the input recovered in the previous hybrid, x∗ = x∗||r∗||e∗ and z∗ = p∗a||p∗m are
forwarded to the trusted third party, which returns f(x∗, y, z∗). The experiment aborts if
the majority output of the computation does not match fm(x
∗, y)⊕ e∗ ⊕ pm.
Here we extend shelat and Shen to include the input from Cloud, which is added in as
a blind to the output of computation in the real protocol.
Hybrid6(MC)(k,x; r),Hybrid7(MC)(k,x; r),Hybrid8(MC)(k,x; r): These hybrid ex-
periments are identical to the hybrids in shelat and Shen’s proof. So, we invoke them directly
and the proofs follow as they are in the two-party case.
Finally, we demonstrate that in the final step of the Whitewash protocol, the output
release, that early termination by M∗ or C∗ is functionally the same as C∗ returning an
incorrect value for p∗a. That is, Application will always detect an early termination, and
will always detect an incorrect value of p∗a except for a negligible probability.
Lemma 33. The probability of catching a malformed p∗a is computationally indistinguishable
from catching early termination.
Proof. Since the output fa(x
∗, y)⊕p∗a was generated by a good circuit and C∗s input to that
circuit was consistent, then the output of the hash H ·p∗a is correctly computed. Thus, let pa
be the value that C∗ returns during the output release. By the guarantees of a 2-universal
hash, the probability that H · p∗a = H · pa is negligible.
Given these changes to the simulator S1 in shelat and Shen’s proof, the modified sim-
ulator SMC proves Theorem 2 (without the fair release guarantee) when the mobile device
and Cloud are malicious and colluding (scenario 3).
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Table 3: Operations required on the mobile device by three outsourcing protocols. Here,
SYM is the symmetric cryptographic operations, GROUP is the group algebraic operations,
OT is the oblivious transfers, and CT is whether the protocol requires a coin toss. Recall
that k is the security parameter, λ is the number of circuits generated, x is the mobile
device’s input, and y is the application server’s input.
Protocol SYM GROUP OT CT
CMTB |x| 2λ5 (|y|+ 1) k yes
Salus 2λ5 (|x|+ |y|+ |f(x, y)|) - - yes
WW λ(|x|+ 25 |fm(x, y)|) - - no
4.5 Comparison with previous outsourcing protocols
In this section, we compare the asymptotic complexity and security guarantees of the White-
wash protocol to two previous outsourcing techniques: the protocol developed in Chapter 3,
which we call “CMTB”, and the Salus framework developed by Kamara et al. [92]. We refer
to our Whitewash protocol as WW.
When examining the complexity of each protocol, recall that one of our main goals is to
optimize the efficiency on the mobile device. Thus, we examine the number of operations
each protocol requires on the mobile device itself. When compared to the underlying shelat-
Shen protocol, Whitewash adds extra input values from the Cloud, but does not add any
steps to the computation that increase the complexity of operations performed on the
application server or the Cloud. Thus, for a discussion of the application server and Cloud
protocol complexity, we refer the reader to the original work by shelat and Shen [151].
4.5.1 Comparison to CMTB
The underlying two-party computation protocols of Whitewash and CMTB follow similar
structures in terms of the security checks that are performed. However, Kreuter, shelat,
and Shen’s (KSS) protocol [103], which underlies CMTB, uses a number of algebraic oper-
ations to perform input consistency checks and output proofs of consistency. The protocol
developed by shelat and Shen [151], which underlies Whitewash, removes these expensive
cryptographic primitives in favor of constructions that use only efficient, symmetric-key op-
erations. In addition to the improvements to the underlying protocol, Whitewash outsources
the generation side of two-party computation, while CMTB outsources the evaluation side.
83
In CMTB, since neither the mobile device or the Cloud could garble inputs before compu-
tation, a specially designed Outsourced Oblivious Transfer (OOT) protocol is necessary to
deliver the mobile device’s inputs to the evaluating Cloud in a secure, privacy-preserving
manner. By swapping roles in the Whitewash protocol, we allow the mobile device to gar-
ble its own inputs, removing the need for an OT protocol to be performed from the mobile
device. While Whitewash still requires OTs between the Cloud and the evaluating party,
these operations can be parallelized, while the OOT protocol acts as a non-parallelizable
bottleneck in computation.
4.5.1.1 Asymptotic Complexity
Table 3 shows this complexity for both Whitewash and CMTB. Note that for the mobile
device, Whitewash requires significantly more symmetric key operations for garbling its
own input and verifying the correctness of its output. By contrast, the OOT protocol
in CMTB requires very few symmetric key operations, but requires several instantiations
of an oblivious transfer. In addition, CMTB requires that the mobile device check the
application server’s input consistency and verify the correctness of the output using algebraic
operations (e.g., modular exponentiations and homomorphic operations). Considering the
fact that modular exponentiation is significantly more costly than symmetric key operations,
removing these public key operations from the phone is a significant efficiency improvement
for Whitewash. We also note that CMTB requires a two-party fair coin toss at the mobile
device, which is not required by Whitewash.
4.5.1.2 Security Guarantees
The removal of the OOT protocol in Whitewash not only increases its efficiency when
compared to CMTB, it also allows for stronger security guarantees. In CMTB, security was
only possible if none of the parties collude, since the mobile device possessed information
that would allow the Cloud to recover both input wire labels for all of the mobile input wires
after the OOT. If the mobile device and Cloud collude in the Whitewash protocol, it simply
removes the guarantee of fair release and makes the protocol equivalent to the underlying
two-party computation protocol. Thus, the only guarantee lost is that of fair release at the
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end of the protocol, since a colluding mobile device and Cloud may not release the one-time
pad used to blind the evaluating party’s output. We believe that this represents a more
realistic security setting, since the mobile device is paying for the assistance of the Cloud
and may collude.
4.5.2 Comparison to Salus
When considering the operations performed on the mobile device, the Salus protocol and
the Whitewash protocol both make the mobile device responsible for generating circuit
randomness and garbling its own inputs. However, the Whitewash protocol requires an
added proof of output consistency that is not included in Salus. While this proof adds some
complexity to the protocol, it allows Whitewash to handle functions where both parties get
different output values, while Salus is designed to handle functions with a single, shared
output value. In addition, the Whitewash protocol outsources the generation of the garbled
circuit, while the malicious secure Salus protocol outsources the evaluation. By swapping
the roles of the outsourced task and adding in consistency checks at the evaluating party,
the Whitewash protocol guarantees security in a stronger adversarial model.
4.5.2.1 Asymptotic Complexity
Both the Whitewash and Salus protocols use only efficient, symmetric key operations, but
there is a slight tradeoff in the number of operations required (Table 3). Salus only requires
operations for the 2λ5 evaluated circuits, but requires those operations for each bit of both
party’s inputs and the shared output. By contrast, Whitewash requires that the mobile
device’s input be committed for all λ circuits generated, but then only requires correctness
proof of the output wires on the 2λ5 evaluated circuits. When the application server’s
input is significantly longer than the mobile device’s, this will cause the Salus protocol
to be less efficient than Whitewash. However, in the average case where both inputs are
approximately the same length, this will mean that Whitewash requires more operations.
This small tradeoff in efficiency is justified by the fact that Whitewash provides security in
a stronger adversarial model than Salus. We also note that Salus requires a two-party fair
coin toss before the protocol begins, which is not required by Whitewash.
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Table 4: Input size and circuit size for all test circuits evaluated.
Input Size Total Gates Non-XOR Gates
Circuit (Bits) KSS PCF KSS PCF
HAM (1600) 1,600 24,379 32,912 17,234 6,375
HAM (16384) 16,384 262,771 376,176 186,326 101,083
MAT (3x3) 288 424,748 92,961 263,511 27,369
MAT (5x5) 800 1,968,452 433,475 1,221,475 127,225
MAT (8x8) 2,048 8,067,458 1,782,656 5,006,656 522,304
MAT (16x16) 8,192 64,570,969 14,308,864 40,076,631 4,186,368
DIJK 10 112/1,040 259,232 530,354 118,357 291,490
DIJK 20 192/2,080 1,653,380 2,171,088 757,197 1,192,704
DIJK 50 432/5,200 22,109,330 13,741,514 10,170,407 7,549,370
RSA-256 256/512 934,092,960 673,105,990 602,006,981 235,925,023
4.5.2.2 Security Guarantees
The Salus protocol provides equivalent security guarantees to CMTB, guaranteeing security
when none of the parties are colluding. This is a result of outsourcing the evaluation to
the Cloud while allowing the mobile device to generate circuit randomness. If the mobile
device colludes with the Cloud, they can trivially recover all of the other party’s inputs.
By outsourcing the generation of the garbled circuit and adding in additional consistency
checks at the evaluating party, Whitewash guarantees security under this type of collusion.
As stated above, the only guarantee lost is that of fair output release, which ultimately
reduces Whitewash to the security of the underlying two-party computation protocol.
4.6 Performance Evaluation
Our protocol significantly expands upon the implementations of the PCF garbled circuit
generation technique [104] and shelat and Shen’s garbled circuit evaluation protocol [151].
For experimental comparison to previous protocols, we used the code implementation of the
outsourcing protocol from Chapter 3, as well as an Android port of the two-party garbled
circuit protocol developed by Kreuter, shelat, and Shen [103]. We would like to thank the






















Figure 15: Execution time (ms) for Hamming Distance with input sizes of 1,600 and 16,384
bits for λ = 256 (note: log scale). Note that without outsourcing, only very small inputs
can be computed over. Additionally, even for a large number of input bits, performing OTs
on the servers still produces a faster execution time.
4.6.1 Test Environment
For evaluating our test circuits, we perform our experiments with a single server performing
the role of Cloud and Application server, communicating with a mobile device over an
802.11g wireless connection. The server is equipped with 64 cores and 1TB of memory,
and we partition the work between cores into parallel processing nodes using MPI. The
mobile device used is a Samsung Galaxy Nexus with a 1.2 GHz dual-core ARM Cortex-A9
processor and 1 GB of RAM, running Android 4.0.
The large input sizes examined in the Hamming Distance trials required us to use a
different testbed. For inputs as large as 16,384 bits, the phone provided by the above
computing facility would overheat and fail to complete computation. Because the gate
counts for Hamming Distance are significantly smaller than the other test circuits, we were
able to run these experiments on a local testbed. We used two servers with Dual Intel
Xeon E5620 processors, each with 4 hyper-threaded cores at 2.4 GHz each for the Cloud
and the Application server. Each server is running the Linux kernel version 2.6, and is
connected by a VLAN through a 1 Gbps switch. Our mobile device is a Samsung Galaxy


















Figure 16: Execution time (ms) for the Matrix-Multiplication problem with input size vary-
ing between 3× 3 matrices and 16× 16 matrices for λ = 256 (note: log scale). This figure
clearly shows that the oblivious transfers, consistency checks, and larger circuit representa-
tions of CMTB add up to a significant overhead as input size and gate count increase. By
contrast, Whitewash requires less overhead and increases more slowly in execution time as
gate counts and input size grow.
RAM, running the Android operating system at version 4.1. The phone connects to the
two servers through a Linksys 802.11g wireless router with a maximum data rate of 54
Mbps. While this test environment represents optimistic connection speeds that may not
always be available in practice, it allows us to consider the performance of the protocol
without interference from variable network conditions, and mirrors the test environments
used in previous work [103, 151]. For all experiments except RSA-256, we take the average
execution time over ten test runs, with a confidence interval of 95%. For RSA-256, we ran
3 executions.
4.6.2 Experimental Circuits
To evaluate the performance of our protocol, we run tests over the following functions. We
selected the following test circuits because they exercise a range of the two major variables
that affect the speed of garbled circuit protocols: input size and gate counts. In addition,
these programs are becoming somewhat standard test applications, having been used as
benchmarks in a large amount of the related literature [103, 151, 104]. All of the programs























Figure 17: Microbenchmarking execution times (ms) for Whitewash and CMTB over the
Matrix-Multiplication problem. We denote the total time spent in computation for White-
wash as “MOBI”. Since the mobile device is linked with “CHKS” and “OT” in CMTB, we
do not separate out the mobile time for that protocol. Notice the dominating amount of
time required to perform oblivious transfers. Moving these operations off the mobile device
removes a significant computation bottleneck.
algorithm, which matches the implementation used in Chapter 3:
• Hamming Distance (HAM): The Hamming Distance circuit accepts binary string
inputs from both parties and outputs the number of locations at which those strings
differ. This circuit demonstrates performance for a small number of gates over a wide
range of input sizes. We consider input strings of length 1,600 bits and 16,384 bits.
• Matrix Multiplication (MAT): Matrix multiplication takes an n×n matrix of 32-
bit integer entries from each party and outputs the result of multiplying the matrices
together. This circuit demonstrates performance when both input size and gate count
vary widely. We consider square matrix inputs where n = 3, 5, 8, and 16.
• Dijkstra’s Algorithm (DIJK): This version of Dijkstra’s algorithm takes an undi-
rected weighted graph with a grid structure and a maximum node degree of four from
the first party, and a start and end node from the second party. The circuit outputs
the shortest path from the start node to the end node to the second party, and nothing























Figure 18: Execution time (s) for Dijkstra’s algorithm with input sizes of 10, 20, and 50 node
graphs for λ = 256. This figure shows that the Whitewash protocol allows for computation
that was only feasible to be executed in a close to practically useful time frame.
104n input bits, while the start and end node descriptions require 8n + 32 bits. We
consider graphs with n = 10, 20, and 50 nodes. Due to an error in the PCF compiler,
we were unable to compile a program for graphs larger than 50 nodes.
• RSA Function (RSA): The RSA function (i.e., modular exponentiation) accepts
an RSA message from one party and an RSA public key from the other party and
outputs the encryption of the input plaintext under the input public key. Specifically,
one party inputs the modulus n = pq for primes p and q, as well as the encryption
key e ∈ Zφ(n). The other party inputs a message x ∈ Z∗n, and the circuit computes xe
(mod n). This circuit demonstrates performance for small input sizes over very large
gate counts. We consider the case where the input values x, n, and e are 256 bits
each. While these are not secure parameters in practice, the function itself provides a
complex circuit that is scalable on input size and useful for benchmarking our protocol.
For each test circuit, we consider the time required to execute and the bandwidth over-
head to the mobile device. Table 6 shows the input size and gate counts for each test circuit,
showing the exact range of values tested for these two circuit variables.
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4.6.3 Execution Time
In all experiments, the efficiency gains of removing oblivious transfers and public key op-
erations are immediately apparent. To examine how Whitewash compares to generating
garbled circuits directly on the mobile device, we considered Hamming Distance as a simple
problem (Figure 15). Even with a relatively small gate count, garbling the circuit directly
on the mobile device is only possible for the small input size of 1,600 bits. Whitewash is
capable of executing this protocol in 96 seconds, while running the computation directly
on the mobile device takes 2,613 seconds, representing a 96% performance improvement
through our outsourcing scheme. For the very large input size of 16,384 bits, computation
directly on the mobile device ceases to be possible. When comparing to CMTB, this cir-
cuit further illustrates the cost of oblivious transfers on the mobile device. Even with the
significantly reduced number of OTs allowed by the OOT protocol in CMTB (80 OTs),
performing 16,384 malicious secure oblivious transfers between two servers in Whitewash
still runs 30% faster than CMTB.
The matrix-multiplication circuit provides a good overview of average-case garbled cir-
cuit performance, as it represents a large range of both gate counts and size of inputs. For
the input size of a 3× 3 matrix, the Whitewash protocol runs in an average of 12 seconds,
while CMTB requires 493 seconds, representing a 98% improvement (see Figure 16). Upon
inspecting the micro benchmarking breakdown of each protocol’s execution in Figure 17,
we observe a significant speedup simply by moving oblivious transfers off of the mobile de-
vice. Even though the number of OTs required by CMTB is essentially constant based on
their application of the Ishai OT extension, performing standard malicious secure oblivious
transfers in parallel between the servers is much more efficient than requiring that the phone
perform these costly operations. In addition, if we examine the amount of execution time
where the phone participates in Whitewash, we see that the mobile device (“MOBI” in Fig-
ure 17), takes around 1 second, and is idle during the majority of computation. By contrast,
both the OT and consistency check phases of CMTB require the mobile device to partic-
ipate in a significant capacity, totaling almost 8 minutes of the computation. Having the
phone perform as little work as possible means that the Whitewash protocol performance
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is nearly equivalent to running the same computation between two server-class machines.
To examine the performance of Whitewash for a more practical application, we con-
sidered the Dijkstra’s algorithm circuit used to implement privacy-preserving navigation in
Chapter 3. They point out that this application, which has uses from military convoys to
industrial shipping routes, is a significant first step in providing privacy for the growing
genre of location-based mobile applications. Unfortunately, the PCF compiler does not op-
timize the Dijkstra’s circuit as well as the previous experimental programs, which is evident
in Table 6. In the 10 and 20 node graphs, the PCF compiler even produces a larger circuit
than the compiler used by KSS. However, despite evaluating larger circuits, the Whitewash
protocol still outperforms CMTB in execution time, running 88%,76%, and 51% faster in the
10, 20, and 50 node cases respectively (shown in Figure 18). As circuit compilers continue to
improve and produce smaller circuits, the performance gains of the Whitewash protocol will
be even larger. In this experiment, we also noticed that because Whitewash evaluates and
checks circuits simultaneously, it created contention for the network stack in our test server.
In a truly distributed environment where each server node has dedicated network resources,
the highly parallelizable structure of shelat and Shen’s protocol would allow Whitewash to
execute faster. Given that Whitewash can execute Dijkstra’s algorithm obliviously on the
order of minutes, it allows computation considered only feasible for previous schemes to be
performed in a nearly practical execution time.
The previous experiments clearly show that outsourcing is necessary to run circuits of
any practical size. For our final test circuit, we consider an extremely complex problem to
demonstrate the ability of outsourcing protocols in the worst-case. The RSA-256 circuit
evaluated by Kreuter et al. in [104] and shelat and Shen in [151] represents one of the
largest garbled circuits ever evaluated by a malicious secure protocol. For the RSA-256
problem, Whitewash completed the computation in 515 minutes. CMTB was unable to
complete one execution of the protocol. A large part of this efficiency improvement results
from the underlying protocol of Whitewash, which uses only symmetric-key operations out-
side of the oblivious transfers between the servers. The reduced non-XOR gate counts and
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Table 5: Bandwidth measures for all experiment circuits. Note that there is as much as a
84% reduction in bandwidth when using the Whitewash protocol.
Bandwidth (MB) Reduction Over
Circuit WW CMTB KSS CMTB KSS
HAM (1600) 23.56 41.05 240.33 42.62% 90.20%
HAM (16384) 241.02 374.03 x 35.56% x
MAT (3x3) 4.26 11.50 x 62.97% x
MAT (5x5) 11.79 23.04 x 48.82% x
MAT (8x8) 30.15 51.14 x 41.05% x
MAT (16x16) 120.52 189.52 x 36.41% x
DIJK 10 1.67 20.21 x 91.73% x
DIJK 20 2.85 35.28 x 91.93% x
DIJK 50 6.38 80.49 x 92.08% x
RSA-256 3.97 x x x x
more compact circuit representation of the PCF compiler also contribute to this improve-
ment. Ultimately, because Whitewash ensures that the phone participates minimally in the
protocol, it no longer acts as a bottleneck on computation. We essentially reduce perfor-
mance of our outsourcing protocol to that of the underlying two-party protocol, allowing
this technique for outsourcing to benefit as more improvements are made in non-outsourced
garbled circuit protocols. In addition, this minimal level of interactivity allows us to run
these protocols with 256 circuits, equivalent to a security parameter of approximately 80-bit
security, which is agreed by the research community to be an adequate security parameter.
Finally, the phone is only active for a few seconds during this large computation, keeping
its system resources free for other user applications (or to preserve battery power) while the
servers complete the computation. This shows that Whitewash is capable of evaluating the
same circuits as the most efficient desktop-based garbled circuit protocols with a minimal
overhead cost.
4.6.4 Network Bandwidth
The Whitewash protocol not only improves the speed of execution when outsourcing garbled
circuit computation, it also significantly reduces the amount of bandwidth required by the
mobile device to participate in the computation. Table 9 shows the bandwidth used by
the mobile device for each test circuit. In the best case, for Dijkstra’s algorithm over 50
node graphs, we observed a 92% reduction in bandwidth between Whitewash and CMTB.
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This is a result of the mobile device not performing OTs and only sending relatively small
symmetric-key values instead of algebraic elements for consistency checks. For all test
circuits, we observed a small decrease in the amount of improvement between the two
protocols as the input size increased. This is because the number of commitments sent by
the phone in Whitewash increases as the size of the input grows, while CMTB performs
a fixed number of OTs as the input size increases. However, the oblivious transfers still
require a significant enough amount of bandwidth to make removing them the most efficient
option. When comparing to not outsourcing garbled circuit generation, the cost of oblivious
transfers and sending several copies of the garbled circuit to the evaluator quickly adds up
to a significant bandwidth cost. For the smallest circuit evaluated, outsourcing the circuit
garbling reduces the required amount of bandwidth by 90%. The importance of these
bandwidth reductions is further highlighted when considering mobile power savings. With
data transmission costing roughly 100 times as much power as computation on the same
amount of data, any reduction in the bandwidth required by a protocol implies a critical
improvement in practicality.
One challenge encountered during the implementation of the
Whitewash protocol was the extensive use of hardware-specific functions used to imple-
ment commitment schemes in shelat and Shen’s code. Rather than try to port this code
over to Android, which would require significant development of hardware-specific libraries,
we chose to implement the protocol in an equivalent manner by having the Cloud generate
the part of the commitments which requires these functions and send them to the mobile
device. The mobile device then finishes generating the commitments that match its input
and forwards them to the evaluator. Our proofs of security remain valid even with this
small protocol modification. Our preliminary implementation using instructions specific to
the ARM architecture has shown that we could further reduce the measured bandwidth
values by over 60%. With already significant bandwidth reductions from previous out-
sourcing schemes, our protocol will see further improvements as mobile hardware begins to
incorporate more machine-specific libraries.
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4.7 Conclusion
Outsourcing garbled circuit protocols has been shown to significantly improve the efficiency
of SMC protocols used in smartphone applications while maintain equivalent privacy guar-
antees to non-outsourced protocols. However, the cryptographic primitives used in previous
protocols cause the mobile device to act as a bottleneck in computation. Our Whitewash
protocol presents a new scheme that eliminates the most costly operations, including obliv-
ious transfers, from the mobile device. By requiring that the mobile device instead produce
the randomness required for circuit generation, we significantly reduce the number of alge-
braic group operations and communication rounds for the mobile device. At the same time,
we bolster the security guarantees against certain types of collusion, yielding a more secure
protocol than any other in this space. Our performance evaluation shows average gains
of 75% for execution time and 60% for bandwidth over the previous outsourcing protocol.
These improvements allow large circuits representing practical applications to be computed
efficiently from a mobile device. As a result, we show that outsourcing has the potential




BLACK BOX SMC OUTSOURCING
5.1 Introduction
Our Whitewash protocol demonstrated that garbled circuit SMC can be outsourced with
a very small amount of computation on the mobile device and minimal overhead additions
to the server-side computation. Furthermore, that protocol moved the bottleneck for com-
putation off of the mobile device and onto the underlying SMC primitive. Because of this,
to significantly improve the efficiency of mobile SMC protocols, it is now necessary to im-
prove the efficiency of the underlying SMC technique. Unfortunately, both of our previous
protocols are build on fixed underlying SMC techniques. As new techniques and models
for garbled circuit computation are developed, these previous protocols cannot be directly
applied to provide an outsourced version, which limits the forward applicability of these
protocols.
In this chapter, we develop a technique for outsourcing secure two-party computation for
any two-party SMC technique. Rather than adding consistency checks to the outsourcing
protocol, we add a small amount of overhead to the evaluated function itself, then evaluate
this augmented functionality with any malicious secure two-party SMC protocol. This
tradeoff allows for an outsourcing scheme that relies on the underlying two-party protocol
in a black box manner, meaning the protocol can be swapped for any other protocol meeting
the same definition of security This makes the task of securely incorporating newly developed
SMC techniques trivial. This protocol enables mobile devices to participate in any secure
two-party SMC protocol with minimal cost to the device and with nominal overhead to the
servers running the computation. Specifically, we make the following contributions:
• Develop a black box outsourcing protocol: We develop a novel outsourcing tech-
nique for lifting any two-party SMC protocol into the two-party outsourced setting.
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To do this, we add a small amount of overhead to the function being evaluated to en-
sure that none of the inputs are modified by malicious participants. This technique of
augmenting the evaluated circuit has been successfully used in other SMC protocols to
balance performance with security guarantees [83, 109, 151]. In addition, we leverage
the non-collusion assumption used throughout the related work to produce an output
consistency check that incurs trivial overhead. While this approach slightly increases
the cost of evaluation, it minimizes the computation and bandwidth required by the
mobile device.
• Prove security for any underlying two-party SMC protocol: We provide
simulation proofs of security to demonstrate that our protocol is secure in the malicious
threat model. The only requirement of the underlying two-party SMC protocol is
that it satisfy the canonical ideal/real world simulation definition of security against
malicious adversaries [66]. This allows any future SMC protocols that are developed
to be used in a plug-&-play manner with our outsourcing technique.
• Implement and evaluate the overhead cost of the outsourcing operations:
Using the garbled circuit two-party SMC protocol of shelat and Shen [151], we imple-
ment our protocol and evaluate the complete overhead cost of outsourcing. Rather
than compare to our previous outsourcing schemes, we instead measure the overhead
incurred by augmenting the desired functionality, as well as the input and output
preparation and checking. This measurement of cost better represents the value of
the scheme, as a direct comparison to previous outsourcing protocols would drasti-
cally change depending on the underlying two-party SMC protocol implemented in
our black box scheme. Our results show that for large circuits, black box outsourcing
incurs negligible overhead (i.e., the confidence intervals for outsourced and server only
execution intersect) in evaluation time and in bandwidth required when compared to
evaluating the unmodified function. To demonstrate the practical performance of our
protocol, we develop a mobile-specific facial recognition application and analyze its
performance.
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This work was originally published at the International Conference on Cryptology and
Network Security [35].
5.2 Underlying techniques
Outsourced two-party SMC protocols are designed to allow two parties of asymmetric com-
putational capability to engage in a privacy-preserving computation with the assistance of
an outsourcing party. We consider the situation where a mobile device possessing limited
computational resources wishes to run an SMC protocol with an application server or other
well-provisioned entity. To allow this, outsourcing protocols move the majority of the costly
operations off of the mobile device and onto a Cloud provider without revealing to the Cloud
either party’s input or output to the computation. These protocols aim to provide security
guarantees of privacy and correctness, and also attempt to minimize the computation re-
quired at the mobile device while still maintaining efficiency between the application server
and the Cloud. To meet these goals in the outsourced setting, a number of careful security
assumptions must be made.
5.2.1 Two-party SMC security
Our black box protocol is based on the execution of a two-party SMC protocol to obliviously
compute the result. We make no assumptions about the techniques used or structure of
this underlying protocol except that it meets the canonical definition of security against
malicious adversaries using the ideal/real world paradigm [66]. Informally, this states that
for any adversary participating in the two-party SMC protocol, there exists a simulator in
an ideal world with a trusted third party running the computation where the output in both
worlds is computationally indistinguishable. In this definition, the simulator in the ideal
world is given oracle access to the adversary in the real world. Particularly in the two-party
setting, there are a few caveats that must be assumed to make this definition feasible, and
must be considered when designing an outsourced protocol that uses a two-party protocol
in a black box manner.
First, it is known that two-party protocols cannot fully prevent early termination. In
any execution, one party will receive their output of computation before the other party
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does. While certain techniques have been developed to partially solve this problem, there
is no complete solution. While other outsourcing protocols have added in a fair-release
guarantee, this guarantee comes at a cost. Either the protocol must provide additional
commitments not guaranteed in a standard two-party protocol [92], or the protocol must
incorporate additional costly MAC operations to ensure the output is not tampered with [92,
127]. However, our black box protocol shows that if we treat the outsourced model like a
standard two-party execution where fair release is not guaranteed, we can reduce the output
consistency check to a single comparison on the mobile device. This allows the application
server to recover its input first and potentially disrupt the mobile device’s output, but
mirrors the two-party execution guarantees exactly. Thus, our protocol optimizes execution
overhead by not assuming a fair output release.
Second, it is possible that a malicious party can provide arbitrary input to the com-
putation that may or may not correspond to their “real” input. While we cannot control
what another party provides as input to the computation, this potential behavior must
be handled by the definition of security. To handle this, the simulator in the ideal world,
which has oracle access to the adversary in the real world, must not only be able to simulate
the adversary’s view of the protocol. Upon running the adversary with a given input, the
simulator must also be able to recover the actual input used by the adversary. In our proofs
of execution, the ideal world will invoke this simulator often as a mechanism to recover the
adversary’s input before initiating computation with the trusted third party. This ensures
that the output in both worlds is indistinguishable.
Given these assumptions, a secure two-party SMC protocol provides two guarantees.
The first is privacy, which means that a malicious adversary cannot learn anything about
the other party’s input or output value beyond what is revealed by his own output value.
The second guarantee is correctness. This implies that even in the presence of a malicious
adversary, the output of the protocol will be the correct output of the agreed upon function
except with negligible probability.










Figure 19: The complete black box outsourcing protocol. Note that the mobile device
performs very little work compared to the application server and the Cloud, which execute
a two-party SMC (2PC) protocol.
5.2.2 Security definition and non-collusion
We follow the security definition first established by Kamara et al. [92] but specified for
the two-party scenario as in Chapter 3. We slightly alter the definition and allow for
the possibility of early termination by one of the parties in the ideal world following the
standard two-party definition [66]. This captures the fact that our black box construction
does not provide fair release as in our first two outsourcing protocols. Furthermore, we
make the same non-collusion assumption as Whitewash in Chapter 4, that the Cloud and
the application server do not collude against the mobile device but the mobile device and
the Cloud may collude against the application server.
5.3 Protocol
In this section, we formally define our black box outsourcing protocol. For a graphical
representation, see Figure 19.
5.3.1 Participants
Our protocol again uses the same participants as in Section 3.3.1. However, in this variation,












































Figure 20: The process of augmenting a circuit for outsourcing. The original circuit is boxed
in red. Essentially, we require that the mobile device’s input be verified using a MAC and
decrypted using a one-time pad before it is input into the function. After the result is
computed, it must be re-encrypted using a one-time pad and delivered to both parties to
guarantee that the mobile device will detect if either party tampers with the result.
protocol. Mobile prepares some input that is used by both of the parties executing the
SMC protocol and is verified during the black box computation.
5.3.2 Overview
The outsourcing protocol can be informally broken down as follows: first, the mobile device
prepares its input by encrypting it and producing a MAC tag for verifying the input is not
tampered with before it is entered into the computation. Since the application server and
Cloud are assumed not to collude, one party receives the encrypted input, and the other
party receives the decryption key. Both of these values are input into the secure two-party
computation, and are verified within the secure two-party protocol using the associated
MAC tags (see Figure 20). If the check fails, the protocol outputs a failure message. Oth-
erwise, the second phase of the protocol, the actual evaluation of the SMC program, takes
place. The third and final phase encrypts and outputs the mobile device’s result to both
parties, who in turn deliver these results back to the mobile device. Intuitively, since our
security model assumes that the application server and the Cloud are never simultaneously
malicious, at least one of these two will return the correct result to the mobile device. From
this, the mobile will detect any tampering from the malicious party by a discrepancy in these
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returned values, eliminating the need for an output MAC. If no tampering is detected, the
mobile device then decrypts the output of computation.
5.3.3 Protocol
Common Input: All parties agree on a computational security parameter k, a message
authentication code (MAC) scheme (Gen(),Mac(), V er()), and a malicious secure two-party
computation protocol 2PC(). All parties agree on a two-output function f(x, y) → fm, fa
that is to be evaluated.
Private Input: Mobile inputs x while Application inputs y. We denote the bit length
of a value as |x| and concatenation as x||y.
Output: Application receives fa and Mobile receives fm.
1. Input preparation: Mobile generates a one-time pad kfm where |kfm| = |fm|.
Mobile then generates two MAC keys va = Gen(k) and vc = Gen(k). Finally, Mobile
generates a one-time pad km where |km| = |x|+ |kfm|.
2. Input delivery: Mobile encrypts its input as a = (x||kfm)⊕ km. It then generates
two tags ta = Mac(a||vc, va) and tc = Mac(km||va, vc). Mobile delivers a, vc, and ta
to Application and km, va, and tc to Cloud.
3. Augmenting the target function (Algorithm 1): All parties agree on the follow-
ing augmented function g(y, a, vc, ta; km, va, tc) to be run as a two-party SMC compu-
tation:
(a) If V er(a||vc, ta, va) 6= 1 or V er(km||va, tc, vc) 6= 1 output ⊥.
(b) Set x||kfm = a⊕ km
(c) Run the desired function fa, fm = f(x, y)
(d) Set output values oa = fa and om = fm ⊕ kfm
(e) Output oa||om to Application and om to Cloud
4. Two-party computation: Application and Cloud execute a secure two-party
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Input : Cloud inputs km, va, tc and Application inputs y, a, vc, ta
Output: Cloud receives om and Application receives oa||om
if V er(a||vc, ta, va) 6= 1 then
return ⊥
else if V er(km||va, tc, vc) 6= 1 then
return ⊥
else
x, kfm = a⊕ km
fm, fa = f(x, y)
oa = fa(x, y)
om = fm(x, y)⊕ kfm
end
Algorithm 1: The augmented function
computation protocol 2PC(g(); y, a, vc, ta; km, va, tc) evaluating the augmented func-
tion.
5. Output verification: Cloud delivers its output from the two-party computation,
om to Mobile. Application also delivers the second half of its output o
′
m to Mobile.
Mobile verifies that om = o
′
m.
6. Output recovery: Application receives output fa = oa and Mobile receives
output fm = om ⊕ kfm
5.4 Security
Our black box outsourcing protocol is secure under the following theorem satisfying the
security definition from Section 5.2:
Theorem 3. The black box outsourced two-party protocol securely computes a function
f(x, y) in the following two corruption scenarios: (1) Any one party is malicious and non-
cooperative with respect to the rest of the parties; (2) The Cloud and the mobile device are
malicious and colluding, while the application server is semi-honest.
Note that these scenarios correspond exactly with the corruption scenarios in Chapter 4,
and that the previous protocols described in Kamara et al. [92] and Chapter 3 are only secure
in corruption scenario (1).
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5.4.1 Malicious Cloud or Application Server
The main idea behind the security in these two settings is that for whichever party is
corrupted, we can rely on the other party to behave semi-honestly. Based on the security
of the underlying two-party protocol, this ensures both that the augmented functionality is
correctly evaluated and that the mobile device will receive unmodified output from one of
the parties. Thus, the MAC on the input and the comparison of the output values prevents
either party from modifying the Mobile device’s private values. Furthermore, unlike the
dual execution model by Huang et al. [83] where the output comparison leaks one bit of
input, our output comparison is composed of two copies of the mobile output produced
from a single, malicious-secure execution of the augmented circuit. Because of this, any
discrepancy in the comparison only reveals that either the Cloud or Application Server
tampered with the output prior to delivering it to the mobile device.
In the ideal world, the simulator works roughly as follows: begin the black box protocol
with random inputs. Then, invoke the simulator for the underlying two-party scheme S2PC
to recover the input of the malicious party and delivers that input to the trusted third party.
Finally, S2PC simulates the output f(x, y). After running all consistency verifications, the
simulator either sends an early termination signal to the trusted third party or completes
the protocol normally.
5.4.2 Malicious Mobile Device
Because the mobile device simply provides MAC tagged input and receives its output after
executing the two-party protocol, there is very little it can do to corrupt the computation
besides providing invalid inputs that would simply cause the computation to terminate early.
The simulator in this scenario accepts the mobile device’s prepared inputs. Given both the
Cloud and the Application Server’s halves of the mobile device’s input, the simulator can
recover the necessary input by decrypting the one-time pad. If either of the MAC tags
does not verify or if the mobile device terminates early, the simulator also terminates.
Otherwise, it invokes the trusted third party to receive f(x, y) and returns the result to the
mobile device.
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5.4.3 Malicious Mobile Device and Cloud
In this scenario, the security of our black box protocol simply reduces to the security of
the underlying two-party scheme. The simulator in the ideal world accepts the input from
the Mobile Device, then invokes the simulator of the underlying two-party SMC scheme
S2PC to recover the values input by the Cloud. Using these values combined with the
values provided by the Mobile Device, the simulator can recover the Mobile input. If any
of the verification checks within the augmented functionality fail, the simulator terminates.
Otherwise, it delivers the recovered input to the trusted third party, and finishes S2PC
delivering the output of computation correctly formatted using the one-time pads recovered
from the Cloud’s input by S2PC .
5.5 Proof of Security
Here we provide the formal simulation proof of security for Theorem 3.
5.5.1 Malicious Mobile M∗
In the scenario where M∗ can adopt an arbitrary malicious strategy, we construct a simu-
lator SM that, operating in the ideal world, can simulate M
∗s view of a real world protocol
execution and can recover M∗s input for delivery to the trusted third party. We construct
this simulator and prove it secure with the following hybrid of experiments.
Hyb1(M)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to REAL(M)(k, x; r) except that the experi-
ment uses the combination of M∗s encrypted input a and km to recover the real input x∗.
It verifies the MAC tags ta and tc and aborts if either check fails.
Lemma 34. REAL(M)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hyb1(M)(k, x; r)
Proof. Since the experiment is controlling both Cloud and Application, it can simply
decrypt the input x∗ using the key km. In addition, since the experiment holds both the
verification keys, the protocol will terminate in both experiments if the MAC tags are
incorrectly constructed.
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Hyb2(M)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb1(M)(k, x; r) except that the exper-
iment passes x∗ to the trusted third party, and returns the result f(x∗, y) ⊕ k∗fm to M∗,
where k∗fm is recovered in the previous hybrid.
Lemma 35. Hyb1(M)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hyb2(M)(k, x; r)
Proof. Because both experiments use the input x∗ for computing the result, the output of
the function in both worlds is indistinguishable. Furthermore, the recovered output key
allows the experiment to present the result to M∗ exactly as it would be in a real world
execution.
Lemma 36. Hyb2(M)(k, x; r) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. This lemma follows trivially since a real world execution of the protocol runs in
polynomial time and each intermediate hybrid adds only constant time operations.
We conclude the proof by letting SM execute Hyb2
(M)(k, x; r). SM runs M
∗ and controls
Cloud and Application. SM terminates the ideal world execution if any consistency
checks fail or if M∗ terminates at any point, and outputs whatever M∗ outputs at the end
of the simulation. From Lemma 34-36, SM proves Theorem 3 when Mobile is malicious.
5.5.2 Malicious Application A∗
In the scenario where A∗ can adopt an arbitrary malicious strategy, we construct a simu-
lator SA that, operating in the ideal world, can simulate A
∗s view of a real world protocol
execution and can recover A∗s input for delivery to the trusted third party. We construct
this simulator and prove it secure with the following hybrid of experiments.
Hyb1(A)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to REAL(A)(k, x; r) except that the experi-
ment prepares the Mobile input according to the two-party protocol simulator S2PC instead
of using the real Mobile input. It then prepares the new input according to the protocol
and delivers the encrypted input and MAC tags to A∗.
Lemma 37. REAL(A)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hyb1(A)(k, x; r)
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Proof. Since the input is blinded by a one-time pad in both experiments, they are statisti-
cally indistinguishable.
Hyb2(A)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb1(A)(k, x; r) except that the experiment
invokes the simulator of the two-party SMC protocol S2PC instead of running the actual
protocol. S2PC is used to recover A
∗s actual input y∗. After recovering the full input,
If A∗ tampers with Mobile’s input, S2PC simulates ⊥ and the experiment terminates.
Otherwise, the experiment delivers y∗ to the trusted third party and simulates the output
f(x, y∗) concatenated with a random string orm.
Lemma 38. Hyb1(A)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hyb2(A)(k, x; r)
Proof. Based on the security definition of the underlying two-party SMC protocol, we know
that a simulator exists that can simulate the protocol in a computationally indistinguishable
way, as well as recover the input used by A∗. Based on the correctness guarantee of the
two-party SMC protocol in conjunction with the unforgettability guarantee of the MAC
protocol, it is computationally infeasible for A∗ to modify Mobile’s portion of the input.
Finally, in both experiments the Mobile output of the computation is blinded by a one-time
pad, making the random output statistically indistinguishable from the real output.
Hyb3(A)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb2(A)(k, x; r) except that the experiment
prevents the trusted third party from delivering input to the other party if A∗ modifies the
Mobile output orm before returning it.
Lemma 39. Hyb2(A)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hyb3(A)(k, x; r)
Proof. Based on the correctness guarantee of the two-party SMC scheme and the fact that
Cloud is semi-honest in this scenario, then A∗ will be caught in either experiment, and
early termination will be the result.
Lemma 40. Hyb3(A)(k, x; r) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. This lemma follows trivially since a real world execution of the protocol runs in
polynomial time, the simulator S2PC runs in polynomial time, and all other intermediate
hybrid adds only constant time operations.
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We conclude the proof by letting SA execute Hyb3
(A)(k, x; r). SA runs A
∗ and controls
Cloud and Mobile. SA terminates the ideal world execution if any consistency checks
fail or if A∗ terminates at any point, and outputs whatever A∗ outputs at the end of the
simulation. From Lemma 37-40, SA proves Theorem 3 when Application is malicious.
5.5.3 Malicious Cloud C∗
In the scenario where C∗ can adopt an arbitrary malicious strategy, we construct a simu-
lator SC that, operating in the ideal world, can simulate C
∗s view of a real world protocol
execution and can recover C∗s auxiliary input for delivery to the trusted third party. We
construct this simulator and prove it secure with the following hybrid of experiments.
Hyb1(C)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to REAL(C)(k, x; r) except that the experi-
ment invokes the two-party SMC simulator S2PC , providing random inputs for Applica-
tion and recovering C∗s real input. Finally, simulate a random result or at the end of the
two-party computation.
Lemma 41. REAL(C)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hyb1(C)(k, x; r)
Proof. Based on the security definition of the underlying two-party SMC protocol, we know
that the simulator S2PC can indistinguishably simulate the two-party execution and recover
Mobile’s MAC tagged one-time pad as input by C∗. Because in both experiments the
output of the circuit is blinded by a one-time pad, the outputs in both cases are statistically
indistinguishable.
Hyb2(C)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb1(C)(k, x; r) except that if the experi-
ment finds from the recovered input that C∗ modified the random key km, the experiment
terminates.
Lemma 42. Hyb1(C)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hyb2(C)(k, x; r)
Proof. Based on the correctness guarantee of the two-party SMC scheme and the unforget-
tability of the MAC scheme, any change to km will cause the circuit to output ⊥, and will
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cause Mobile to terminate except for a negligible probability. Thus, termination in both
experiments in computationally indistinguishable.
Hyb3(C)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb2(C)(k, x; r) except that if the experi-
ment aborts if C∗ modifies the output string or.
Lemma 43. Hyb2(C)(k, x; r)
c
≈ Hyb3(C)(k, x; r)
Proof. Because Application is semi-honest and will not tamper with Mobile’s output,
in both hybrids C∗ will be caught for tampering with the output and result in an abort of
the protocol.
Lemma 44. Hyb3(C)(k, x; r) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. This lemma follows trivially since a real world execution of the protocol runs in
polynomial time, the simulator S2PC runs in polynomial time, and all other intermediate
hybrid adds only constant time operations.
We conclude the proof by letting SC execute Hyb3
(C)(k, x; r). SC runs C
∗ and controls
Application and Mobile. SC terminates the ideal world execution if any consistency
checks fail or if C∗ terminates at any point, and outputs whatever C∗ outputs at the end
of the simulation. From Lemma 41-44, SC proves Theorem 3 when Cloud is malicious.
5.5.4 Malicious Mobile and Cloud MC∗
In the final scenario, the colluding parties MC∗ can adopt an arbitrary malicious strategy
against Application. The simulator SMC that proves security in this scenario is essen-
tially the two-party SMC simulator S2PC with one small change. Rather than completely
recovering MC∗s input from the simulator, the experiment must combine the malicious
Mobile input a∗||v∗s ||t∗a with the input recovered by S2PC to learn the real input x∗ that
is to be delivered to the trusted third party. Once this real input is retrieved, it simulates
the result f(x∗, y) exactly as S2PC does. Since the added operations are constant time and
S2PC runs in polynomial time, we have that SMC proves Theorem 3 when both Mobile and
Cloud are malicious and colluding. Note that, as in the underlying two-party SMC scheme,
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Table 6: A comparison of the original function size to the augmented outsourcing circuit.
Program Name SS13 Total BB Total Increase SS13 Non-XOR BB Non-XOR Increase
Dijkstra10 259,232 456,326 1.8x 118,357 179,641 1.5x
Dijkstra20 1,653,542 1,949,820 1.2x 757,197 849,445 1.1x
Dijkstra50 22,109,732 22,605,018 1.0x 10,170,407 10,324,317 1.0x
MatrixMult3x3 424,748 1,020,196 2.4x 161,237 345,417 2.1x
MatrixMult5x5 1,968,452 3,360,956 1.7x 746,977 1,176,981 1.6x
MatrixMult8x8 8,069,506 11,354,394 1.4x 3,060,802 4,075,082 1.3x
MatrixMult16x16 64,570,969 77,423,481 1.2x 24,494,338 28,458,635 1.2x
RSA128 116,083,727 116,463,648 1.0x 41,082,205 41,208,553 1.0x
this scenario does not guarantee that the output will be released fairly to Application.
However, it does guarantee privacy and correctness of the output.
5.6 Performance Evaluation
To demonstrate the practical efficiency of our black box outsourcing protocol, we imple-
mented the protocol and examined the actual overhead incurred by the overhead operations.
We initially considered comparing our black box protocol to existing implementations of
outsourcing protocols such as Salus [92] or the protocols described in the previous chapters.
However, these existing protocols are built on fixed underlying SMC techniques. As new
protocols for two-party SMC are developed, the plug-and-play nature of our protocol allows
for these new techniques to be applied, which would provide a different comparison for
each underlying protocol. Instead, we chose to compare the overhead execution costs of our
black box protocol to performing the same computation in the underlying two-party proto-
col. Because the mobile device computation requires seconds or less to execute, we focus our
attention on the cost at the two executing servers. This performance analysis demonstrates
two key benefits of our protocol. First, it gives a rough overhead cost for an entire class of
two-party SMC protocols (in our case, garbled circuit protocols). Second, it allows us to
demonstrate that our outsourcing technique allows a mobile device with restricted compu-
tational capability to participate in a privacy-preserving computation in approximately the
same amount of time as the same computation performed between two servers. Essentially,
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we show that our protocol provides a mobile version of any two-party SMC protocol with
nominal overhead cost to the servers. This is a novel evaluation methodology not used to
evaluate previous black box SMC constructions, and provides a more intuitive estimate for
performance when applying a new underlying SMC construction.
5.6.1 System Design
Our implementation of the black box outsourcing protocol uses the two-party garbled circuit
protocol developed by shelat and Shen [151] as the underlying two-party SMC protocol.
We selected this protocol because it is among the most recently developed garbled circuit
protocols and it has the most stable public release. We emphasize that it is possible to
implement our outsourcing on any two-party SMC protocol, such as the recent protocols
developed to reduce the cost of cut-and-choose [79, 109]. We implement our MAC within
the augmented circuit using AES in cipher-block chaining mode (CBC-MAC), as the AES
circuit is well-studied in the context of garbled circuit execution. This MAC implementation
adds an invocation of AES per 128-bit block of input. Using the compiler developed by
Kreuter et al. [103], the overhead non-XOR gate count in the augmented circuit based on
input size is ( |x|15686128 ) for input x. We provide exact gate counts with overhead measurements
for each tested application in Table 6.
5.6.1.1 Testbed
Our experiments were run on a single server equipped with 64 cores and 1 TB of RAM. For
each execution, the application server and cloud were run as 32 processes communicating
using the Message Passing Interface (MPI) framework. The mobile device used was a
Samsung Galaxy Nexus with a 1.2 GHz dual-core ARM Cortex-A9 processor and 1 GB
of RAM, running Android version 4.0. The mobile device communicated with the test
server over an 802.11n wireless connection in an isolated network environment. We ran
each experiment 10 times and averaged the results, providing 95% confidence intervals in
all figures.
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Table 7: The total operations and bandwidth required at the mobile device. Recall that |x|
is the length of the mobile input in bits, k is the security parameter, and |om| is the length
of the mobile output in bits. When measured with the total protocol execution time, these
operations are lost in the confidence intervals.
Symmetric Asymmetric Bandwidth (bits)
9 0 2(|x|+ 2k) + 4(|om|)
5.6.1.2 Test applications
We selected a representative set of test applications from previous literature [103, 151, 104]
to examine the performance of our protocol over varying circuit and input sizes. We use all
applications as implemented by Kreuter et al. [103] except for Dijkstra’s algorithm which
is implemented as in Chapter 3.
1. Dijkstra: this application accepts a weighted graph from one party and two node
indices from the other party (i.e., start and end nodes), and calculates the shortest
path through the graph from the start to the end node. We consider n-node graphs
with 16 bit edge weights, 8 bit node identifiers, and a maximum degree of 4 for each
node. We chose this problem as a representative application for the mobile platform.
2. Matrix Multiplication: this application accepts a matrix from both parties and outputs
the matrix product. We consider this application for input size n, where each matrix
is an n × n matrix of 32-bit integers. This test application demonstrates protocol
behavior for increasing input sizes.
3. RSA: this application accepts a modulus N and an exponent e from one party, and a
message x from the other party, and computes the modular exponentiation xe mod N .
We consider input values where each value is 128 bits in length. While this is certainly
too short for secure practical use, the size of the circuit provides a good benchmark















Figure 21: Dijkstra execution time in seconds. Note that for the largest input size, the
execution overhead of outsourcing is almost non-existent.
5.6.2 Execution Time
With the mobile operations reduced to a minimal set, shown in Table 7, our experiments
showed a diminishing cost of server overhead as the size of the test application increased.
Considering Dijkstra’s algorithm in Figure 21 shows that for a graph of 10 nodes, the out-
sourcing operations incur a 2.1x slowdown from running the protocol between two servers.
However, as the number of graph nodes increases to 50, the confidence intervals for out-
sourced and server-only execution overlap, indicating a virtually non-existent overhead cost.
When we compare these results to the gate counts shown in Table 6, we see that as the gate
count for the underlying protocol increases, the additive cost of running the input MAC
and output duplication amortize over the total execution time. This is to be expected from
our predicted overhead of 15686 non-XOR gates for each CBC-MAC block in the input.
However, since the mobile input for Dijkstra’s algorithm is of a fixed size, we observe that
increasing the application server input size does not add to the outsourcing overhead, show-
ing the black box protocol to be more efficient for large circuit sizes with small mobile
input.
When we consider a growing mobile input size, we observe the overhead cost of the
















Figure 22: Matrix multiplication execution time in seconds. Note that the execution over-
head still diminishes even as the mobile input size increases.
we observed a 2.6x slowdown for the smallest input size of a 3× 3 matrix (Figure 22). As
in the previous experiment, this overhead diminished to a 1.3x slowdown for the largest
input size, but diminished at a slower rate when compared to the circuit size. This is a
result of additional AES invocations to handle the increasing mobile input size. However,
the reduction in overhead shows that even as input sizes increase, the circuit size is still the
main factor in amortizing overhead.
In our final experiment, we considered a massive circuit representing one of the most
complex garbled circuit programs evaluated to date. When comparing the outsourced execu-
tion to a standard two-party execution, the overhead incurred by the outsourcing operations
is almost non-existent, as shown in Table 8. This experiment confirms the trends of dimin-
ishing overhead cost observed in the previous two experiments. From this and previous
work, we know that evaluating large circuits from mobile devices is not possible without
outsourcing the bulk of computation. Given that many real-world applications will require
on the order of billions of gates to evaluate, this experiment shows that our black box out-
sourcing technique allows mobile devices to participate in secure two-party computation at







Figure 23: An example of the facial recognition application.
Table 8: Comparing SS13 and Black Box runtime. All times in seconds.
Program Name SS13 BB Increase
Dijkstra10 16 ± 1% 33 ± 1% 2.1x
Dijkstra20 77 ± 1% 100 ± 1% 1.3x
Dijkstra50 940 ± 2% 980 ± 2% 1.0x
MatrixMult3x3 28.6 ± 0.8% 73.2 ± 0.5% 2.6x
MatrixMult5x5 110 ± 2% 200 ± 2% 1.9x
MatrixMult8x8 400 ± 2% 627 ± 0.9% 1.6x
MatrixMult16x16 2900 ± 1% 3800 ± 2% 1.3x
RSA128 4700 ± 2% 4900 ± 3% 1.0x
5.6.3 Bandwidth
Because transmitting data from a mobile device is costly in terms of time and power usage,
we attempted to minimize the amount of bandwidth required from the mobile device. Thus,
the bandwidth used by the mobile device for any given application can be represented
as a simple formula, shown in Table 7. Because this bandwidth is nearly minimal and
easily calculated for any test program, we focused our experimentation on examining the
bandwidth overhead incurred between the application server and the Cloud.
As in the case of execution time, Table 9 shows an inverse relation between circuit
size and overhead cost. Before running the experiment, we predicted that the bandwidth
overhead would approximately match the overhead in circuit size shown in Table 6. The
experiments confirmed that the actual bandwidth overhead was equal to or slightly larger
than the overhead in non-XOR gates in the circuit. The reason for this correlation is
twofold. First, the free-XOR technique used in the shelat-Shen protocol allows XOR gates
to be represented without sending any data over the network. Thus, adding additional XOR
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Table 9: Comparing SS13 and Black Box bandwidth usage between the parties performing
the generation and evaluation of the garbled circuit. All bandwidth in bytes.
Program Name SS13 BB Increase
Dijkstra10 2.44 x 109 3.87 x 109 1.6x
Dijkstra20 1.52 x 1010 1.73 x 1010 1.1x
Dijkstra50 2.02 x 1011 2.05 x 1011 1.0x
MatrixMult3x3 3.43 x 109 7.66 x 109 2.2x
MatrixMult5x5 1.57 x 1010 2.56 x 1010 1.6x
MatrixMult8x8 6.43 x 1010 8.73 x 1010 1.4x
MatrixMult16x16 5.11 x 1011 6.01 x 1011 1.2x
RSA128 8.69 x 1011 8.72 x 1011 1.0x
gates does not incur bandwidth cost. Second, in cases where the actual overhead is slightly
larger than the circuit size overhead, we determined that the added cost was a result of
additional oblivious transfers. These operations require the transmission of large algebraic
group elements, so the test circuits which incurred increased overhead from the growth of
the mobile input showed a slightly larger bandwidth overhead as well. Ultimately, as in
the case of execution time, our experiments demonstrate that the black box outsourcing
scheme incurs minimal bandwidth usage at the mobile device with diminishing bandwidth
overhead between the application server and the Cloud.
5.7 Application: Facial Recognition
The growing number of mobile applications available present a wealth of potential for ap-
plying privacy-preserving computation techniques to the mobile platform. In Chapter 3,
we demonstrated one potential application with their privacy-preserving navigation app.
Mood et al. [127] presented a second app, a friend-finding application. Here we present a
third mobile-specific application: facial recognition. In this setting, a secret operative or law
enforcement agent carrying a mobile device needs to analyze a photo of a suspected criminal
using an international crime database (see Figure 23). The database, managed by an inter-
national organization, would compare the photo to their database in a privacy-preserving
manner, returning a match if the suspect appears in the database. In this scenario, the agent
must keep the query data private to prevent insiders from learning who is being tracked,
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Table 10: Runtime results for the privacy-preserving facial recognition application. Time
indicates the total runtime of the garbled circuit part of the computation. All time in
seconds.
Program Name Time
FaceRec10 87.1 ± 0.9%
FaceRec100 170 ± 2%
FaceRec1000 1000 ± 2%
and the international organization must keep the database private from agents associated
with any particular nation.
To implement this application, we use the facial recognition techniques developed for
the Scifi protocol of Osadchy et al. [135]. They develop a technique for two servers to
perform efficient facial recognition using discrete parameters, which can more easily be
manipulated in secure computation protocols. They combine machine learning techniques
in a preprocessing phase with a secure online phase that compares the hamming distance of
photos represented as bit strings. To demonstrate our application, we implement the online
comparison phase of this protocol in our black box outsourcing protocol (the Fthreshold
function in their work). The mobile device provides a 928 bit representation of a photo,
while the application server provides a database of representations containing 10, 100, and
1000 faces.
Our results show that given a database of 10 faces, the outsourced protocol can run
the online phase in approximately 87 seconds (see Table 10). As the size of the facial
database increases, the execution time for comparing across the entire database grows.
This growing cost is a result of the large cost of representing the facial database as garbled
input. Provided with a two-party SMC protocol that more efficiently computes over large
data sets, our black box protocol could be used to move this application from feasible to
practical. This demonstrates that an application designed and implemented to run between
two servers can be feasibly executed from a mobile device. As new, more heavyweight
applications are developed, our technique for outsourcing allows any of those applications
to be executed from a mobile device with comparable efficiency to the server platform.
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5.8 Comparison to Previous Techniques
While our implementation and evaluation in the previous section represents the first em-
pirical analysis of black box outsourcing, two other protocols have been proposed in the
literature, which we term KMR [92] and JNO [89]. We evaluate the tradeoffs between each
technique in this section.
5.8.1 KMR
While the main focus of their work is the fixed outsourcing protocol Salus [92], Kamara
et al. sketch a black box technique for outsourcing any two-party computation protocol.
Essentially, their protocol encodes each bit of the Mobile input as a bit string of length k
for some computational security parameter k. This encoded input, along with the mappings
for reversing this encoding, is secret shared between Application and Cloud, and then
restored using only XOR gates inside the circuit. A similar encoding technique is used to
maintain both privacy and integrity of the output from the circuit. This technique has
the advantage of adding only XOR gates to the circuit, which can be transmitted and
evaluated cheaply using many SMC techniques. However, it also requires that the mobile
input and output be expanded by a factor of k. By contrast, our evaluation demonstrates
that the overhead caused by adding AND gates to the computation is minimal, and the
Mobile bandwidth use is kept to O(|x|) with a small constant multiple. This is particularly
advantageous on smartphones, where data usage is often restricted by slow network speeds
or provider-imposed bandwidth caps.
5.8.2 JNO
Developed concurrently to our protocol, Jakobsen et al. [89] presented a framework for
outsourcing SMC protocols across any number of “worker” servers. Their protocol follows
a similar procedure to our own, but they describe a novel MAC construction that allows
the Mobile input to be checked using only inexpensive linear operations in the circuit.
Essentially, their technique requires that the MAC key be committed at the start of the
protocol, then opened once the rest of the input values are committed to the computation.
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Once the key is opened, it can be multiplied as a known constant with the Mobile input,
which is secret shared according to the underlying SMC protocol. A simple multiplicative
MAC can then be verified before computation continues. The advantage of this scheme
is that it does not incur the k factor expansion of KMR while still adding only linear
operations to the underlying circuit (e.g., XOR for boolean circuits). The tradeoff is that
the underlying SMC protocol must allow for reactive computation (i.e., private values can
be opened in the middle of computation). While this property is common in secret-sharing
SMC protocols, it is difficult to achieve with garbled circuits. The generic technique for
making garbled circuits into a reactive SMC protocol requires additional, MAC operations
inside the circuit [76]. More efficient reactive garbled circuit protocols exist [58, 127], but
require special constructions that cannot be combined with all garbled circuit protocols in
a generic way. Our protocol allows for true black box outsourcing of any SMC protocol
(reactive or non-reactive), and our empirical performance evaluation demonstrates that the
overhead of adding AND operations to the circuit is minimal when the circuit size is large.
This setting is preferable for computation that is more efficiently evaluated using garbled
circuits than arithmetic secret-sharing SMC schemes.
5.9 Conclusion
While our previous outsourcing protocols both allow for significant performance improve-
ments when executing garbled circuits on the mobile platform, it is unclear how these
techniques can be applied to other SMC primitives that exist now or may be developed in
the future. To resolve this limitation, this chapter presents a technique for outsourcing any
two-party SMC protocol in a black box manner. Our black box protocol securely offloads
the cost of the SMC protocol to the Cloud, providing maximal efficiency to the mobile
device while maintaining strong security guarantees. Our performance evaluation shows
that as the complexity of the program being evaluated increases, the cost of outsourcing
diminishes. As a result, we enable execution of any SMC protocol from a mobile device at
approximately the same efficiency as running the protocol between two servers.
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CHAPTER VI
OUTSOURCING PRIVATE FUNCTION EVALUATION
6.1 Introduction
Our protocol for black box SMC outsourcing brings privacy-preserving computation to the
mobile device with extremely high efficiency for the mobile device as well as diminishing
overhead for the servers participating in the computation. Furthermore, as more efficient
two-party SMC protocol are developed, along with more efficient circuit constructions for
MAC primitives, the cost of our outsourced SMC will directly diminish as well. Given these
results, the challenge of producing practical, deployable SMC on mobile devices now largely
rests with solving the same problem on the desktop platform, which lies outside the scope
of this work.
However, the security of outsourced SMC protocols can still be bolstered in a variety
of real-world settings. Specifically, our black box protocol, as well as all of the existing
protocols for outsourced SMC, require that all parties have knowledge of the application
being executed. In a variety of real for government agencies and private companies, the
computation itself may be confidential or proprietary information that should not be re-
vealed to the mobile device or the Cloud. While it is possible to combine these techniques
with universal circuits to achieve function privacy, universal circuit constructions incur a
significant expansion in the size of the circuit being evaluated. For example, given a fam-
ily of circuits of size g, Valiant’s construction [157] for a universal circuit to evaluate this
circuit family contains 19g log g gates. Because circuit sizes are a significant limiting factor
for all SMC techniques, several protocols for private function evaluation (PFE) have been
developed in the non-outsourced setting with linear complexity with respect to the size of
the circuit being evaluated. However, it is currently unknown how these protocols could be
applied in the outsourced setting.
In this chapter, we develop the first linear outsourced PFE protocols secure against
120
semi-honest, covert, and malicious Cloud adversaries. These protocols allow an application
server to execute a private function over inputs provided by a set of mobile devices that are
aided by an untrusted Cloud server. To make these protocols possible, we developed a new
technique for combining public garbled circuit computations with the privately evaluated
function, which we term a “partially-circuit private” garbling technique.
Our setting and protocols constitute the following contributions:
• Outsourced PFE Setting: We develop a new setting for outsourcing private func-
tion evaluation against a variety of adversaries. We build our setting on the outsourced
model for SMC developed in our previous work. However, we motivate a new trust
model that allows for parties needing privacy guarantees to use any Cloud infras-
tructure without revealing any information about the computation being executed.
Following this new motivation, we adapt the trust model used in these protocols to
increase security against the Cloud.
• Outsourced PFE Protocols: Our primary contribution is a set of outsourced PFE
protocols with security guarantees against semi-honest, covert, and malicious Cloud
adversaries. To achieve this, we build on the garbled circuit-based PFE scheme of
Mohassel and Sadeghian [126] and generalize their protocol according to the garbling
scheme framework developed by Bellare et al. [16]. Given this technique for garbling
circuits obliviously, we construct an outsourced PFE protocol that is secure against
a semi-honest application server and both semi-honest and covert Cloud providers.
Furthermore, we show that our covert secure protocol can also defend against mali-
cious mobile parties. To achieve this, we leverage cut-and-choose techniques used in
existing outsourced garbled circuit protocols [9] to ensure that all parties follow the
protocol and learn nothing about the function being evaluated or the other inputs to
the computation. Our proofs of security demonstrate that the Mohassel-Sadeghian
garbling scheme, while originally proven secure against semi-honest adversaries, can
be extended into stronger adversary models.
While outsourced PFE is theoretically possible using an outsourced SMC protocol
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executing an universal circuit, our protocols provide the first approach with linear
complexity in the size of the private function. Furthermore, our protocols require the
mobile parties to perform operations that are only depended on the input and output
length. These operations can be implemented in practice using fast, symmetric-key
operations.
• PCP Garbling: Our outsourced PFE protocol for a covert Cloud adversary provides
efficient security for a variety of applications. However, to extend our results to all
possible Cloud adversaries, we construct a third outsourced PFE protocol that is
secure against a malicious Cloud and malicious mobile devices. Our chief technical
innovation to make this protocol possible is the development of a partially-circuit
private (PCP) garbling scheme, a technique which allows us to stitch together public
and private functions in a single computation by alternating garbling techniques.
This allows preprocessing input checks and post-processing output preparation to be
ensured by all parties rather than just the party providing the private function as
input. In this way, we can apply input consistency checks and output encryption via
one-time pad using auxiliary circuits as in previous SMC protocols [150, 124, 151, 109].
While we apply this technique expressly for the purpose of adding consistency checks,
the garbling technique stands as an independent contribution, as it is useful in practice
to provide arbitrary public preprocessing and post-processing for any garbled circuit-
based PFE protocol.
6.2 Setting and Background
Our protocols combine a range of underlying SMC techniques for circuit garbling and for
ensuring that adversarial behavior is caught during protocol execution. Here we provide a
summary of our modified outsourced setting and the underlying constructions use in our
protocols. We refer the reader to the original work for further discussion.
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6.2.1 Outsourced PFE Setting
Our outsourced PFE setting is modeled closely after the outsourced SMC setting used in the
previous chapters. However, the trust model in the PFE setting requires a more nuanced
approach, and the motivation for why this trust model fits is slightly different from our
previous work. Here we define the parties in our outsourced PFE protocols and the trust
model for each.
Application: We define this party as the application server that is hosting the application
and providing the private function to be evaluated. Our setting assumes that this party
will always provide the function and may or may not provide input and receive output from
the computation. In addition, we assume this party to be semi-honest for all protocols.
Mobile: We define this party (these parties) as one (or more) computationally-restricted
devices that provide input to the application server and may receive some output from
the computation. We develop protocols that are secure in the presence of semi-honest and
malicious mobile devices. While many applications can also model the mobile device as a
semi-honest adversary, it is possible that maintaining the privacy of the evaluated function
from the mobile participant is critical to the application.
Cloud: Our final participant is the Cloud server that assists the mobile device(s) in ex-
ecuting the costly operations in our PFE protocols. Since mobile users may be accessing
variable Cloud infrastructure in any particular application scenario, we seek to develop pro-
tocols that remain secure against any adversary (semi-honest, covert, and malicious).
There are two reasons why we model the function holder as a semi-honest adversary.
First, recent work in the general PFE space has produced protocols to defend against mali-
cious function holders [125]. However, the practicality of such a guarantee is not universally
applicable. If the function holder receives output from the computation, even a protocol
that is secure against a malicious function holder cannot prevent that party from providing
a function that reveals other parties’ inputs.
Second, this setting accurately models a large number of real-world applications. A
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plethora of smartphone applications are built with the architecture of a client running
on the mobile device contacting an application server for information and data processing.
While the user may trust the application to provide useful and correct functionality, he may
wish to limit the application server’s access to his data in the event that the application
server is later compromised. Given these two parties that can be trusted to follow a PFE
protocol, it is reasonable to model the Cloud as the strongest possible adversary while
modeling the application server as semi-honest. This allows the mobile device to use any
publicly available computing infrastructure to assist with the computation, from high-profile
Cloud services to public access library terminals. For these reasons, as the first step in this
space we prioritize security against the Cloud, and add guarantees against other adversaries
as a secondary goal.
6.2.2 Garbling Scheme Definitions
To allow for a general approach to proving security in garbled circuit protocols, Bellare et
al. [16] developed a cryptographic definition for a garbling scheme as well as several notions
of security that are necessary to provide security in SMC protocols. They define a garbling
scheme as a five-tuple G = (Gb,En,De,Ev, ev). Given the description f of a function
that we wish to compute securely, the function ev(f, ·) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m executes f .
Gb(1k, f)→ (F, e, d) is a probabilistic function that takes a function and security parameter
as input and produces a garbled representation F , and the strings e and d which are used to
describe the encode function En(e, ·) and decode function De(d, ·). These functions are used
to encode the input to the garbled circuit, and decode the output after the garbled circuit
has been evaluated. Finally, Ev(F, ·) evaluates the garbled circuit with an encoded input.
Correctness for the scheme is guaranteed by the requirement that for any x ∈ {0, 1}f.n and
(F, e, d) ∈ [Gb(1k, f)], then ev(f, x) = De(d,Ev(F,En(e, x))).
Many practical garbled circuit protocols also require that a garbling scheme have a pro-
jective property. Bellare et al. define this property as follows: if, for all x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}f.n, k ∈
N, and i ∈ [1, ..., n], when (F, e, d) ∈ [Gb(1k, f)], X ′ = En(e, x′), and X = En(e, x), then
X = (X1, ..., Xn) and X
′ = (X ′1, ..., X
′
n) are n vectors, |Xi| = |X ′i|, and Xi = X ′i if x and x′
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have the same ith bit. For our partially-circuit private garbling scheme, all garbling schemes
used must be projective garbling schemes.
In addition, Bellare et al. define a side-information function Φ(f) that defines what
information is revealed about the function f by the garbled representation F . For the
purpose of our protocols, we specify two specific side functions from their work. For a
function f , Φsize(f) = (n,m, q) reveals the size of the circuit as having n input bits, m
output bits, and q gates. If the circuit does not hide any information about the function,
we say that Φcirc(f) = f .
Finally, Bellare et al. develop five different definitions of security for garbled circuits,
providing three distinct guarantees: privacy (when the evaluating party receives output
from the function), obliviousness (when the evaluating party does not receive output),
and authenticity (to ensure that the evaluating party cannot tamper with the results of the
computation). Our protocols require a garbling scheme to provide privacy under the prv.sim
definition of privacy. This game-based definition specifies a game PrvSim that is given a
garbling scheme, an adversary, a side-information function, and a security parameter. The
adversary is allowed a single garbling query for a function f and input x of its choosing.
The adversary is returned the tuple (F,X, d), where this tuple is, with uniform probability,
either prepared according to the real garbling scheme G, or is produced by a simulator
S(1k, y,Φ(f)) that only has access to the output y ← ev(f, x) and the side-information
function Φ(f). A garbling scheme is said to be prv.sim secure over a side information
function Φ(f) if for every polynomial time adversary B, there is a polynomial time simulator
S such that the advantage of the adversary:




6.2.3 PFE with Garbled Circuits
Mohassel and Sadeghian [126] define a framework for general PFE by breaking the protocol
into two generic steps: hiding circuit topology and evaluating a single gate in a private
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manner. Using this framework, they develop a two-party, constant-round protocol for per-
forming both steps using Yao’s garbled circuits. Their construction requires a linear number
of operations with respect to the size of the circuit being evaluated and is secure against
semi-honest adversaries. Their protocol specifies the circuit generator as the party provid-
ing input, while the circuit evaluator provides the circuit to be computed and optionally
an additional input value. To maintain privacy of the circuit topology, their protocol be-
gins with the generating party defining random wire labels for every wire in the circuit.
Then, using a construction termed the oblivious extended permutation (OEP), the evalu-
ating party defines which gate output wires are connected as inputs to subsequent gates
using blinding values to prevent the generating party from learning these mappings. Once
the generating party receives the blinded input wires for each gate, he garbles the gates
and returns the garbled circuit to the evaluator. The evaluator then evaluates the circuit
following Yao’s protocol by applying the blinding value at each gate to recover the correct
output wire value. Rather than developing a special protocol for private gate evaluation,
they simply define all functions using NAND gates, so that the generator cannot infer any
information from the functionality of the gates.
To implement the OEP functionality, they define two constructions. The first uses an
oblivious switching network (OSN) to blind and permute the wire values in an offline/online
protocol. The second construction uses partially homomorphic encryption to allow the eval-
uator to add in blinding values for each input wire while not learning the actual garbled wire
value. We build our protocol on the simpler construction using homomorphic encryption.
As an additional contribution, we define their protocol in Section 6.3 and prove that it is
prv.sim secure in Section 6.4 according to the definition of Bellare et al. [16].
Intuitively, the combination of the OEP functionality and the use of NAND gates pre-
vents the generator from learning anything about the circuit beyond the size and the number
of input and output bits. The use of the homomorphic blinding or OSN prevents the eval-
uator from learning the garbled wire values, which preserves the privacy of the generator’s
inputs based on the guarantees of the garbled circuit construction. However, given a mali-
cious generator, the security of the scheme does not hold. To protect against a malicious or
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covert adversary, a PFE protocol must handle the same malicious scenarios as any garbled
circuit SMC protocol (i.e., ensure that the circuit is garbled consistently and that any oblivi-
ous transfers deliver correct input wire labels). In addition, we must ensure that a malicious
generator cannot learn anything about the function during the partially homomorphic OEP
protocol.
6.2.4 Outsourcing SMC Techniques
To develop an outsourced PFE protocol, we examine techniques from previous outsourced
SMC protocols. However, many of these techniques do not directly apply to the PFE
setting. For example, recent protocol developments have shown that any SMC protocol can
be transformed into an outsourced protocol using black box techniques as in Jakobsen et
al. [89] or our protocol in Chapter 5. These protocols work by adding security checks into
the evaluated circuit itself. In the PFE setting, such a protocol must always assume an
honest function holder. If we hope to improve the security to defend against a malicious
function holder, we cannot rely on black box techniques that provide security checks inside
the private function.
Our approach uses techniques from Kamara et al. [92] and the protocol described in
Chapter 4 to allow the mobile participants to jointly generate the randomness used to
garble the circuit. This randomness is then passed to the Cloud for garbling a set of gates
that can be assembled and checked using a cut-and-choose that is modified for the PFE
setting to ensure the circuit is constructed correctly and that no information about the
function is leaked to the generator. As a secondary contribution, these security checks can
be applied to the original two-party protocol of Mohassel and Sadeghian to provide security
guarantees against a covert or malicious generator.
6.2.5 Security Definition
To capture the added security guarantee of function privacy in the outsourced setting, we
slightly modify the definition for secure outsourced SMC used in Chapter 3. As in our
previous work, we demonstrate security by showing that the real world protocol execution
can be simulated in an ideal setting with a trusted third party. However, rather than
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providing the function as a public parameter to all parties, we allow the simulator controlling
the Application server to include the circuit as a private input to the trusted third party in
the ideal world. By treating the circuit as an input to the computation, the input privacy
captured by the existing SMC definition encompasses the function privacy that we wish to
achieve in our PFE setting.
6.2.6 Notation
Here we define the notation used in the following sections. We describe the circuit hiding
garbling protocol of Mohassel and Sadeghian [126] (which we later refer to as MS13) using a
slight modification on the general notation of Bellare et al. [16] as
G = (GbMS , EnMS , DeMS , EvMS , ev). The function GbMS(1k, f, r) → (F, e, d) uses the
random seed r to output a garbled circuit F using that is composed of two components
(G,B). G is the garbled representation of the circuit, and is delivered to the generator,
while B is a set of blinding values maintained by the evaluator during the OEP protocol.
One critical note for the security of our protocol is that G reveals no information about
the topology of the underlying circuit without possession of B. Finally, we also assume a
projective garbling scheme Gb(1k, f, r) to be a Yao-based circuit garbling technique, with
inputs defined as previously stated.
6.3 Private Function Garbling
For reference, we define the semi-honest PFE scheme developed by Mohassel and
Sadeghian [126] in the generalized garbled circuit notation developed by Bellare et al. [16].
For ease of comparison to our work, we refer to the garbling party as Cloud and the eval-
uating party as Application. In the following section, we provide a new proof that this
garbling scheme satisfies prv.sim security.
Given the functions in Figure 24 and Figure 25, the remaining functions in the garbling
scheme En,De,Ev, ev are trivially realized. En and De simply consist of mapping a real
bit value b to a garbled wire value wb and vice versa. Ev corresponds to the standard
Yao evaluation protocol, with the exception that Application adds the appropriate blind
(based on the permutation vector v′) back to the previous output key before evaluating the
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Common inputs: a computational security parameter k and the side information function
Φsize(C) = (n,m, q) for Application’s private function C. Here, n is the number of input
wires, m is the number of output wires, and q is the number of gates in C.
Private inputs: Application inputs a circuit C that corresponds to her private function.
Cloud inputs a random seed r.
Outputs: Application receives the garbled function G, a vector of blinding values B,
and a vector d that describes the decoding function De(d, ·) that recovers the final output
from the garbled output.
1. Using r to seed a pseudorandom generator, Cloud generates n+q sets of topologically
ordered wire labels w0i , w
1
i , where the indices i ∈ [1, ..., n] correspond to input wires,
i ∈ [n+1, ..., n+ q−m] correspond to gate output wires that are input to other gates,
and i ∈ [n+ q −m+ 1, ..., n+ q], and circuit output wires.
2. Cloud generates a random permutation string v from r where |v| = n + q and
permutes the wire labels as wvii , w
vi
i . He then appends each permutation bit to the
wire label as wvii ||vi, w
vi
i ||vi.
3. Cloud inputs wvii ||vi, w
vi
i ||vi for i ∈ [1, ..., n + q −m] into the CTH(·) functionality,
while Application inputs the circuit C. Cloud receives a vector of blinded input
wires bw0j , bw
1
j for j ∈ [1, ..., 2q] that are topologically ordered input wires for the gates
of C.
4. Given the ordered and blinded gate input wires bw0j , bw
1
j for j ∈ [1, ..., 2q] and the
ordered gate output wires w0i , w
1
i for i ∈ [n + 1, ..., n + q], Cloud garbles each gate
following Yao’s garbling protocol and using the NAND functionality for all gates.
5. Cloud sends the garbled gates G and the hash of the output wire mappings d =
(H(w0i ), H(w
1
i )) for i ∈ [n + q −m + 1, ..., n + q] to Application. The vector of
blinding values B is retained by Application from the CTH(·) functionality.
Figure 24: The private function garbling protocol by Mohassel and Sadeghian
next gate. ev is simply the function f that corresponds to the circuit C.
6.4 Proof of MS13
Here we prove the prv.sim security of Mohassel and Sadeghian’s garbling scheme.
Theorem 1. The scheme GbMS is prv.sim secure over the size-information function Φcirc.
We set an adversary A such that the tuple of garbled circuit, garbled input, and decoding
function (F,X, d) is indistinguishable between the real protocol and a simulated view where
the simulator is given Φcirc(f) and f(x). To do this, we build a simulator S through
the following series of hybrid experiments. We slightly modify the notation of Bellare et
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Private inputs: Application inputs a circuit C that corresponds to her private function.
Cloud inputs a set of permuted wire labels wvii ||vi, w
vi
i ||vi for i ∈ [1, ..., n+ q −m].
Outputs: Application receives a vector of blinding values B and Cloud receives a vector
of blinded input wires bw0j , bw
1
j for j ∈ [1, ..., 2q] that are topologically ordered input wires
for the gates of C.
1. Cloud encrypts each wire label using his public key pk for a semantically secure,





Cloud sends the permuted and encrypted labels to Application.
2. Application generates pairs of random blinding values b0j , b
1
j for j ∈ [1, ..., 2q] to
blind the input labels for each gate. In addition, she generates a second permutation















3. Application then homomorphically adds the blind to the permuted keys by using


























Application then returns the resulting ciphertexts to Cloud in topological ordering.
4. Cloud decrypts the input wire labels, and for the ith gate in topological order,
recovers the correct blinded input wire label by permuting based on the appended
bit, returning the labels to their correct ordering (because, for the bit b, b⊕ (vj ⊕
v′2j−1)⊕ (vj ⊕ v′2j−1) = b).
Figure 25: The CTH(·) functionality by Mohassel and Sadeghian
al. [16] and notate the prv.sim game as PrvSimAMS,Φcirc,S(k,b), where b = 1 denotes the real
protocol and b = 0 denotes the simulated view. Note that for this garbling scheme, the
garbled function F = (G,B), where G is the set of garbled gates and B is the set of blinding
values generated during garbling.








Proof. This follows from the original proof of Yao’s protocol. Since the adversary is only
given a single garbled input X, they can only decrypt a single entry at each garbled gate,
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guaranteed by the semantic security of the underlying encryption scheme. Because they
cannot decrypt any other output wire labels, a real circuit garbling and a fixed output
garbling are indistinguishable.
Hyb2AMS,Φcirc,S(k): This experiment is identical to Hyb1
A
MS,Φcirc,S(k)
except that the experi-




Proof. This follows from the garbling function EnMS(e, ·), which produces a uniformly
random string to represent each garbled input bit. Since the distribution of these strings




Lemma 47. Hyb2AMS,Φcirc,S(k) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. This lemma follows trivially since the real world garbling protocol runs in polynomial
time and each intermediate hybrid adds a constant number of operations.




follows the real world protocol where the hybrid experiment does not differ, garbling the
function f given Φcirc(f) and y = f(x) (with the exception of the output wire modification
in Lemma 45). From Lemma 45-47, S proves Theorem 1.
6.5 Semi-Honest Outsourced PFE
To illustrate our outsourcing techniques in a simplified setting, we first define a protocol for
outsourcing PFE in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. Not only does this protocol
serve as a warm up to stronger security settings, it could also be applied to applications
requiring higher efficiency with less need for strong assurance.
6.5.1 Protocol Overview
At a high level, our outsourcing protocol (described in detail in Figure 26) essentially
splits the role of the circuit generator across all of the mobile devices participating in the
computation. These devices must initiate the computation with a shared secret that will
131
then be used by the Cloud as the randomness to generate the garbled wire values. This
shared secret can be generated using a secure coin flip or a key exchange protocol. Next,
the Cloud and the Application server engage in the MS13 circuit hiding garbling process to
prepare the function for evaluation. Then, since each mobile device possesses the random
seed used to garble the circuit, it can generate the garbled wire labels that correspond to
its input and directly deliver their input to the Application server for evaluation. Finally,
the Application server delivers the garbled output to each party and receives a table to
ungarble her output wires (if she receives any output from the computation). Again, using
the shared random seed, the mobile parties can then generate their own ungarbling table
and recover their output.
Note that unlike other outsourced SMC protocols, this protocol does not achieve any sort
of fairness, as the Application server receives her output before all other parties. However,
fairness can be incorporated into this protocol by having Cloud blind all of the output
values with one-time pads, which it can release simultaneously at the end of the protocol.
6.5.2 Security
The security of our scheme essentially reduces to the underlying PFE scheme. Cloud learns
nothing about the private function based on the topology-hiding property of Mohassel and
Sadeghian’s protocol, while Application learns nothing about any party’s input based
on the privacy of Yao’s garbled circuit protocol. Finally, since Cloud never observes any
Mobile input in any form and receives no output from the circuit, it cannot learn anything
about the inputs to the computation. We provide a complete proof of security in Section 6.6.
6.5.3 Complexity
Our protocol essentially matches the complexity of Mohassel and Sadeghian for the Appli-
cation server and Cloud, with the only computation for the mobile devices being the input
and output preparation and recovery. For the mobile devices input mi and output yi, this
amounts to O(|mi| + |yi|) symmetric key operations. While Mohassel and Sadeghian pro-
vide a more thorough discussion of the complexity of their protocol, it essentially requires
that the Cloud generate O(g) wire values, encrypt these, decrypt the result, and garble the
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Common inputs: a computational security parameter k and the side information function
Φsize(C) = (n,m, q) for Application’s private function C. Here, n is the length of a single
party’s input, m is the length of a single party’s output, and q is the number of gates in C.
All Mobile participants share a common random seed s where |s| = k.
Private inputs: For every i ∈ [2, ..., N ], Mobilei inputs a string mi. Application inputs
a bit string a and a circuit C that evaluates her private function f(a,m2, ...,mN ).
Outputs: Application receives the output y1 and Mobilei receives the output yi for
i ∈ [2, ..., N ].
1. The Mobile devices deliver s to Cloud.
2. Cloud and Application run the interactive protocol GbMS(1
k, C, s)→ (G,B, e, d),
with Cloud as generator using the seed s and Application as the evaluator with
the private circuit C. After the protocol, Cloud receives the garbled circuit G and
Application receives a vector of blinding values B. Cloud delivers the garbled
circuit G to Application along with output decoding function d for Application’s
output wires only.
3. Application and Cloud run k instances of an oblivious transfer protocol (using OT-
extensions). After the protocol, Application receives her garbled input EnMS(e, a).
4. Every Mobile participant delivers his garbled input EnMS(e,mi) to Application.
5. Application runs EvMS([G,B], [EnMS(e, a), EnMS(e,m2), ..., EnMS(e,mN )]) to
evaluate the garbled circuit, producing a vector of output values [Y1, ..., YN ].
6. Application recovers her output as DeMS(d, Y1) = y1. She then delivers the garbled
output wires Yi to the ith Mobile participant for i ∈ [2, ..., N ].
7. The ith Mobile participant recovers his output as DeMS(e, Yi) = yi.
Figure 26: Semi-honest Outsourced PFE Protocol
gates, yielding a complexity of O(g) symmetric key operations and O(g) asymmetric key
encryptions for the additive homomorphic encryption. The Application server must then
generate O(g) blinding values, encrypt these, add them homomorphically to the wire values
sent by the generator, then evaluate the circuit using these blinding values. This yields
O(g) symmetric key operations, O(g) asymmetric key encryptions, and O(g) homomorphic
additions. Finally, using OT extensions, the Cloud and Application server must also per-
form O(k) public key operations to garble the Application server’s input. For a summary
of each party’s complexity, see Table 11.
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Table 11: The computational complexity of our semi-honest outsourced PFE protocol. Note
that HE signifies additively homomorphic encryptions, HA signifies homomorphic addition.
Mobile O(|mi|+ |yi|)
Application server O(g) +O(g HE) +O(g HA) +O(k)
Cloud O(g) +O(g HE) +O(k)
6.6 Semi-honest Protocol Proof
Here we prove the security of our outsourced PFE protocol against semi-honest adversaries
according to the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The outsourced PFE protocol securely and privately computes a circuit C
when the Application server is semi-honest and non-colluding, the Cloud is semi-honest
and non-colluding, and the mobile devices are semi-honest.
6.6.1 Semi-honest Mobile
Here we construct a simulator SM that can simulate the view of a semi-honest Mobile
adversary M∗. Without loss of generality, this party represents any number of colluding
Mobile devices executing the protocol. We construct this simulator through a set of hybrid
experiments.
Hyb1(M)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to REAL(M)(k, x, f ; r) except that the
experiment sends M∗s input m to the trusted third party instead of entering it into the real
world protocol.
Lemma 48. REAL(M)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb1(M)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. Since all parties are behaving semi-honestly, the experiment can send the input it
used to run M∗ to the trusted third party. The trusted party will then return the result
of computation y = f(x) to the experiment, which will be identical to the result output by
the circuit executed in the real world.
Hyb2(M)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb1(M)(k, x, f ; r) except that the ex-
periment uses s, received from M∗ at the beginning of the protocol, to generate the output
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wire labels used in the real world protocol. It then garbles the value y received from the
trusted third party and returns goM∗ to M
∗
Lemma 49. Hyb1(M)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb2(M)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. This hybrid holds since the garbled wire values in the real world protocol are gener-
ated deterministically based on s. In addition, since all parties are semi-honest, the resulting
output y will be identical in both experiments.
Lemma 50. Hyb2(M)(k, x, f ; r) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. This lemma follows trivially since a real world execution of the protocol runs in
polynomial time and each intermediate hybrid adds only constant time operations.
We conclude the proof by letting SM execute Hyb2
(M)(k, x, f ; r), following the real world
protocol where the hybrid experiment does not differ. SM runs M
∗ and controls Cloud
and Application. SM simulates the real world protocol and outputs whatever M
∗ outputs
at the end of the simulation. From Lemma 48-50, SM proves Theorem 2 when the Mobile
parties are semi-honest.
6.6.2 Semi-honest Application
Here we construct a simulator SA that can simulate the view of a semi-honest Application
adversary A∗. We construct this simulator through a set of hybrid experiments.
Hyb1(A)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to REAL(A)(k, x, f ; r) except that the
experiment sends A∗s inputs f(·), x to the trusted third party.
Lemma 51. REAL(A)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb1(A)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. Since A∗ is semi-honest, the experiment invokes the trusted party using the input
function f(·) and the input data x that it provided to A∗ at the start of the experiment.
The value returned by the trusted third party y = f(x) will be identical to the value output
by the circuit evaluated in the real world.
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Hyb2(A)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb1(A)(k, x, f ; r) except that during
the GarbleCTH() execution, the experiment runs the simulator SMS to simulate A
∗s view
of the garbled circuit.
Lemma 52. Hyb1(A)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb2(A)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. Since the experiment knows topologically which gates feed into output wires of the
private function f(·), it can garble those gates to always output the same value y. Based
on Theorem 1, we know that SMS exists and can indistinguishably simulate the view of the
garbling scheme.
Lemma 53. Hyb2(A)(k, x, f ; r) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. This lemma follows trivially since the experiment runs the real world protocol and
the simulator SMS , both of which run in polynomial time.
We conclude the proof by letting SA execute Hyb2
(A)(k, x, f ; r), following the real world
protocol where the hybrid experiment does not differ. SA runs A
∗ and controls Cloud and
Mobile. SA simulates the real world protocol and outputs whatever A
∗ outputs at the end
of the simulation. From Lemma 51-53, SA proves Theorem 2 when the Application party
is semi-honest.
6.6.3 Semi-honest Cloud
Here we construct a simulator SC that can simulate the view of a semi-honest Cloud ad-
versary C∗. We construct this simulator through a set of hybrid experiments.
Hyb1(C)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to REAL(C)(k, x, f ; r) except that the
experiment garbles a random function f ′(·) during the GbMS() invocation instead of the
function f(x) used in the real world invocation, such that Φsize(f
′) = Φsize(f)
Lemma 54. REAL(C)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb1(C)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. Based on the proof of security from Mohassel and Sadeghian [126], a simulator SCTH
exists that can simulate the view of C∗ given only Φsize(f).
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Hyb2(C)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb1(C)(k, x, f ; r) except that during
the oblivious transfer execution, the experiment provides a random input x′ instead of
Application’s real input x.
Lemma 55. Hyb1(C)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb2(C)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. Based on the security guarantees of the OT protocol used, a simulator SOT can
simulate C∗ view of a real protocol invocation using a random input x′.
Lemma 56. Hyb2(C)(k, x, f ; r) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. This lemma follows trivially since the experiment runs the real world protocol with
two polynomial time simulators.
We conclude the proof by letting SC execute Hyb2
(C)(k, x, f ; r), following the real world
protocol where the hybrid experiment does not differ. SC runs C
∗ and controls Applica-
tion and Mobile. SC simulates the real world protocol and outputs whatever C
∗ outputs
at the end of the simulation. From Lemma 54-56, SC proves Theorem 2 when the Cloud
party is semi-honest.
6.7 Covert Server Outsourced PFE
While the semi-honest secure protocol in the previous section provides a foundation for
outsourcing PFE, it does not capture the necessary security guarantees for many realistic
applications. Our original motivation for developing protocols in this setting is to allow
users to participate in secure computation with any available Cloud resource, trusted or
untrusted. Because many Cloud providers wish to maintain a reputation as reliable and
trustworthy, they may not cheat if there is some possibility of being caught. This behavior
is modeled by the covert security model, allowing a balance between efficiency and security
guarantees. To meet this application scenario, we developed an outsourced PFE protocol
that is secure against a covert Cloud server and malicious mobile devices.
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Common inputs: a computational security parameter k, a statistical security parameter λ,
and the side information function Φsize(C) = (n,m, q) for Application’s private function
C. Here, n is the length of a single party’s input, m is the length of a single party’s output,
and q is the number of gates in C. All Mobile participants share a common random seed
s where |s| = k.
Private inputs: For every i ∈ [2, ..., N ], Mobilei inputs a string mi. Application inputs
a bit string a and a circuit C that evaluates her private function f(a,m2, ...,mN ).
Outputs: Application receives the output y1 and Mobilei receives the output yi for
i ∈ [2, ..., N ].
1. The Mobile devices deliver s to Cloud.
2. Cloud ensures that every copy of s received is identical. If any of the values differs,
Cloud aborts. Otherwise, Cloud uses a pseudorandom generator seeded with s to
produce random seeds ri for i ∈ [1, ..., λ].
3. For every i ∈ [1, ..., λ], Cloud and Application run the interactive protocol
GbMS(1
k, C, ri) → (Gi, Bi, ei, di), with Cloud as generator using the seed ri and
Application as the evaluator with the private circuit C. After the protocol, Cloud
receives the garbled circuit Gi and Application receives a vector of blinding values
Bi. Cloud delivers all garbled circuits to Application along with output decoding
functions di for Application’s output wires.
4. For every i ∈ [1, ..., λ], Application and Cloud run k instances of a covert-secure
oblivious transfer protocol (using OT-extensions). After the protocol, Application
receives her garbled input EnMS(ei, a).
5. Application selects a random and uniform index E ∈ [1, ..., λ]. For every i ∈







i) and checks that:
(a) Gi = G
′
i
(b) di = d
′
i
(c) En(ei, a) = En(e
′
i, a)
If any of these checks fails, Application aborts.
6. Every Mobile participant j ∈ [1, ..., N ] delivers his garbled input EnMS(eE ,mj) to
Application.
7. Application runs EvMS(GE , BE , EnMS(eE , a), EnMS(eE ,m2), ..., EnMS(eE ,mN ))
to evaluate the selected evaluation circuit, producing output values [Y1, ..., YN ].
8. Application recovers her output as DeMS(dE , Y1) = y1. She then delivers the gar-
bled output wires Yi to the jth Mobile participant for j ∈ [2, ..., N ].
9. The jth Mobile participant recovers his output as EnMS(dE , Yj) = yj .
Figure 27: Covert Server Outsourced PFE Protocol
138
6.7.1 Protocol Overview
At a high level, our covert secure protocol (Figure 27) replicates the semi-honest garbling
process and adds a cut-and-choose operation to ensure that the Cloud has a low probability
of successfully cheating. Given a statistical security parameter λ, the Cloud and Applica-
tion server execute the garbling procedure λ times. They then execute λ sets of oblivious
transfers to garble the Application server’s input to the computation. After both of these
sets of operations are complete, the Application server selects a single execution circuit, and
for the remaining check circuits, she checks the correctness of both the circuit garbling and
the oblivious transfers. This ensures that the Cloud will be caught with ε = 1λ probability.
Once this procedure is complete, each mobile device delivers his input to the Application
server for the selected execution circuit. The protocol concludes as in the semi-honest pro-
tocol, with the Application server evaluating the circuit and returning the output to each
mobile device.
6.7.2 Security
The security of this protocol against a covert Cloud is essentially achieved through the
addition of a cut-and-choose. While it is possible for Cloud to improperly garble a circuit,
it will be caught with a very high probability. Furthermore, because the Mobile devices
perform so few operations (sending a random seed, garbling their input, and un-garbling
their output), the checks required to prevent malicious behavior are trivially added in.
Finally, while there are several additional operations performed in the cut-and-choose, it
can be clearly observed from the proof of the semi-honest protocol that none of these
operations reveal any additional information to a semi-honest Application. We have
included a complete proof of security in Section 6.8.
6.7.3 Complexity
The complexity of our covert secure protocol essentially multiplies the complexity of the
semi-honest protocol by a factor of λ for both the Application Server and the Cloud. How-
ever, the complexity at the mobile parties is identical to the semi-honest model, since they
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Table 12: The computational complexity of our covert outsourced PFE protocol. Note that
HE signifies additively homomorphic encryptions, HA signifies homomorphic addition.
Mobile O(|mi|+ |yi|)
Application server λ[O(g) +O(g HE) +O(g HA) +O(k)]
Cloud λ[O(g) +O(g HE) +O(k)]
still only garble input and ungarble output for a single circuit execution. These formulae
are summarized in Table 12.
6.8 Covert Protocol Proof
Here we prove the security of our outsourced PFE protocol against a covert Cloud according
to the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The outsourced PFE protocol securely and privately computes a circuit C
with a covert security parameter of ε = 1λ when the Application server is semi-honest and
non-colluding, the Cloud is covert and non-colluding, and the mobile devices are malicious.
6.8.1 Malicious Mobile
Here we construct a simulator SM that can simulate the view and output of a malicious
Mobile adversary M∗. Without loss of generality, this party represents any number of
colluding Mobile devices executing the protocol. We construct this simulator through a
set of hybrid experiments.
Hyb1(M)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to REAL(M)(k, x, f ; r) except that the
experiment terminates if any of the parties controlled by M∗ send an inconsistent seed s to
Cloud.
Lemma 57. REAL(M)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb1(M)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. In the real world protocol, Cloud will terminate upon receiving inconsistent seeds
from any Mobile participant, thus, these two experiments are identical.
Hyb2(M)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb1(M)(k, x, f ; r) except that the ex-
periment uses s to generate the input wire labels and recover M∗s actual input m∗ to the
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computation. If any of the inputs are malformed, the experiment terminates. Otherwise,
the experiment delivers m∗ to the trusted third party and receives y∗ = f(m∗) as a result.
Lemma 58. Hyb1(M)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb2(M)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. In the real world protocol, if any party delivers a malformed garbled input, the circuit
evaluation will fail and the protocol will terminate except with a negligible probability.
Otherwise, the garbled input delivered here will be the input value used in computing the
garbled circuit, so the output will match the ideal world output y∗.
Hyb3(M)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb2(M)(k, x, f ; r) except that the ex-
periment uses s to generate the output wire labels and garbles y∗ before returning the result
to M∗.
Lemma 59. Hyb2(M)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb3(M)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. This hybrid holds since the garbled wire values in the real world protocol are gener-
ated deterministically based on s. In addition, since the arbitrary malicious input m∗ was
recovered and used in the ideal world computation, the output y∗ will match in both the
real and ideal execution.
Lemma 60. Hyb3(M)(k, x, f ; r) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. This lemma follows trivially since a real world execution of the protocol runs in
polynomial time and each intermediate hybrid adds operations that are polynomial with
respect to input and output lengths.
We conclude the proof by letting SM execute Hyb3
(M)(k, x, f ; r), following the real world
protocol where the hybrid experiment does not differ. SM runs M
∗ and controls Cloud
and Application. SM simulates the real world protocol and outputs whatever M
∗ outputs




Here we construct a simulator SC that can simulate the view and output of a covert Cloud
adversary C∗. We construct this simulator through a set of hybrid experiments.
Hyb1(C)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to REAL(C)(k, x, f ; r) except that rather
than garble the private function f(·) during the GarbleCTH() functions, the experiment
garbles a random function f ′(·) such that Φsize(f) = Φsize(f ′).
Lemma 61. REAL(C)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb1(C)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. This lemma follows from the proof of Mohassel and Sadeghian [126], which states
that the view of the adversary C∗ can be simulated indistinguishably by a simulator SCTH .
Even though the garbling party is covert, the output of the oblivious extended permutation
(OEP) is always a set of uniformly random strings based on the blinding values used by the
experiment to hide the circuit topology. Thus, C∗ cannot distinguish between garbling f(·)
and garbling f ′(·).
Hyb2(C)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb1(C)(k, x, f ; r) except that the ex-
periment invokes a simulator SOT with a random input x
′ to simulate C∗s view of the
oblivious transfer.
Lemma 62. Hyb1(C)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb2(C)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. This lemma holds based on the covert security of the OT protocol used. This guar-
antees that a simulator SOT exists and can indistinguishably simulate C
∗s view for any
input value.
Hyb3(C)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb2(C)(k, x, f ; r) except that the ex-
periment uses s, which it generated according to the protocol, to check all of the garbled
circuits sent by C∗ according to the checking procedure in the real protocol. The experiment
does one of three things:
1. If all circuits, output tables, and the result of the OT are consistent and correct, the
experiment continues.
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2. If exactly one circuit is incorrectly garbled (or the output table is malformed, or
the output of the OT for one circuit is incorrectly generated), the experiment sends
cheat to the trusted third party. If the trusted party returns caught, the experiment
terminates. Otherwise, it continues.
3. If more than one circuit is incorrectly garbled (or the output tables are malformed,
or the output of the OT for more than one circuit is incorrectly generated), the
experiment terminates.
Lemma 63. Hyb2(C)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb3(C)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. This hybrid essentially matches the probability of failure during the cut-and-choose
for each scenario:
1. If C∗ runs the protocol correctly, the cut-and-choose will pass and the protocol will
continue.
2. If C∗ corrupts only one circuit (or output table or OT result), there is a 1λ probability
that it will not be caught in the cut-and-choose. This matches the probability that
the trusted third party will not return caught if we assume ε = 1λ .
3. If C∗ corrupts multiple circuits, it will always be caught during the cut-and-choose,
and so the protocol will terminate in both the real and ideal execution.
Lemma 64. Hyb3(C)(k, x, f ; r) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. This lemma follows since a real world execution of the protocol runs in polynomial
time; the simulator SOT runs in polynomial time and is invoked a fixed number of times
with respect to input length; the simulator SCTH runs in polynomial time; and checking an
additional circuit incurs a polynomial addition of operations with respect to circuit size.
We conclude the proof by letting SC execute Hyb3
(C)(k, x, f ; r), following the real world
protocol where the hybrid experiment does not differ. SC runs C
∗ and controls Mobile
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and Application. SC simulates the real world protocol and outputs whatever C
∗ outputs
at the end of the simulation. From Lemma 61-64, SC proves Theorem 3 when the Cloud
is covert.
6.8.3 Semi-honest Application server
The only difference between this protocol and our semi-honest protocol is the addition of
the cut-and-choose, which essentially repeats the semi-honest garbling protocol multiple
times. Thus, simulating the Application server’s view in this protocol reduces easily to the
proof in Section 6.6.
6.9 Partially-Circuit Private Garbling
While the previous protocols provide relatively efficient and secure mechanisms for out-
sourcing PFE, they do not handle an arbitrarily malicious Cloud adversary, which is a
critical requirement for highly sensitive applications. Unfortunately, the techniques used in
current garbled circuit SMC protocols to achieve security against a malicious generator do
not trivially translate to the PFE setting. In particular, many of these protocols assume
that the function being evaluated will contain auxiliary circuits to perform checks of input
consistency and encrypt the output of the circuit to maintain privacy. However, since the
PFE setting allows the function holder to evaluate an arbitrarily chosen function, we can-
not make these structural assumptions. As a result, these techniques can only be directly
applied to PFE protocols where the function holder is always semi-honest.
To allow for development of protocols with stronger security guarantees against the
function holder, we designed a partially-circuit private (PCP) garbling technique that allows
the private function to receive input from some public preprocessing circuit, and output to
another publicly available post-processing circuit. This allows us to incorporate auxiliary
circuit based consistency checks into a PFE scheme while not making any assumptions
about the private function being evaluated.
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6.9.1 Protocol Overview
Our PCP garbling technique (Figure 28) is achieved by requiring the generator to alternate
between different garbling techniques for each section of the circuit, then stitching these
sections together by matching the appropriate garbled wire labels from the output of one
circuit to the input of the next. Essentially, since the number of input and output wires
of the private function are publicly known, they can be correlated to the output wires of
a preprocessing function and the input wires to a post processing function. By simply
garbling these circuits with the same wire labels, a circuit with a private central function
can be generated by combining the MS13 private garbling technique with any Yao-based
garbling technique as long as it has the projective property.
To evaluate the function, the evaluating party simply evaluates the preprocessing func-
tion using a typical garbled circuit evaluation protocol. Once she gets the output wire labels
from this function, she can apply her blinding values used to garble the private function
and continue evaluation according to MS13. Finally, since the output labels of the private
circuit are not blinded, they can be directly input into the post-processing circuit, which is
evaluated and output as in a typical garbled circuit protocol.
6.9.2 Security
To understand the security implications of combining two different garbled circuit primi-
tives, we consider the fact that the wire labels for the private function are generated inde-
pendently from each other as well as the wire labels used in the pre- and post-processing
circuits. Thus, having knowledge of the input and output wires of the private section of the
circuit, which are shared with one of the public circuits, reveals nothing to Cloud about
the topology of the private portion of the computation. Furthermore, during the evaluation
of the circuit, we are guaranteed from both garbling schemes that privacy is maintained
as long as Application only observes one wire label for each wire in the circuit. This
holds for the public circuits, which may use correlated wire labels to achieve free-XOR and
other optimizations, as well as the private circuit, which simply requires the addition of the
correct blinding pad to properly evaluate the circuit. We prove security of this construction
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Common inputs: a computational security parameter k; circuit representations C1 and
C2 of the preprocessing function f1(x1, ..., xn) and post processing function f2(x1, ..., xn);
and the side information function Φsize(C) = (n,m, q) for Application’s private function
C.
Private inputs: For every i ∈ [2, ..., N ], Mobilei inputs a string mi. Application inputs
a circuit Cp that evaluates her private function fp(x1, ..., xn).
Outputs: Application receives a vector of blinding values B and Cloud receives the
garbled representation (G, e, d) of the composite function f2(fp(f1)).
Circuit Garbling
1. Given random seeds s1 and s2, Cloud garbled the pre and post processing circuits
Gb(1k, C1, s1) → (G1, e1, d1) and Gb(1k, C2, s2) → (G2, e2, d2). For each of these
circuits, there is an associated vector of input wire labels IWi and a vector of output
wire labels OWi.
2. Using the random seed rp, Cloud and Application run the modified
GbMS(1
k, Cp, rp, OW1, IW2) → (Gp, Bp, ep, dp). Rather than generating new wire la-
bels for the input and output wires of Gp, the modified garbling algorithm associates
OW1 with the input wires of Gp and IW2 with the output wires of Gp. This sets the
composite functions EnMS(ep, De(d1, Y1)) = Y1 and En(e2, DeMS(dp, Yp)) = Yp to
both be the identity function.
3. Cloud receives the composite garbled circuit (Gc, e1, d2) and Application receives
a vector of blinding values Bp for the private section of the function.
Circuit Evaluation
1. Given the garbled input values [En(e1, xi)] for i ∈ [1, ..., N ] and Gc, Application
evaluates Ev(G1, [En(e1, xi)]) using the chosen garbled circuit evaluation technique.
2. Given the garbled wire values for Ev(G1, [En(e1, xi)]), Application evaluates
EvMS(Gp, Ev(G1, [En(e1, xi)])) using the MS13 evaluation algorithm.
3. Given the garbled wire values for EvMS(Gp, Ev(G1, [En(e1, xi)])), Application con-
cludes by evaluating Ev(G2, EvMS(Gp, Ev(G1, [En(e1, xi)]))) again using the chosen
evaluation algorithm.
Figure 28: Outsourced PCP garbling and evaluation protocols
applied to our malicious secure PFE outsourcing protocol in Section 6.11, but these security
properties can be shown to extend to more general applications as well.
6.9.3 Efficiency Concerns
This protocol for combining private and public circuit garbling adds no overhead to any
of the garbling techniques used. Since it relies only on correctly matching the output wire
labels from the previous circuit to the input wires of the next circuit, each sub-circuit can be
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garbled for the cost of garbling that circuit outside of the combined protocol. In addition,
while the private circuit garbling requires that the wire labels be chosen independently at
random and that all gates be garbled as NAND gates, this same restriction does not apply
to the public portions of the circuit. As our security discussion shows, any of the recently
developed optimizations for Yao circuit garbling can be applied to the preprocessing and
post-processing circuits (e.g., garbled row reduction, free-XOR, etc.)
6.9.4 Additional Applications
While we apply PCP garbling for the specific purpose of protocol security enhancement, our
technique promises applicability for an array of practical computation needs. For a variety
of data mining scenarios, data must be aggregated to preserve privacy before it is processed
by research or advertising agencies. By making the necessary preprocessing a public circuit,
data owners can be assured that their data is properly anonymized before any proprietary
or sensitive analytic functions are applied using the private circuit. To summarize, our
PCP garbling technique is applicable in any PFE application where multiple parties need
assurance that the data is prepared or finalized using specific operations.
6.10 Malicious Server Outsourced PFE
To apply the partially private circuit garbling to our previous PFE outsourcing techniques,
we can now apply the k-probe-resistant input encoding technique and the 2-Universal out-
put hash as implemented by shelat and Shen [151] in our preprocessing function. This
ensures that all parties participating in the computation will know and can verify that the
necessary checks are being performed within the garbled circuit. We present our protocol
and prove security in the presence of a semi-honest Application server that is in posses-
sion of the private function. However, the addition of an aut-secure (defined by Bellare et
al. [16]) garbling scheme and an efficient zero-knowledge circuit commitment would allow
this protocol to be secure even in the presence of a malicious function holder. This is be-
cause whatever arbitrary function is chosen by the Application server to be evaluated, to
prove security the function must be recoverable by the simulator and sent to the trusted
third party to be evaluated in the ideal world. If this function is committed and verified
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to have been executed by the Application server, then the output distributions between
the real world and ideal world will be computationally indistinguishable. Furthermore, the
function holder must not be able to tamper with the output of the garbled circuit, which is
prevented by the aut-secure garbling scheme. While this adversary model appears flawed
in practice when the function holder both defines the function and receives the output of
that function, it provides a useful guarantee when only the mobile parties receive output
from the computation.
6.10.1 Protocol Overview
The malicious secure outsourced PFE protocol (Figure 29) begins by having all mobile
participants commit to their inputs for a set of λ garbled preprocessing circuits, where λ
is a statistical security parameter. Once these values are committed, the generating party
will garble λ copies of the preprocessing function, post processing function, and private
function, using the appropriate garbling protocol for each section. Once the Application
server possesses the garbled circuits and has her input delivered for each via oblivious
transfer, she selects a fraction of the circuits to be opened using cut-and-choose. Once
these circuits are verified, the mobile parties decommit their inputs corresponding to the
remaining evaluation circuits, and the Application server evaluates the remaining unopened
garbled circuits. Finally, the Application server concludes by taking the majority output
value from all of the evaluation circuits and delivering this value to the mobile devices to
conclude the computation.
6.10.2 Security
The primary requirement for achieving malicious security over covert security is in modifying
the cut-and-choose to include multiple evaluation circuits. This modification allows us to
reduce the probability of cheating to a computationally negligible probability. Our cut-and-
choose technique is derived from the two-party garbled circuit protocol developed by shelat
and Shen [150], which gives 2−0.32λ probability of an adversary successfully cheating. Given
our computational security parameter k, we use this bound to set λ = k0.32 .
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Common inputs: a computational security parameter k, a statistical security parameter
λ, a commitment scheme comc(x) with key c and message x, and the side information
function Φsize(C) = (n,m, q) for Application’s private function C. Here, n is the length
of a single party’s input, m is the length of a single party’s output, and q is the number of
gates in C. All Mobile participants share a common random seed s where |s| = k.
Private inputs: For every i ∈ [2, ..., N ], Mobilei inputs a string mi. Application inputs
a bit string a and a circuit C that evaluates her private function f(a,m2, ...,mN ).
Outputs: Application receives the output y1 and Mobilei receives the output yi for
i ∈ [2, ..., N ].
1. The Mobile devices deliver s to Cloud.
2. Cloud ensures that every copy of s received is identical. If any of the values differs,
Cloud aborts. Otherwise, Cloud uses a pseudorandom generator seeded with s to
produce random seeds ri for i ∈ [1, ..., λ].
3. Every Mobile participant generates the same set of seeds ri for i ∈ [1, ..., λ]. The
jth Mobile then generate a one-time pad bj ∈ {0, 1}m for j ∈ [2, ..., N ] to blind his
output from the evaluated circuits. Each then garbles his input using each seed, so
that the jth mobile party produces En(ei,m
j ||bj) for i ∈ [1, ..., λ]. Finally, Mobile
generates commitment keys ci for i ∈ [1, ..., λ] and commits to each garbled input
as comci(En(ei,m
j ||bj)) for i ∈ [1, ..., λ]. Mobile delivers all of his commitments to
Application.
4. Cloud and Application agree on the preprocessing and post-processing func-
tions. These parties jointly establish a 2-Universal hash matrix H ∈ {0, 1}k×n,
and Application generates her k-probe-resistant matrix M. She then defines
an input vector a such that M · a = a. They then define the preprocessing
function f1(a,m
2, ...,mN ) = {M · a,m2, ...,mN} and the output function to be
f2(f(a,m
2, ...,mN )) = {y1, [y2 ⊕ b2,H · m2], ..., [yN ⊕ bN ,H · mN ]}. They set C1
and C2 to be the circuit representations of these functions.
5. For every index [i ∈ 1, ..., λ], Cloud and Application run
GbPCP (1
k, C1, C2, C, ri)→ (Gi, Bi, ei, di).
Figure 29: Malicious Server Outsourced PFE Protocol – Part 1
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6. For every i ∈ [1, ..., λ], Application and Cloud run k instances of a malicious-secure
oblivious transfer protocol (using OT-extensions). After the protocol, Application
receives her garbled input En(ei, a).
7. Application selects a random set of indices [E] ∈ [1, ..., λ] where |[E]| =
2λ
5 . For the indices i ∈ [1, ..., λ] \ [E], Cloud reveals ri. Application runs
GbPCP (1
k, C1, C2, C, ri)→ (G′i, B′i, e′i, d′i) and checks:
(a) Gi = G
′
i
(b) di = d
′
i
(c) En(ei, a) = En(e
′
i, a)
If any of these checks fails for any index i, Application aborts.
8. Every Mobile participant decommits its garbled input by delivering ci for i ∈ [E].
9. Application For every i ∈ [E], Application runs
EvPCP (Gi, Bi, En(ei, a), En(ei,m
2||b2), ..., En(ei,mN ||bN )) = Y1, Y2, ..., YN
10. For all i ∈ [E], Application recoversDe(di, go1) = y1 andDe(di, goj) = yj⊕bj ,H·mj
for all j ∈ [2, ..., N ]. For each j ∈ [2, ..., N ], Application ensures that the hash of the
input H ·mj is the same across every evaluated circuit in [E] and aborts otherwise.
11. Application takes a majority vote from all evaluation circuits i ∈ [E] to determine
the output y1, y2 ⊕ b2, ..., yN ⊕ bN for all parties. If no majority exists, Application
aborts. Otherwise, she delivers yj ⊕ bj to the jth Mobile party.
12. The jth Mobile party recovers his output yj = (yj ⊕ bj)⊕ bj .
Figure 30: Malicious Server Outsourced PFE Protocol – Part 2
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This cut-and-choose technique requires additional verification to ensure that the Mo-
bile participants provide consistent inputs to all evaluation circuits, as well as taking the
majority output from the evaluation circuits to prevent the Cloud from learning anything
about a party’s input based on differing circuit outputs from the evaluation circuits. By
applying our partial PFE garbling technique, we can incorporate existing techniques from
traditional malicious secure garbled circuit protocols to combat these attacks. In particular,
we ensure input consistency using shelat and Shen’s 2-Universal hash construction [151],
output privacy during the majority vote with additional one-time pads, and selective failure
prevention using the k-probe-resistant encoding as implemented by shelat and Shen [151].
However, our protocol could easily be modified to incorporate new consistency checks as
they are developed. We formally prove the security of our construction in Section 6.11.
Recent work in two-party SMC has produced protocols with more efficient cut-and-
choose techniques, such as Lindell’s auxiliary circuit technique [109]. However, applying
this techniques to the outsourced PFE setting remains an open challenge. In particular,
Lindell’s technique of punishing the generator by exposing his outputs to the evaluator
does not translate into a setting where the generator is responsible for other parties’ inputs.
In our setting, Cloud could potentially cheat, which would result in an honest Mobile
party’s input being revealed to Application.
6.10.3 Complexity
This protocol magnifies the complexity of our covert secure protocol with respect to three
parameters: the size of the circuit representations of f1 and f2, as well as the increase in
λ to ensure security against a malicious Cloud (λ = 16 is common in practice for covert
security, with λ = 256 for malicious security under our cut-and-choose parameters.) In this
protocol, Cloud is tasked with garbling λ copies of the private circuit C and both public
functions C1 and C2. Application is then responsible for checking
3λ
5 complete circuits
(preprocessing, private, and postprocessing), as well as evaluating 2λ5 remaining circuits,
according to the optimal cut-and-choose parameters used by shelat and Shen [150]. For a
detailed representation of these operations, see Table 13.
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Table 13: The computational complexity of our malicious outsourced PFE protocol. Note
that HE signifies additively homomorphic encryptions, HA signifies homomorphic addition.
Mobile O(2|mi|+ |yi|)
Application server λ[O(|C1|+ g + |C2|) +O(g HE) +O(g HA) +O(k)]
Cloud λ[O(|C1|+ g + |C2|) +O(g HE) +O(k)]
6.10.4 Black Box PFE Outsourcing
Jakobsen et al. [89], as well as our work in Chapter 5, show that the concept of auxiliary
circuits that we apply here can be extended for efficiently outsourcing SMC protocols in a
completely black-box manner. However, additional research into varied adversary models
and computation techniques is necessary before black-box outsourcing can be applied to
PFE protocols. Our partial PFE garbling technique offers a useful first step in developing
a completely black-box approach to outsourcing PFE. However, it can only be applied
to garbled circuit-based PFE schemes. To achieve security against malicious adversaries
using this generic technique, a two-party PFE protocol using garbled circuits must first
be developed. The only existing PFE protocol that has been demonstrated secure against
malicious adversaries is the secret-sharing based scheme of Mohassel et al. [125]. Our
outsourcing protocol can be reduced to a two-party PFE protocol, but is only secure against
a malicious circuit generator, while the function holder must be semi-honest.
6.11 Malicious Protocol Proof
Here we prove the security of our outsourced PFE protocol against a malicious Cloud
according to the following theorem.
Theorem 4. The outsourced PFE protocol securely and privately computes a circuit C
when the Application server is semi-honest and non-colluding, the Cloud is malicious and
non-colluding, and the mobile devices are malicious.
6.11.1 Malicious Mobile device
Here we construct a simulator SM that can simulate the view and output of a malicious
Mobile adversary M∗. Without loss of generality, this party represents any number of
colluding Mobile devices executing the protocol. We construct this simulator through a
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set of hybrid experiments.
Hyb1(M)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to REAL(M)(k, x, f ; r) except the experi-
ment terminates if any of the parties controlled by M∗ send an inconsistent seed s.
Lemma 65. REAL(M)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb1(M)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. In the real world protocol, Cloud will terminate upon receiving inconsistent seeds
from any Mobile participant, thus, these two experiments are identical.
Hyb2(M)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb1(M)(k, x, f ; r) except that after M∗
decommits his inputs, the experiment uses s to generate the input wire labels and recover
M∗s actual input m∗ to the computation. If any of the decommitted inputs are inconsistent
or malformed, the experiment terminates. Otherwise, the experiment delivers m∗ to the
trusted third party and receives y∗ = f(m∗) as a result.
Lemma 66. Hyb1(M)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb2(M)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. In the real world, if any party delivers inconsistent input, the 2-Universal hash will
reveal the inconsistency with all but negligible probability. In addition, malformed garbled
input will cause the evaluation to fail and the protocol will again terminate except with a
negligible probability. Otherwise, the garbled input delivered here will be the input value
used in the garbled circuit, so the output will match the ideal world output y∗.
Hyb3(M)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb2(M)(k, x, f ; r) except that the ex-
periment uses s to generate the output wire labels and returns the garbled y∗ to M∗.
Lemma 67. Hyb2(M)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb3(M)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. This hybrid holds since the garbled wire values in the real world protocol are gener-
ated deterministically based on s. In addition, since the arbitrary malicious input m∗ was
recovered and used in the ideal world computation, the output y∗ will match in both the
real and ideal execution.
Lemma 68. Hyb3(M)(k, x, f ; r) runs in polynomial time.
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Proof. This lemma follows trivially since a real world execution of the protocol runs in
polynomial time and each intermediate hybrid adds operations that are polynomial with
respect to input and output lengths.
We conclude the proof by letting SM execute Hyb3
(M)(k, x, f ; r), following the real world
protocol where the hybrid experiment does not differ. SM runs M
∗ and controls Cloud
and Application. SM simulates the real world protocol and outputs whatever M
∗ outputs
at the end of the simulation. From Lemma 65-68, SM proves Theorem 4 when the Mobile
parties are malicious.
6.11.2 Malicious Cloud
Here we construct a simulator SC that can simulate the view and output of a malicious
Cloud adversary C∗. We construct this simulator through a set of hybrid experiments.
Hyb1(C)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to REAL(C)(k, x, f ; r) except that rather
than garble the private function f(·) during the GbMS() functions, the experiment garbles
a random function f ′(·) where Φsize(f ′) = Φsize(f).
Lemma 69. REAL(C)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb1(C)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. This lemma follows from the proof of Mohassel and Sadeghian [126], which constructs
a simulator SCTH that can simulate C
∗s view of the real execution given only Φsize(f). The
output of SCTH after the oblivious extended permutation (OEP) is a set of uniformly
random strings based on the blinding values used by the experiment to hide the circuit
topology. Thus, C∗ cannot distinguish between garbling f(·) and garbling f ′(·).
Hyb2(C)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb1(C)(k, x, f ; r) except that the ex-
periment invokes a simulator SOT to simulate C
∗s view of the oblivious transfer.
Lemma 70. Hyb1(C)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb2(C)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. This lemma holds based on the malicious security of the OT protocol used. This
guarantees that a simulator SOT exists, can indistinguishably simulate C
∗s view of a real
execution, and can recover C∗s input to the OT w0i , w
1
i for i ∈ [1, ..., n].
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Hyb3(C)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb2(C)(k, x, f ; r) except that the ex-
periment uses s, which it generated according to the protocol, to check the garbled circuits
sent by C∗. The experiment does one of three things:





i ∈ [1, ..., n] and for j ∈ [1, ..., λ] \ [E] are not consistent and correct, the experiment
terminates.





i ∈ [1, ..., n] and for j ∈ [E] are not consistent and correct, the experiment terminates.
3. Otherwise, the experiment continues.
Lemma 71. Hyb2(C)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb3(C)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. This hybrid essentially matches the probability of failure during the cut-and-choose
for each scenario:
1. If C∗ corrupts a circuit in the check circuits [1, ..., λ] \ [E], the experiment terminates.
2. If C∗ corrupts a majority of the evaluation circuits in [E], the experiment terminates.
Based on the proof by shelat and Shen [150], this happens with negligible probability.
3. Otherwise, execution continues with a majority of evaluation circuits correctly con-
structed.
Lemma 72. Hyb3(C)(k, x, f ; r) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. This lemma follows since a real world execution of the protocol runs in polynomial
time; the simulator SOT runs in polynomial time and is invoked a fixed number of times
with respect to input length; SCTH runs in polynomial time; and checking the additional
circuits incurs a polynomial addition of operations with respect to circuit size.
We conclude the proof by letting SC execute Hyb3
(C)(k, x, f ; r), following the real world
protocol where the hybrid experiment does not differ. SC runs C
∗ and controls Mobile
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and Application. SC simulates the real world protocol and outputs whatever C
∗ outputs
at the end of the simulation. From Lemma 69-72, SC proves Theorem 4 when the Cloud
is malicious.
6.11.3 Semi-honest Application server
Here we construct a simulator SA that can simulate the view of a semi-honest Application
adversary A∗. We construct this simulator through a set of hybrid experiments.
Hyb1(A)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to REAL(A)(k, x, f ; r) except that the
experiment sends A∗s inputs f(·), x to the trusted third party.
Lemma 73. REAL(A)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb1(A)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. Since A∗ is semi-honest, the experiment invokes the trusted party using the input
function f(·) and the input data x that it provided to A∗ at the start of the experiment.
The value returned by the trusted third party y = f(x) will be identical to the value output
by the circuit evaluated in the real world.
Hyb2(A)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb1(A)(k, x, f ; r) except that the ex-
periment commits to a random input m′ rather than the real Mobile input m.
Lemma 74. Hyb1(A)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb2(A)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. Indistinguishability here is based on two properties. First, the hiding commitment
scheme guarantees the commitments are indistinguishable between the ideal and real world.
Second, the 2-Universal hash construction of shelat and Shen [151] guarantees the hashes
that are output by the circuit for consistency checking are indistinguishable for any two
inputs.
Hyb3(A)(k, x, f ; r): This experiment is identical to Hyb2(A)(k, x, f ; r) except that the ex-
periment uses the random coins given to A∗ to determine [E]. During the GbPCP () exe-
cution, for all circuits F ∈ [E], the experiment simulates the view of A∗ using simulators
S1, SMS , S2.
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Lemma 75. Hyb2(A)(k, x, f ; r)
c
≈ Hyb3(A)(k, x, f ; r)
Proof. This follows from the prv.sim security of the preprocessing and post-processing gar-
bling schemes, as well as the prv.sim security of GbMS proven in Theorem 1, all of which
guarantee a simulator S1, SCTH , S2 that can simulate the adversary’s view of a real circuit
and garbled inputs given only Φcirc and y = f2(f(f1(x))).
Lemma 76. Hyb3(A)(k, x, f ; r) runs in polynomial time.
Proof. This lemma follows trivially since the experiment runs the real world protocol and
a set of simulators S1, S2, SCTH that all run in polynomial time.
We conclude the proof by letting SA execute Hyb3
(A)(k, x, f ; r), following the real world
protocol where the hybrid experiment does not differ. SA runs A
∗ and controls Cloud and
Mobile. SA simulates the real world protocol and outputs whatever A
∗ outputs at the end
of the simulation. From Lemma 73-76, SA proves Theorem 4 when the Application party
is semi-honest.
6.12 Conclusion
The outsourced SMC model developed in the previous chapters has shown that SMC proto-
cols can be efficiently applied to the mobile platform for a variety of applications. However,
SMC outsourcing protocols require that the function being evaluated be public to all par-
ticipants, which prohibits their use in a variety of government and commercial applications.
This chapter develops the first efficient outsourced PFE protocols that allow for private
applications to be evaluated securely using mobile input sources. By combining existing
outsourcing techniques with a novel partially-circuit private garbling technique, we show
that security can be maintained against malicious mobile devices and covert or malicious
Cloud providers. These protocols allow for a range of new, real-world mobile applications
that could not be securely executed using previous outsourcing protocols.
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CHAPTER VII
FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
7.1 Future Work
While this work has demonstrated significant progress towards practical mobile SMC, there
are still a variety of open problems that promise to produce improvements in outsourcing
techniques and SMC protocols in general.
7.1.1 Practically Motivated Applications
As new SMC techniques are continually being developed, a hotly debated topic in the
research community is how to move these prototype techniques into production use. While
many compelling privacy-preserving example applications have been proposed, many of
these applications lack the financial incentive for industry to further develop them into a
live application. For example, maintaining privacy of location queries and search terms
from a large provider like Google is a good application for the user. However, it removes
Google’s ability to monetize this information in the form of advertising, negating their
financial motivation to actually implement the application.
To solve this problem, future research should focus on identifying applications that
provide mutual benefit for all parties involved in the computation. For example, legal
restrictions on medical record privacy is making the transition to cloud-based record stor-
age costly and slow [138]. In addition, as medical professionals begin using smartphones
and tablets to access these records, SMC offers a compromise that allows medical profes-
sionals the convenience of access they require while still maintaining the legally required
privacy protection. As a second example, biometric authentication presents unique poten-
tial for easy to use authentication, but presents significant problems with revocation. In
this setting, added privacy protection is necessary to prevent the leakage and invalidation
of biometric credentials. While academic research may continue to make progress towards
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more efficient SMC constructions, we cannot address the practical issues associated with at-
scale implementation until a strongly motivated practical application is put into production
use.
7.1.2 Optimal Combination Protocols
After identifying potential real-world applications for SMC protocols, the research commu-
nity will have the opportunity to improve SMC performance by optimizing protocols that
meet the specific needs of these practically motivated applications. As recent work has
shown, combining SMC protocols can lead to significantly improved overall performance
depending on the underlying function being evaluated [77, 54]. However, to maximize these
performance gains, these combination SMC protocols must be tailored towards specific
functions. These custom optimizations for real-world applications may provide the last
necessary improvements to move SMC from an experimentally feasible construction to a
practically deployed industrial tool.
7.2 Conclusion
As mobile computing continues to become more commonplace, privacy-preserving compu-
tation techniques are necessary to allow users to take advantage of mobile applications
without the threat of their private information being exposed. While SMC protocols pro-
vide us with tools for such privacy-preserving computation on the desktop platform, these
protocols too resource-intensive for the computational, power, and bandwidth limitations
inherent to the mobile platform. In this dissertation, we have developed a wide range of
techniques for outsourcing the most costly operations of SMC protocols to an untrusted
Cloud provider, and have shown that these techniques can be applied in practice to many
real-world applications. Our first two protocols demonstrate that outsourcing garbled cir-
cuit computation can achieve significant increases in the efficiency of SMC executed from a
mobile device, and provided foundational techniques for future developments in outsourcing
protocols. Our black box construction provides a forward compatible technique for turn-
ing any two-party SMC protocol into an outsourced protocol. This generic construction
will continue to be applicable as new SMC protocols are developed in the future. Finally,
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our outsourced PFE protocols establish a set of protocols that provide a range of secu-
rity guarantees, allowing for application-specific tradeoffs between security and efficiency.
Furthermore, these protocols provide the strongest security against the third party Cloud
provider, preventing it from learning anything about the computation beyond the circuit
size. As a whole, this body of work has moved the state of the art in mobile SMC from
completely infeasible to near-practical, and promises to allow for deployable SMC protocols
as new techniques continue to be developed.
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